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Justin Sherman
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On February 24, 2020, Air Force One landed in Gujarat, India, the birthplace and home of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the start of the Trump administration’s two-day scale with India’s political and economic elite. collection of music, dancers and more than 100,000 Indian citizens crowded at the Motera cricket stadium who applauded Donald Trump and Modi’s speeches on a glass stage. “Namaste, ” said Trump a howl of applause.
At the heart of the schedule for the “5G security” scale, a coded reference to Chinese telecommunications company Huawei and Washington’s insistence that its allies and partners exclude their apparatus from 5G networks. Officials had spent months trying to influence other nations, without success. India was no exception: in December 2019, India’s telecommunications minister told reporters that Huawei could participate in the country’s 5G tests.
American officials were determined to replace that reality. At the Roosevelt House in New Delhi, the U. S. ambassador’s golden pillar apartment, the Trump administration brought together combined force moguls, generation executives and other force agents for a roundtable discussion. He raised his head as Mukesh Ambani, India’s richest businessman, stood up and touted the exclusion of his company from Huawei equipment. “That’s good,” Trump responded. Good. “
Surprisingly, however, 5G barely discussed more in the hours of discussion that followed. For all the behind-the-scenes meetings and public charades of unity, a MAGA-style meeting, Modi and Trump hugging, Indian and American flags intertwined, there was no consensus. Despite the Trump administration’s rhetoric about the spread of China’s virtual repression, the Washington crusade has continued to fail, and Chinese telecommunications that U. S. officials see as a serious threat have continued to take root in India’s virtual infrastructure.
What happened in India is not just the result of a political attitude, it is the product of a much deeper problem: the lack of publicity of internet freedom during President Trump’s administration. the current administration, the United States is doing very little about it.
That wasn’t the case. The Bush and Obama administrations have promoted and defended online freedom in a vision of global Internet access, albeit with their own setbacks and calculation errors. Even with the slow decline in investment and concentration in international relations in the United States, many diplomats around the world have spent countless hours helping small countries develop their police capacity against cybercrime, openly condemning internet repression in authoritarian countries; and combat Internet regulatory proposals in Russia and China. at the United Nations, many of these efforts have eroded.
The Trump administration has emptied important diplomatic bodies, from USAID’s investment to the State Department’s cyber work, creating a leadership vacuum, a vacuum that authoritarian governments are trying to fill. news sites on the Internet are blocked; national political bloggers are imprisoned; The content policies of social media companies are being implemented. Dictators increasingly define the long-term Internet, undermining its form that was once global and open to the virtual across the state, along with harsh offline coertion.
The growing repression of the Internet, coupled with the publicized misdeeds of a largely unregulated US generation sector, calls for a revitalization of American leadership for global Internet freedom. Such a purpose has many things to do: to reconsider how politics and generation collide. in the online fashion area to consider how U. S. corporations can help or interact in the same types of abuses that damage discourse and organization on and over the Internet. At a basic level, the United States wants diplomats to advertise those systems, so it’s more vital than ever, adding with the uncertainty of the November election , for the United States to reinvest in virtual international relations before it is too late.
Around 2006, R. David Edelman began asking, “If one country closes the Internet of another country, is it an act of war?”
When he asked at Oxford, while he was listening to foreign affairs, not all of his teachers were receptive. One of them, he said, “an eminent historian of World War I, disarmed me and said, “Boy, know this: there is nothing new under the sun in the war. “So take your talents and apply them to something more practical. “
Edelman eventually wrote his thesis on restricting the use of cyberattacks across the state. Although many rejected it, the Internet temporarily meddled in politics. Facebook and Google, global Internet connectivity, hacking unions, state-developed army cyber units, all booming. An episode cited in 2007, the Estonian government moved a debatable Soviet World War II monument to the country’s capital, Tallinn, causing Russian virtual attacks on banks’ websites, ministries, newspapers, etc. Estonia
“I was only interested in those problems in the abstract,” Edelman says, “and they have something genuine and concrete in front of me over the years. That’s exactly how he ended up at the State Department in 2008 when he started running like A Cyber. He then served as the first Director of International Cyber Policy on the National Security Council from 2010 to 2012, and now teaches at MIT. Initially, Edelman and the State Department focused on genuine “cyber-diplomacy. “
Day by day, the conduct of virtual international relations an aggregate of activities: Distilling Internet policy for busy diplomats with many other pieces on the most sensitive agenda. Convene bilateral and multilateral meetings on technological challenges, as well as on the sidelines of global summits. Work at the many U. S. agencies with skin in the game to write a basic policy.
