On January 23, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan harshly criticized Sweden, whose NATO bid was blocked through Ankara, saying the country deserves not to expect goodwill from Turkey as long as it does not “show respect for the devout ideals of Muslims. “the Turkish people,” allows the Koran to be burned and allows “terrorist organizations to go mad. “On January 21, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar canceled the planned stopover on his Swedish counterpart, Pal Jonson, on January 27. “meaningless” after “ugly actions” in Sweden, Akar said.
He was referring to earlier occasions in January, when left-wing activists from the Swedish Rojava Committee hung an effigy of Erdogan outdoors in the city hall of Stockholm, the Swedish capital. Then, on January 21, the Swedish government allowed a far-right activist party to level a protest outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, where they burned a copy of the Koran. Meanwhile, on the same day, left-wing activists leveled a demonstration against Turkey’s and Sweden’s candidacy for the NATO club and spoke out for the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey. The protesters, who carried PKK flags, unfurled a banner reading: “We are all from the PKK. “
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization across the European Union and countries such as the United States and Sweden. However, Sweden has been a sanctuary for the PKK, and its cause has been supported by leading Swedish politicians. Before introducing Sweden’s defense minister, Peter Hultqvist, who left last October following national elections, he participated in an “anniversary celebration” of the PKK in 2011.
On January 23, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan harshly criticized Sweden, whose NATO bid was blocked through Ankara, saying the country deserves not to expect goodwill from Turkey as long as it does not “show respect for the devout ideals of Muslims. “the Turkish people,” allows the Koran to be burned and allows “terrorist organizations to go mad. “On January 21, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar canceled the planned stopover on his Swedish counterpart, Pal Jonson, on January 27. “meaningless” after “ugly actions” in Sweden, Akar said.
He was referring to previous occasions in January, when left-wing activists from the Swedish Rojava Committee hung an effigy of Erdogan outdoors in the hallway of the city of Stockholm, the Swedish capital. Then, on January 21, the Swedish government allowed a far-right activist party to level a protest in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, where it burned a copy of the Koran. Meanwhile, on the same day, left-wing activists leveled a demonstration against Turkey and Sweden’s candidacy for the NATO club and voiced the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey. The protesters, carrying PKK flags, unfurled a banner that read: “We are all from the PKK. “
The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization across the European Union and countries such as the United States and Sweden. However, Sweden has been a sanctuary for the PKK, and its cause has been supported by leading Swedish politicians. Before introducing Sweden’s defense minister, Peter Hultqvist, who left last October following national elections, he participated in an “anniversary celebration” of the PKK in 2011.
It’s not what Sweden says or does, but what the U. S. says. The U. S. does or does not do in Syria that affects Turkey’s national security interests.
Several other Swedish politicians, generally, but not only left-wing, also participated in public events organized by PKK supporters. Sweden’s previous Social Democratic government presented policies and money to Kurdish PKK-related teams in northern Syria: the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG).
To join NATO, Sweden pledged to sever those ties and amend its legislation to outlaw PKK activities on its soil. Indeed, Sweden’s new conservative government rushed to gain Turkey’s trust. He has publicly distanced himself from the PYD and YPG. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson condemned the hanging of Erdogan’s effigy as an “act of sabotage” opposed to the Swedish NATO offer. He also said burning the Koran was, while legal, “deeply disrespectful. “
However, as Erdogan makes clear, no Turkish government will ask the Turkish parliament to ratify Sweden’s NATO club as long as anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim sentiments prevail in Sweden. While the Swedish government has fulfilled its promises to Turkey in the tripartite agreement that Sweden, Finland and Turkey signed at the NATO summit in Madrid last June, it will now have to convince the Swedish public that meeting Turkey’s demands does not amount to capitulating to “fascism. “as leftists and liberals protest in Sweden, and curb the rise of anti-Turkish opinion.
However, this will not be easy, as other Western countries, especially the United States, remain linked to Kurdish militants with whom Sweden has severed ties. According to Turkey, the continuation of the United States for the PYD and the YPG undermines the argument: what the Swedish government will have to do – that Sweden, through the assembly of Turkey’s demands, join other Western democracies in a united front against terrorism.
Turkey had to have challenges with Sweden and its pro-Kurdish stance and chose Sweden (not Finland, with which Turkey has no challenge and would ratify if it continued with the NATO procedure without Sweden) because of its long-standing commitment to the Kurds. But the U. S. continues for the Kurds in Syria which is Turkey’s main concern.
The fact that Sweden and Finland are the first Western nations to say that Kurdish teams that have carved out autonomous territory in northern Syria are connected to the PKK and pose a risk to Turkey’s security represents a diplomatic gain for Ankara. But that was never the case. It will be enough for the question Turquie. La it is not what Sweden says or does, but what the US does or does not do. The U. S. military presence in Syria affects Turkey’s national security interests, and who will have its position on NATO expansion to the north than the U. S. government. You are pressing.
