In late August 2022, Western attention to Russia’s war in Ukraine faded. The two sides have long stalled, preventing Western leaders from making difficult choices or thinking too much about the long-term conflict. Events since early September: Ukraine’s dramatic gains, followed by Russian mobilization, annexations, missile attacks on civilian spaces, and nuclear threats, have shattered this illusion, pushing the war into a new, more damaging phase.
Since the beginning of the war, Biden’s leadership has maintained a balanced technique in realpolitik: arming and investing in Ukraine while making clear that the United States will not have direct interaction in the conflict. But the leadership has refrained from talking about a very important domain of war strategy: how it might end. Experts and politicians who have warned that the U. S. is not yet a major in the U. S. U. S. officials who also deserve to assist in diplomatic efforts toward a negotiated settlement have been called naïve or borderline traitors. Issues of morality: Many argue that it is immoral to push Ukraine toward a deal.
But almost all wars end in negotiations. The escalation in Moscow this fall raises the double specter of a broader war with NATO and the use of nuclear weapons. The global economic prices of the shock are already huge and will almost in fact rise with the onset of winter. Even if a negotiated end to the war proves highly unlikely today, Biden’s management deserves to start raising, both publicly and with his partners, the difficult questions such a technique would entail. He wants to think about the right time to push the negotiations forward and when the prices of proceeding to fight will outweigh the benefits. In seeking a lasting settlement, the leadership will also have to figure out how to capitalize on Ukraine’s successes without paving the way for a new confrontation. To prepare for the most productive deal, US policymakers will need to maintain a not unusual front between the West and Ukraine, Ukraine’s domestic politics and Russia, and be flexible, especially in determining what sanctions against Russia can be applied. lifted without reinforcing the Putin regime. If the leadership does not prepare quickly, its consciously calibrated reaction to war may be overwhelmed by a damaging fantasy of outright victory.
In the 8 months since the Russian invasion, the help of Biden’s leadership has allowed Ukraine to regain territory and inflict great damage on Russian forces, keeping the threat of a full-scale escalation relatively low. He is next, saying that it is up to the Ukrainians to make a decision that is in their most productive interest. But maintaining that position is more complicated now that Russian President Vladimir Putin has doubled down on war and made blatant nuclear threats opposed to the West. Your disaster
At the same time, the economic consequences of war develop rapidly. In Ukraine, public finances have been devastated; The country is short of money. As economic historian Adam Tooze put it in September: “Unless Ukraine’s allies increase their monetary aid, there are any and all reasons to worry about a social and political crisis on the home front. “Europe, meanwhile, is caught in its own noose, as high energy costs exacerbate inflation and increase the possibility of a deep recession. All this makes the position of the administration, which only Kyiv will have when the war ends, increasingly untenable.
In reality, the question is not whether negotiations are mandatory to end the war, but when and how they will take place. However, politicians face a trap 22: the greater the number of Ukrainian forces on the battlefield, the more difficult it will be to talk about a negotiated settlement, even if Ukraine is interested in negotiating from a position of strength. As the threat of Russian escalation increases, so does the possibility that any Western leader who talks about ending the war will be portrayed as unrealistic, immoral, or giving in to “nuclear blackmail. “But internal talks about the appropriate terms of the deal would now better position all parties when the opportunity for such a deal arises.
To lay the groundwork for a deal, U. S. lawmakers will have to act to make sure American, European and Ukrainian interests don’t diverge. Ukrainian interests are not necessarily the same as those of its Western partners. For Kyiv, the stakes are higher, and with Ukraine’s economy already in shambles, it would possibly have little to lose by threatening escalation or continuing the war. But Ukraine’s efforts are made imaginable through Western weapons, investment and intelligence. any threat of nuclear escalation or exchange poses a direct threat to the West itself. Ukraine’s Western sponsors have a strong interest in war; They deserve to have something to say in the end.
This does not mean that the West deserves to pressure Ukraine to give in, as some have argued. But it suggests that the U. S. is not doing so. The U. S. and its partners deserve to provide long-term help for the purpose of putting Ukraine in the most productive negotiating position, not war. For example, Ukraine and its allies will have to focus on their core interests, such as preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and protecting its people. or punish Russian leaders, Ukraine deserves to pursue purposes that are less likely to produce a dramatic escalation and more likely to lead to lasting peace. Washington deserves to inspire the pursuit of those purposes and also deserves to be transparent to Kyiv, at least privately. , where the U. S. boundaries lie. What the White House perceives as unacceptable threats on the rise. Setting transparent expectations now reduces the threat of perception errors in Kyiv.
