The United States is a world superpower subsidized through numerous military sites around the world. By the end of this decade, China could have its own booming network.
U. S. military doctrine begins in peacetime with a sustained or alternating presence at strategic locations outside the continental United States: airfields, seaports, and camps, as well as weapons depots, administrative offices, and educational complexes. habitation: in allied, friendly or impartial territory.
This global stance has been maintained for decades in the call to protect the national interest, and the wonderful brand of force will most likely be reproduced through China, in whole or in part, as its own economic and security interests are growing.
American soldiers, sailors and airmen operate from bases that involve multiple sites, but not each and every site constitutes a military base. Unclassified documents, such as the Pentagon’s annual base design report, also record ownership of recreational areas, adding parks and golf courses.
The only official consultant to U. S. amenities around the global is published at the finish of fiscal year through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Facilities, and Environment, which oversees all army sites used through the U. S. Department of Defense.
Newsweek’s interactive map shows in blue the closest city or locality to separately indexed military sites outside the United States or U. S. territory. The U. S. Department of Commerce, as well as the service branch that uses it. Chinese sites are shown in red and likely sites in pink.
U. S. military sites located in key regional centers such as Hawaii or Guam, the westernmost point of the United States, were not included in the presence map. Similarly, China’s militarized synthetic islands in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos in the South China Sea were excluded.
As of September 2023, more than 40 countries and territories were home to U. S. sites larger than 10 acres or valued at more than $10 million. Together, they accounted for less than 10 percent of the Pentagon’s total stock of 4,800 sites, on just about 26. 8 million acres of land, valued at about $2. 2 trillion.
Among the sites are decommissioned facilities that are still under U. S. jurisdiction or awaiting disposal. In an example likely to supersede the following calculation, the U. S. military this week handed over a U. S. -built air base to Niger’s ruling junta, giving U. S. troops until mid-September to leave Agadez.
The Pentagon’s database is detailed, though not exhaustive, and lacks clandestine sites used by more than a dozen military intelligence agencies, as well as access granted under visiting forces agreements, a non-permanent counterpart to signed status agreements. between Washington and the treaty. allies such as Tokyo.
One such agreement is the United States-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, under which visiting U. S. forces can build and operate nine Philippine-owned military bases in the archipelago, adding to hotspots such as the Taiwan Strait.
A year ago, Papua New Guinea awarded the United States six airports and seaports as part of a historic security deal in the South Pacific, a region that has seen the geopolitical fest between Washington and Beijing intensify.
A July report by the Congressional Research Service estimates that the United States Department of Defense uses at least 128 bases in at least 51 other countries, with estimated costs ranging from $30 billion to $50 billion a year.
Quarterly statistics from the United States Defense Manpower Data Center in March showed 54,774 military workers on active duty in Japan, 35,068 in Germany, 24,234 in South Korea and 12,375 in Italy, with a total of 169,117 infantrymen deployed overseas, adding U. S. embassies and consulates Unidos. world.
It has long been observed that the forward presence’s role as a U. S. projection force achieves the dual objectives of deterring adversaries and reassuring allies, but this strategy carries significant political dangers and demands intense diplomacy.
Host countries retain ultimate sovereignty over their territory and, as was the case in Niger, can limit or revoke United States access at any time, including after a government replacement. And in the event of an eventuality, defense planners would arguably not be guaranteed full use of military sites as staging spaces due to potential public opposition.
China’s pursuit of bases and access will face similar challenges, according to US defense and intelligence assessments. But the dangers associated with site variety can be mitigated.
A December 2022 study by the Rand Corp. think tank. it ranked more than a hundred potential applicants according to their desirability and feasibility and found that Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan had the highest odds of meeting Beijing’s demands.
The four neighbors participated in the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s ambitious plan to expand his country’s economic footprint in land and sea connections. According to Rand’s authors, economic security and the legitimacy of the internal regime are the main points that have led the Chinese army to inevitably move away from their shores.