For the most part, says Edelman, they have spent their time “clarifying what the United States represents” in foreign cyberspace. They did so with a varied set of tools: asking other countries questions about cybersecurity, promoting online freedom dialogues, explaining U. S. policy and intentionally making an investment in relationships.
Shortly after Edelman left for the White House National Security Council in 2010, the State Department turned generation problems into the express of a new diplomatic office.
The review of cyberspace policy at the beginning of Obama’s management included “a tip that we accentuate our game diplomatically,” says Chris Painter, who participated in the review and who, based on this directive, created the Office of the State Department Coordinator. for cyberspace disorders in 2011. This review also stimized the creation of the US government’s first foreign cyberspace strategy. At the White House.
It was not a quiet time for global technological problems. In 2011, the Egyptian government closed the Internet amid protests for democracy; In 2013, Edward Snowden’s leaks provoked a public out-of-the-box protest over surveillance systems and forced U. S. officials to attack virtual espionage systems in their diplomatic messages. protest and oppression of surveillance and industry — would be even more appalling.
“My workplace tried to analyze all those challenges quite broadly because we knew they weren’t compartmentalized,” says Painter, now president of the nonprofit Global Forum on Cyber Expertise Foundation. “The most important thing was to point out that it wasn’t just this technical challenge that other people saw as, this kind of trade challenge, but a real foreign policy challenge, that you don’t need to be an encoder to understand. “Painter noted that the Obama administration’s paintings on the theft of industry secrets over the Internet, discussed in a 2015 agreement with the Chinese government, was emblematic of this strategy.
Painter’s portfolio included a commitment through the U. S. diplomatic apparatus, from the State Department to the White House, from human rights to the fight against terrorism. By extending Washington’s global Internet success and focus on virtual issues, embassies continue to move forward. Prominent diplomats abroad can interact with local officials in capacity building, such as assisting in the fight against cybercrime at the national level or coordinating Internet freedom projects with partners in the UK, Japan, Brazil and South Africa.
However, the progression and promotion of policies also meant communicating with the nations it refers to as adversaries. The Obama administration’s many technological dialogues with Russia, for example, “were born of a decades-long strategic vocabulary” that opposing countries had developed “to communicate difficult things that can lead, if left untreated, to very bad situations. “As Edelman says. During a stopover in Moscow, says Edelman, a Russian defense officer approached himself and his colleagues with”really, I would say, outrageous “The misunderstandings of an American political document were squeezed in his fists. The presence of experts in the courtroom provided an opportunity for the US delegation to continue to have a strong opportunity. The U. S. will explain the wording and face possible misconceptions.
None of these verbal exchanges were based on mutual trust, Edelman says; however, the verbal exchange with the leader of the Russian defense is emblematic of “one of probably a thousand actions,” he says, “which helped clarify the undergrowth of this challenge as it unfolded, so that we can in turn focus on the most vital challenges that can create dramatic and serious instability between the United States and Russia.
Yet diplomatic paintings on demanding Internet situations, issues with genuine effects on politics, economics and security, from online censorship to the theft of industry secrets on the Internet, have marked a growing popularity through government of its importance. . While Edelman was in the White House, “these disorders were very much on the calendar of the Committee of Deputies [of the National Security Council]. “Far from inevitable, it was an intentional reinforcement of global paintings about Internet disorders, because the Internet in other parts of the world was increasingly different from that of the United States.
Masih Alinejad was born in 1976 in the small village of Ghomikola in northern Iran, she and her five siblings were born at home, she said, because the circle of relatives could not pass her mother to the hospital. His space had two bedrooms, with no bathrooms or interior showers. “I didn’t know we were deficient until I became a teenager and went to Babol, the nearest city, to high school,” she says.
A politically active teenager, Alinejad has already been imprisoned and questioned for generating state-critical pamphlets with several other students (the government subsequently suspended the sentence). When he discovered a vocation in journalism, press articles for reformist newspapers on issues such as the regime’s corruption temporarily followed a reaction from the Iranian government. As recounted in his memoirs The Wind in My Hair, I was on a project in 2009 when it became transparent that I might not return. intensifying, along with the pro-democracy citizen organization, in a recognizable way through many around the world.