U. S. policymakers are not allowed to do so. The U. S. will also need to take into account the domestic politics of Ukraine and Russia, as domestic support in both countries will be key to maintaining any agreement. History suggests that a transition of force in Moscow is imaginable, but by no means most likely or inevitable. Therefore, policymakers want to focus on Putin and the small organization of elites around him and think about the deal they might be willing to accept. Given Putin’s mobilization of several hundred thousand more troops on the front lines, it is becoming increasingly transparent what he will seek to avoid a total and devastating loss at all costs. But like many other authoritarians before him, he can sell a bad outcome as a victory. , as Russian legal control of Crimea, can also be recognized, and that the Kremlin can also provide the Russian public as an authentic concession to the west.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a more open and debatable political environment as divisions in Ukrainian politics begin to resurface. However, he faces a similar dilemma. The Ukrainian population has been united since February, joining a national struggle against the invasion. Having asked so much of the Ukrainians, the Ukrainian government will find it difficult to reach a compromise in a way that turns out to praise the enemy. If Zelensky accepts an unpopular deal, it may lead to his defeat at the polls. Under those circumstances, a deal in which Ukrainians feel they have largely succeeded is more likely to succeed. This makes it even more important to manage expectations now. Washington urged Kyiv to take a more moderate stance on issues, such as Crimea, that could be included in a long-term deal; toning down the triumphalist discourse; and highlight the economic benefits that Ukraine is likely to derive through foreign assistance for reconstruction and European economic integration within the framework of an agreement.
Policymakers deserve to establish transparent fundamental parameters for regulation, but they have great flexibility in many details. Some things are non-negotiable. Among them, Ukraine’s sovereignty and the coverage of Ukrainian citizens, especially those who wish to leave the occupied territory through Russia, are paramount. But there are other problems where flexibility is possible. The final territorial boundaries, for example, possibly make a decision in part through the army’s gains on the ground. Politicians deserve not to be irrevocably tied to the prestige quo before February 24 or even before 2014. A more territorially compact Ukraine, free of Crimea and part of Donbas, any of which retain pro-Russian populations – may also be more solid and defensible.
And in general, policymakers seek to prioritize practical outcomes over overarching principles. An independent sovereign Ukraine that can protect itself and integrate economically into Europe, for example, would be far better than a Ukraine with permanent territorial disputes within its borders. The scenario in Ukraine remains dynamic; U. S. lawmakers are not allowed to do so. The U. S. avoids tying its hands now with statements that might be difficult to achieve in practice.
Meanwhile, sanctions relief is likely to be one of the most important but politically tense parts of any negotiations for Western politicians. Sanctions tend to become permanent features of foreign policy, even if their economic and political effect fades over time. Therefore, they are more useful as a bargaining chip than as a permanent punishment. Policymakers now deserve to think conscientiously about how to use sanctions relief to win Russian concessions. Throughout the war, Western sanctions served two purposes: to punish Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the short term and to weaken the Russian military’s apparatus in the long term.
Some sanctions relief for Russia is likely a prerequisite for a successful peace deal, but policymakers want to think conscientiously about which sanctions are worth lifting. Allowing Russia to repatriate some of its foreign exchange reserves, for example, may be useful as a component of a deal because it is angry with the Kremlin over short-term economic stabilization and because freezing those reserves does not weaken the Russian economy in the long run. On the contrary, export controls imposed on Russia serve to restrict the country’s long-term defense trade base; that they are maintained, if possible. Policymakers also adopt gradual comprehensive plans, in which Russia concedes or withdraws in exchange for slow sanctions relief, which was notably absent in the failed Minsk agreements.
There are 3 cases where it would possibly make sense for the US to push for an agreement. The first is that Ukrainian forces continue to achieve significant successes and that leaders in Kyiv are beginning to communicate about the liberation of Crimea. For Russian leaders, such a purpose greatly increases Putin’s threat to resort to the use of nuclear weapons, undermining norms that oppose nuclear use and directly endangering the United States or, more likely, its NATO allies. The moment is whether Russian forces regain the initiative. and regain significant territory, especially if they start leaving Donbass. This would suggest that Russian mobilization has worked and that an agreement for Ukraine’s sovereignty would possibly be needed. The third is if both aspects are blocked in some other deadlock, without either aspect you can regain the advantage. In such a situation, Europe and the United States and even Russia and Ukraine might realize that it is no longer worth bearing the really high costs of continuing the war.
At first glance, it might seem odd that U. S. lawmakers are not yet in the U. S. The U. S. is contemplating a deal when Ukraine wins, when it loses, and when neither wins. 3 is that, in each, the effects of the battlefield imply a relative consensus around which an agreement can also simply be built. Today, the battlefield remains dynamic; Both sides believe they will succeed. An agreement will only be imaginable when the final results on the battlefield are more evident. Until then, strong Western aid can help ensure that the first of those scenarios is the most likely.
Recent airstrikes on Kyiv and other major Ukrainian cities suggest Russia may be considering further escalation. There are very great risks and costs to an expanding conflict; Even if it’s not yet time to negotiate, policymakers will now have to explore cases where the U. S. is not yet in the U. S. to negotiate. The U. S. would push to end the war. They think about how to exploit sanctions and battlefield gains well to put Ukraine in the maximum productive position at the negotiating table. And perhaps most importantly, politicians in Washington talk about the effects of those discussions on Kyiv and European capitals to avoid potentially damaging divergences of national interest between Ukraine and its Western partners.
All wars end. By raising now the very important issues that will need to be addressed in the event of Russia’s war in Ukraine, policymakers can guard against unwanted escalation and ensure a stronger and physically stronger agreement when the time comes. It is only through shrewd and careful negotiations that Ukraine’s core interests, and the security of the region, are likely to be maintained in the long run.