The U. S. is arming and investing Kurdish PKK-linked militants in Syria who have fought the Islamic State. Their good fortune opposing the Islamic State at a time when Turkey was doing little to combat the terrorist organization is one explanation for why the U. S. government is counting on them. However, what represents an asset to U. S. national security is not enough. UU. es anything Turkey sees as an existential threat. The creation of a small Kurdish state adjacent to its long border with Syria has alerted Ankara’s security bureaucracy to the threat that Turkey may simply lose control. from their own Kurdish region. Aid for the tiny Kurdish state has undermined Turkey’s acceptance as true in the United States, which many Turks have come to notice as a hostile power. It was partly in reaction to this perceived American hostility that Turkey developed its ties with Russia. as a defensive measure.
Turkish democracy has also suffered. In 2015, Erdogan cancelled the peace deal the Turkish government had reached with the Kurdish motion after two years of negotiations. Faced with the risk of an emboldened, US-backed PKK in Syria, Erdogan chose to adopt the policy the army had demanded and aligned. with the far-right nationalists.
Washington is considering it to maintain the alliance with Kurdish teams in Syria. This alliance provides the U. S. military with the ability toa territorial foothold in Syria, a forward base that can prove useful in a long-term confrontation with Iran. For this reason, it is unlikely that the United States will move and settle for Turkey.
Biden’s management can bet that Turkey will be influenced by the sale of much-needed F-16 fighter jets to its air force. However, the sale assembly is not only strong resistance in the U. S. Congress. But its realization would save the U. S. as much as possible. US-Turkish dating back to the collapse. On the one hand, being able to buy the soon-to-be-obsolete F-16 would not compensate for Turkey’s expulsion from the allocation of the F-35 fighter jet after its mistaken acquisition of Russia’s S-400 missile system. .
Biden’s management would possibly also consider the idea that he will pressure Turkey or convince it to settle for Sweden and Finland in NATO after Turkey’s presidential election in May. She can expect Erdogan, if re-elected, to give in because he will no longer want to vigorously oppose the United States for electoral purposes or, if he loses, that a new Turkish president will be willing to repair relations with Washington and bid for America.
However, this is too positive a view. It is a mistake to underestimate Turkey’s determination to seize this opportunity to neutralize what it considers the greatest risk to its national security: the PKK and Kurdish teams connected to the PKK. It would also be a mistake to perceive Turkey’s position as reflecting the long-term strategic interests of the Turkish state, which is a broad, non-partisan view unrelated to electoral concerns. It will therefore be affected, in one way or another, by the final results of the upcoming presidential election.
Which represents an asset to U. S. national security. UU. es that Turkey sees it as an existential threat.
Alternatively, the U. S. The U. S. may choose to play with Turkey, promoting the prospect of a shift in U. S. policy. The U. S. government is targeting the Syrian Kurds without the goal of fulfilling such a commitment. This worked in 1980, when the U. S. returned to NATO’s built-in army design (which it had left in 1974). Then NATO’s supreme allied commander, US General Bernard Rogers, gave the head of the Turkish army junta, General Ahmet Kenan Evren, his word that the Turkish army’s considerations in the Aegean Sea would be taken into account, a promise that was temporarily ignored by the socialist government that came to power in Greece in 1981. who refused to comply with the agreement. Turkey will not repeat this mistake, Erdogan trusted voters.
Turkey will continue to veto the Sweden club (the Finland club is blocked for the time being only because the request was made jointly) until its main fear has been addressed, and pro-Kurdish left and right anti-Muslim activists in Sweden will continue to provide Turkey with excuses to do so. But Erdogan’s outrage over those incidents is a spectacle of appearance.
Quite simply, in order for Sweden to join NATO, the U. S. is not allowed to join NATO. The US will have to prevent investment and weaponry of the PYD and YPG in Syria.
Unfortunately for Washington, U. S. strategic interests are not in the U. S. in Northern Europe and the Middle East they cannot be reconciled. Washington will have to make a decision on which issues are more important: the survival of the small Syrian Kurdish state connected to the PKK or a strengthened NATO with Sweden as a member. Biden’s management will have to recognize that it is America’s denial of Turkey’s valid security interests that jeopardizes NATO’s unity and strength.
But the Turkish government will have to recognize that the United States also faces strategic risk and be prepared to help address it. For Washington to reconsider its bet on the PYD and YPG, Turkey will have to show that it is willing to work with the United States to counter Iranian risk.
Unfortunately, U. S. policy is not enough. The U. S. toward Turkey is tinged with non-public antipathies toward its president, who has put such a commitment out of reach. However, U. S. strategic interests are not yet important. The U. S. and Turkey coincide to a much greater extent than appearances suggest. be fully accepted as the West’s best friend if NATO wants to remain strong and united from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
Halil Karaveli is a senior fellow of the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute
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