Shortly after his departure, he said, “closed my diary; some of my former colleagues and friends have been arrested and imprisoned. My former editor and presidential candidate, [Mehdi] Karroubi, is still under space arrest. He hasn’t been home in 11 years. Currently the host of the Voice of America pill program, she divides her time between the UK and the United States. He continued to control Iranian politics, human rights violations and post-2009 electoral repression from abroad. I sought to focus on anything very close to my heart, which I also suspected, which would sound true in many Iranian women,” says Alinejad: the obligation to dress in the hijab. The mandate is brutally enforced. So he started campaigning against the online rule.
Launching the My Stealthy Freedom Facebook page, Alinejad filed a motion of women sharing acts of resistance opposed to mandatory hijab legislation. Despite being limited to Facebook, thousands of Iranian women have posted or sent their photos and videos of themselves without hijab. , an act of defiance that jeopardizes your physical security. These shots capture women in the markets or around the corner, remove the hijab and the wind passes through their hair; Even in Covid-19, Iranian women continue this fight for their rights. In a recent video, a woman walks in public without a hijab, but with a mask.
The Iranian government, however, has described Alinejad as a spy and traitor. When she first introduced My Stealthy Freedom, a state propaganda medium lied that she had been raped through three men in London. The regime’s attacks have only intensified: in 2018, her sister denounced her on state television; his brother arrested in September 2019 (then secretly tried and convicted of “propaganda opposed to the regime” and other expression activities); In August 2020, state media called for Alinejad’s abduction. Tehran has also introduced attacks to involve women in the country: “To prevent women from contacting me,” Alinejad said, the head of the Revolutionary Court in July 2019 said that anyone who sent me videos can get up to 10 years in criminal. So far, six activists on my crusade have been sentenced to more than a hundred years in criminals just for defying the laws of the country’s hijab. “
Restrictions on Iran’s virtual ecosystem go back years. At the turn of the century, many democracies were somewhat blinded by optimism about the expansion of the Internet, contemplating its strengthening of connection and communication as the death sentence for autocratic control of information. “free” and “open” was a cry heard in the United States and Canada, France, Germany, Israel and Australia. President Bill Clinton’s 2000 claim that controlling the Web is like “trying to nail gelatin to the wall” is perhaps the ultimate notorious articulation from this point of view. Not all countries wore pink glasses.
Mehdi Yahyanejad, an Iranian expat founded in California and co-founder of the nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, recalls online in Iran years ago. While studying physics at Sharif University in the mid-1990s, he was one of the first to adopt e-mail: in the days of key text editors, Internet browsers such as Netscape and Lynx and the use of the full term “email”. Sending messages online was at the forefront at the time, as the country’s Internet was quite open. it was one of the first countries in the region to host the Internet. The educational network has led much of this adoption through a national data network, as has the Iranian public’s interest in this technology.
But the government “quickly realized that the Internet was going to have political consequences,” he says, “that’s where the restrictions started. “At the time it earned its PhD from MIT in 2004, Iran censored websites, aligned Internet service providers, and declared prohibitions on “immoral” content, extending long-standing offline bureaucracy to Internet dominance.
However, as Alinejad, Yahyanejad and other Iranians have noticed firsthand, Tehran’s tactics on the Internet are not limited to blocking online pages. “There have been disinformation campaigns; there have been DDOS attacks on online pages; there have been attempts at piracy against all. those militants who were in or out of the country, call it the “management” of cyberspace,” says Yahyanejad. After founding Balatarin’s online page in 2006 to allow the exchange and organization of new policies (he calls it a type of Reddit for politics), the site itself has become the target of such coertion. Arrests and arrests of Internet users are also not an unusual practice.
However, in today’s environment, global Internet freedom in the country is declining, while the government is even more dependent on the Iranian Internet and casting an even greater shadow over discourse and activism in the country. One of the plans favored through the regime is the National Information Network, a national Internet separate from the global network that hosts only content destined for the state. Officials “strangle” Internet traffic to inspire compliance with state Internet guidelines: access to domestic sites is less expensive and faster than access to foreign sites, for example, this home network is also configured to discourage encryption, not to mention brazen repression tactics such as the closure of the Internet amid demonstrations and the risk and detention of those who refute state propaganda. Sanctions (which the Trump administration intensified this month) are even having an impact, allegedly leading Apple in 2018 to prevent Iranians from accessing the iOS App Store.