People’s Liberation Army Navy task forces have been carrying out non-stop anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. Since 2017, Chinese military escorts have been reinforced through a logistics base in the port of Doraleh, Djibouti.
“The creation of the base in Djibouti is a joint resolution of the two countries. The final touch and commissioning of the base will help China better fulfill its external obligations, such as escorting the Gulf of Aden and coastal waters as well as humanitarian aid operations,” Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, D. C. , told Newsweek.
“It will also herald Djibouti’s economic and social progress and China will make new contributions to safeguarding peace and stability in Africa and the world,” he said.
The only publicly identified Chinese base is 3 miles west of Camp Lemonnier – the only permanent US military base in Africa – and about a half-dozen other installations pass by US allies at this critical shipping node.
Last fall, the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military strength said the Djibouti facilities “are most likely capable of hosting the PLA Navy’s aircraft carriers, other giant fighters, and submarines. “
“Beyond the PLA base in Djibouti, the [People’s Republic of China] is probably already contemplating and making plans to expand the army’s logistical facilities for the projection of naval, air, and ground forces,” the report says.
“If realized, a global logistics network of the PLA military could disrupt U. S. military operations as the People’s Republic of China’s global military objectives evolve,” the Pentagon said, noting the presence of Chinese military instructors in the Solomon Islands, Congo and Tanzania.
Liu, a spokesman for the embassy, said China’s security cooperation is carried out “on the basis of equality and gaining mutual advantages with other countries. “
“The United States operates more than 800 military bases around the world and has long been the world’s biggest fear. The last thing it does is judge other countries,” Liu said.
The United States Department of Defense responded to requests for comment.
In March, an unclassified report released through the Office of the Director of National Intelligence indicated that the Chinese government “is considering deploying military facilities in several locations,” adding Cuba and the United Arab Emirates, longtime spouses of the United States. United in the fight against terrorism.
Last month, an investigation by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, concluded that China likely operated secret listening stations at 4 sites in Cuba, adding 3 near the capital Havana and one near Santiago de Cuba. 65 kilometers west of Cuba. US naval base in Guantanamo Bay.
Closer to home, Chinese naval ships have docked at Cambodia’s newly renovated Ream Naval Base for more than six months, satellite imagery showed this summer, but Beijing and Phnom Penh have objected to the description as an established Chinese base.
“China’s search for bases is a natural evolution in its purpose of forming a superpower, a concept that is not new and has been perfectly summarized in Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, The Influence of Sea Power on History: 1660-1783, which profoundly influences its naval doctrine,” said Bryce Barros, a former Washington-based congressional foreign policy adviser. Anno Domini.
“For now, the United States does not deserve to worry about the number of Chinese bases abroad, which is insignificant compared to the number of Chinese bases in the United States. However, the United States will have to continue to engage its partners and allies. Chinese plans at the Ream Naval Base, which China could use in the event of an emergency in the South China Sea,” Barros told Newsweek.
In June, Rand’s analysis of Chinese military writings found that “the PLA has neither the goal nor the ability to use Chinese military bases to conduct preemptive moves or other offensive operations opposed to U. S. forces or interests in a long-term clash between the United States and China. “and China until at least 2030. “”.
Chinese overseas bases may simply be non-combatant evacuation operations, sea route patrols, and “non-kinetic” missions opposed to U. S. activities, the authors say (in military parlance it refers to intelligence gathering or cyberattacks).
“However, a network of bases may simply pose indirect security considerations for the United States by complicating U. S. defense plans. “In highly dubious and conflict-prone countries, the U. S. is most likely to grant the People’s Republic of China access or permission to build on a large scale. permanent bases,” the report says.
John Feng is the Asia editor of Newsweek, founded in Taichung, Taiwan. It focuses on East Asian politics. He covered foreign policy and defense issues, specifically those similar to United States-China relations and between China and Taiwan. John joined Newsweek in 2020 after reporting from Central Europe and the United Kingdom. He is a graduate of National Chengchi University in Taipei and SOAS, University of London. Languages: English and Chinese.
You can contact John by emailing j. feng@newsweek. com.
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