Citizens feel the weight of national restrictions on the Internet and the shadow cast on freedom of expression on the basis. It’s incredibly complicated to access YouTube and search for videos in Iran today. The government is technically blocking access to the website. Even to connect to YouTube, citizens want a VPN to encrypt their traffic and verify to avoid firewalls. There is no guarantee of success, and even of a quick or lasting union if there is one. Facebook, the same platform that Alinejad uses to revitalize the My Stealthy Freedom movement, is also one of many other blocked sites.
Internet connectivity in the United States is more widespread, available, and open. That’s why Yahyanejad’s organization, NetFreedom Pioneers, is helping those living with a limited or unavailable Internet get content online. In Iran, the organization ingeniously adds archived Internet content – from the BBC from Persian to kitchen screens, on specially formatted satellite screens that citizens can record on their TVs and use traditional software to reformatting it.
The virtual connection with the global outside world – and with its citizens – remains important for many Iranians. “Because the obligatory hijab is a red line for the Islamic Republic, no internal publication in the country would give me a fair hearing,” Alinejad says. Thanks to the Internet, its movement has reached millions of people within the country and has daily contacts with citizens through messages on Twitter and Telegram. “In a way, I never left,” he says. Enthusiastic and capable citizens To evade censors there is interaction in this type of communication, with the dangers they provide and the state never lays behind. Alinejad calls it a cat-and-mouse game.
But serious state restrictions on the Internet ecosystem, which impede access to YouTube and make it much more difficult for activists like Alinejad to make strong pro-replacement arguments, are far more vital than Iran. Similar stories are unfolding around the world, from Beijing to Moscow, ankara to Abu Dhabi, from Khartoum to Cairo. Governments are doing what President Clinton has declared impossible: sticking jelly on the wall through the gallon.
There was a cold in the air on the morning of November 18, 2019, when high-ranking diplomats addressed the United Nations headquarters in New York for a General Assembly assembly and several other demonstrations. a fairly long title: “Fight against the use of data and communications technologies for fraudulent purposes. “For those who revel in endemic online identity theft (with several Americans suffering from it every day), there is likely to be an endless stream of knowledge violations (Yahoo, Equifax) and the expansion of ransomware attacks on public infrastructure (as many later feared for hospitals in the midst of Covid-19), the proposal would possibly seem reasonable. Democratic opposition would be surprising.
However, the authors and supporters of the November proposal have been kind to their critics: Russia, China, Iran; Cuba, Egypt, Kazakhstan; Nicaragua, Venezuela, North Korea and a dozen other countries known for strong state influence on the web Research into the UN’s meticulously preserved documentary archives would, in fact, reveal many other proposals with titles: a 2015 letter, for example, calling for an “international code of conduct for data security”. What diplomats like R. David Edelman perceive is that those words are politicized.
Western discourses on “cyber-terrorism” involve the breakdown of water source facilities or the closure of power grids. But in Russia, for example, terrorism is the side leaf used to explain the suppression of online dissent or the criminalization of vocal aid for LGBTQ rights. Cybercrime is a network for Beijing to censor state complaints and block foreign news websites; He is quoted through Iranian officials who physically threaten and punish citizens like Masih Alinejad, who post a selfie or express their opinion online.
So when the vote on the solution began, delegates from Washington, Seoul, Canberra, and other democratic capitals could have had it on the bag. In fact, some effects were expected: China, Russia, Iran and North Korea supported their own proposal. They were joined through Cuba and Iraq, Egypt and Sudan. The United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, South Korea, Poland, Japan and many other historic defenders of freedom voted against it.
However, as more and more votes arrived, a worrying trend emerged: India, the world’s most populous democracy, voted for it, along with Indonesia and South Africa; Brazil, another wonderful democracy, abstained. Soon, the scale increasingly changed in favour of the solution, and with a final count of 88 to 58, in addition to 34 abstentions, the cybercrime proposal was adopted.
“It’s an embarrassing and amazing defeat,” says R. David Edelman. Previously, U. S. diplomatic efforts at the United Nations had succeeded in blocking the avalanche of repressive proposals on the Internet launched by authoritarians in Iran, Russia, and China. Russia’s victory in New York on the last day of autumn, which a Kremlin envoy praised for “addressing in combination this grave evil” (of freedom of expression on the Internet) – is responsible for fleeing those institutions.
Diplomacy is increasingly on the sidelines of American foreign policy. The toughest force has become preferable to olive branches and the military is preferable to diplomatic officials, at least the U. S. government funded the State Department. War and the army have become everything. However, the Bush and Obama administrations have at least committed to the cause on the virtual front, such as defending global freedom on the Internet, so that citizens can read the BBC or organize the the same politically into community-run blogs.
The decline in American investment in international relations began long before Donald Trump became president, but the current administration has given new meaning to the decline. The White House continues to increase military spending while cutting the budget of the State Department and organizations like the United States Agency for International Development, which works on generation issues.
Trump’s leadership is undermining the experience, making the stage worse. Dismissing career public servants Remove the post of White House cybercoordinator Reduce the influence of the State Department’s cybersecretariat Start building alliances on the side. Reduce investment for systems such as the Open Technology Fund, which supports censorship evasion teams like those used by Iranians to access Facebook. It is not a fat cutting consultation yet of important organs. The State Department did not respond to a request for comment.
“Fundamentally, we peel, layer by layer, the insulation that was built for thirty years for a flexible global Internet,” says Edelman. When he described many other officials about U. S. Internet diplomacy, “it’s both high-profile occasions and I’ve read them as the hard, hard, glamorous but incredibly vital paintings of our outrageously engaged public officials and foreign service agents. “That’s why ” the dismissal of the US Foreign ServiceThe U. S. will cause incalculable harm to American diplomatic interests in the broadest sense, but at least as vital, if not excessive, to American Internet policy.
Not to mention that, as if it were going to collide with an iceberg, much of the pain lies beneath the surface. “For every one of those episodes where we see America paralyzed and embarrassed in its current form,” Edelman says, “there will have to be ten or twenty episodes of day-to-day diplomacy, because our diplomats aren’t. It has been legal to dedicate them or, in many cases, they are not even there to do the task because their leadership has prevented them from doing the service.
Dictators, on the other hand, gain advantages from it. The Chinese government is investing cash in the Global Strip and Route Capacity Building Initiative and other systems to publicize the Chinese generation and, in many cases, the authoritarian, state-controlled edition of the Internet that Beijing officials like. The United States, even with committed officials remaining in their posts, more and more countries are turning to state-controlled Internet models, from India to Vietnam. some instances of authoritarian appropriation of force in others—only one generation, nor American efforts—but the abdication of American leadership remains.
“Beyond investment and everything, America’s credibility is so broken with this president that I think it will also have to be taken into account,” says Marietje Schaake, who was a Member of the European Parliament from 2009 to 2019 onwards. generation and global affairs, and now he’s at Stanford University.
Tides would possibly replace in some respects, for example, the Indian government is contemplating a ban from Huawei, a move the Trump administration also only expected during its February vacation in India, but that’s not due to a step forward. defense diplomacy on a loose and open Internet. And at home, the Trump administration has attacked the press and complied with very troubling executive orders to restrict social media speech, ban TikTok and ban WeChat, the last two allegedly after a screaming fight in the Oval Office.
“We sat in front of the Chinese government as they denigrated American intelligence as flawed, as they tried to politicize law enforcement to expel foreign corporations as they demonstrated and tried to punish social media corporations that would not publicize their propaganda and empower critics of the regime. Sound familiar? Ask Edelman. ” The Trump administration’s Internet policy is directly out of China’s playbook and, therefore, it may no longer likely write to play in Beijing’s hand, creating the predicate of all the government’s worst trends in Internet problems.
At the national level, Schaake also points out that the challenge is not only the abdication of international relations, but also the abdication of the regulation of the generation industry and broader for a foreign order based on regulations. “Promote democracy, promote Rule of law, protection of human rights, sale of civil society, fair elections, etc. , require much more than equipment manufactured by a few Silicon Valley fanatics who are increasingly motivated through profit targets. ” he said. “This perception that the generation itself would democratize” without broader political paintings and regulation of Internet corporations for profit “has had a reputation for far too long, whether in Washington and Silicon Valley, and perhaps because of the revolving doors between them. “In general,” it is difficult to protect values and interests if you cannot articulate them in your own legislature in one style in a co njoint of regulations and regulations “.
All of this puts America on a cliff. For the billions of others who have benefited from a flexible and global Internet, a resilient tool for social organization and communication, even in addition to the damage of profit-driven progression, this is a turning point, with the government making a cash investment in selling its Internet style while the Trump administration abandons years of leadership. The genuine question, especially since November, is whether America will return to the game before it’s too late.
The United States has its percentage of virtual gaps. However, the daily delight of connecting to Gmail and talking to colleagues, posting state-critical speeches on Twitter is not something many in the world can take for granted. Despite all their disorders: misinformation, hate speech, business-driven surveillance, and more – the loose, global Internet has allowed this communication, connection and expression. These many realities and delights are not mutually exclusive.
“The Internet is the equalizer,” says Masih Alinejad. Internet, giving activists the ability to retaliate, create a media channel of choice, and circumvent corporate or government censors. “And yet,” all dictatorships, from China and Russia to the Islamic Republic, limit the freedoms of their citizens and use the generation to impose limits. . “
The escalation of censorship, surveillance and coercion of activists such as Alinejad and Mehdi Yahyanejad, the adoption of the UN Treaty on Russian Cybercrime and China’s massive spending on advertising a state-controlled Internet are pieces of a bigger puzzle. authoritarian repressions on the Internet, and in democracies like India, a troubling identity with these policies, American leadership in international technological relations continues to fade.
“The democratic decline that is happening in the world is going down both online and offline,” says Edelman. “There’s a little time left to avoid bleeding. But I don’t know how much time he has left in America. “to keep that exercise off the station. “
The first is to revitalize the State Department’s investment and resources to paint on virtual issues. The Internet is transnational and its effects on the economy, politics and security are proven, as demonstrated from the Russian attack on Estonia in 2007 to the Arab Spring Movements to Russia’s exploitation of an open Internet ecosystem in Europe and the United States. Fewer American pins in a room like the United Nations General Assembly can have genuine political effects when dictators face weaker opposition to their resolutions on Internet control.
Nor is returning to the prestige quo of pre-Trump Internet international relations the most productive path. Democracies, increasingly connected in the virtual field, have room for much greater cooperation on Internet issues. powerful position if we are more in building alliances than in doing things unilaterally,” Painter says. You don’t want the president’s attention all the time, of course,” he adds, recalling his time at the State Department,” but that will have been one of the priorities of any management to move forward. “India, Australia, Japan, Canada, South Korea, and european Union countries are just some of the countries with which the United States can interact diplomatically to publicize and protect a democratic Internet.
And the need for internal reforms is also enormous. Privacy advocates have for years suggested to Congress that it pass a strong federal privacy law to curb corporate knowledge collection. Export is another domain that requires work, as U. S. corporations are continually stuck in promoting Internet surveillance technologies. perpetrators of human rights violations – the guys who use Russia and China to capture dissidents online, or those used through Philippine dictator Rodrigo Duterte’s brutal police. Copying China’s guide, such as R. David Edelman, is not a democratic approach; The United States will also have to publicize Internet freedom at home.
“There is a transparent mismatch between hopes of what for-profit corporations can bring in terms of human rights and democracy, and reality,” says Marietje Schaake, “and I don’t think anyone will be surprised that if you optimize your design, your government, its products, its for-profit knowledge flows, which won’t be optimized for human rights. Fix democracy, respect for minorities, other people’s coverage of follow-up and traceability after exercising their free speech online. “
Schaake proposes that “we not only see an authoritarian style and a democratic style” for the Internet, “but we necessarily see a style of government privatized in much of the democratic world in terms of technology. “Building a democratic style for technology, he says, adding to internet freedom issues that billions of Internet users every day, is a component of the solution to an unregulated area and the growing divergence of the Internet between democracies.
In the end, as Mehdi Yahyanejad said about the U. S. government’s investment in tools to circumvent censorship, “politicians who make such decisions will have to be convinced that this is a vital issue. “Investment in others and resources to protect and publicize freedom on the global Internet has produced enormous benefits. The fight against an increasingly authoritarian global Internet amounts to political will and the conviction of the US government. UU. de that a global democratic Internet and diplomats required to preserve itArray is a genuine foreign policy priority.
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