An agreement was reached on August 13 marking a significant geopolitical replacement in the Middle East. It is not a “historic peace treaty,” as officials from Jerusalem and Washington have described it, as peace treaties are concluded between enemies. There is no state of war, no confrontation of any kind between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, in fact since 1994. On the contrary, its dating is that of a hidden friendship entrenched in the 1990s after the Oslo Accords that have been opened and institutionalized.
But what underlies the agreement? What trade-offs are involved? First of all, and above all, it is a political agreement. Israel’s annexation of the West Bank territories will stop and be removed from the table, either temporarily (if President Donald Trump is re-elected) or permanently (if former Vice-President Joe Biden is elected). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu identified the opportunity and was aware of two trends. First, for a quarter of a century, the Gulf States have defended their own interests at the expense of Arab collective interests, adding the Palestinian cause. The solidarity and resistance that characterized Arab states in the third quarter of the 20th century has dissolved, and the Arab League has gradually lost its influence over the past decade and a half. In this context, Abu Dhabi has remained a safe and independent player. Second, Trump’s leadership has focused on “out-of-the-box” paintings, a regional procedure that incorporates a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, as opposed to “from the inside out,” meaning the paintings start bilaterally with a solution. Israeli-Palestinian challenge and move towards normalization with Arab states. Thus, Trump reorganized the linear procedure that characterized all peace initiatives. Policies and movements in Iran and Turkey have led Israel to explore new political and security alliances. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has raised the need for cross-border economic, technological and medical cooperation.
The timing of the announcement was somewhat surprising, the measure itself is consistent with significant evidence of ever closer relations between Israel and the Gulf States, i.e. with the United Arab Emirates, in recent years. It is worth not forgetting that it was Mohammed bin Zayed, the de facto leader, who stood alongside King Abdullah of Jordan at the head of the Arab camp, who publicly and resolutely opposed the application of Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank. Possibly, if the Israeli government had not declared its goal of annexing giant portions of the West Bank (with the help of the Trump administration), normalization of relations might not have taken place.
Since the launch of the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, Arab states have defended the plan and consistently reiterated their support. Some, like Kuwait, still see it as a precondition for the normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel after the construction of a comprehensive peace agreement with the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia also announced that it was still committed to peace on the basis of the Arab Peace Initiative, but had departed from a direct reaction to developments in the Emirates-Israel pact. Israel, for its part, has worked in recent years to improve relations with Arab countries while abandoning any discussion with the Palestinians. In view of this trend, the Palestinian Authority has made every effort to counteract the symptoms of normalization between Israel and the Arab States in general (and the Gulf States in particular) in order to retain data sheets for negotiations with Israel. However, the Gulf States’ technique towards Israel has been replaced over the years, along with the erosion of the preconditions of the Arab Peace Initiative.
In early May, the Baker Institute of Public Policy at Rice University published an article highlighting the importance of the Arab pathway in restructuring a viable procedure that would lead to the solution of “two states for two people.” In this document, we argue that “not only can Arab states provide meaningful infrastructure and inspiration for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but that Arab-Israeli normalization is a key component of any roadmap to regional peace.” We also note that “Encouraging Arab states to interact in the proceeding is a mandatory step in resolving multilateral conflicts… Arab states can inspire a negotiating procedure as a basis for achieving many of the stated objectives of the Arab Peace Initiative.”
In the United Arab Emirates, the agreement is touted as a diplomatic victory to gain advantages for the Palestinians and as a mandatory charge to end the Israeli annexation to the West Bank. In this way, they say that they not only contribute to maintaining the relevance of the two-state solution, but also contribute to stability in the Middle East. In the domestic sphere, which still shows little fraternity with Israel, the value bin Zayed believes he will pay to normalize relations is less than the possible advantages obtained. Surveys conducted in the United Arab Emirates in recent years mean that public opinion is primarily involved about the risk posed by Iran and places the Palestinian factor at the back of the agfinisha. As far as the regional level is concerned, opposition to the measure is led by Iran and Turkey, which have been placed as rivals of Israel and the United Arab Emirates.
For the Emirates, the benefits of the agreement do not prevent at the end of the Israeli annexation to the West Bank or any divisive finishes that may result from its relations with Israel (which were in any case strong). Bin Zayed also hopes that the agreement will be the symbol of the United Arab Emirates, which has suffered damage basically as a result of his army involvement in Yemen and bin Zayed’s cooperation with Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and leader of the kingdom in practice, who, through a series of actions, oversaw the decline of Saudi prestige and influence.
More importantly, bin Zayed hopes that his act of decision will strengthen Abu Dhabi’s relations with Washington, especially in the area of security, and provide Trump with some kind of success. It turns out that ben Zayed hopes to have access to sophisticated U.S. offensive weapons that Washington has not yet supplied to Arab countries to maintain the qualitative advantage of Israel’s military. Since the announcement of the agreement to identify diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, several past official resources involved in the talks between the two countries have expressed considerations that, under the new agreement, Netanyahu may have defected from Israel’s historically vehement opposition. for sale. delicate army apparatus and generation in the United Arab Emirates, namely the complex F-35 fighter jet. A plan for such a sale has been blocked by the United States Congress in the past, under pressure from Israel and its supporters in Washington.
This is where the sync factor comes in. Biden, if elected, is likely to adopt a much stricter policy than his predecessor’s on the human rights factor and a smoother technique for Iran. In addition, doubts have also arisen within the United Arab Emirates about America’s continued commitment to its security.
Bin Zayed’s valiant act will not harm the Israeli-Palestinian peace procedure, which in any case has been stalled for many years. Paradoxically, a slow regional normalization procedure may limit the chances of a long-term agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Abu Dhabi’s rupture of Arab consensus may simply put pressure on Palestinians to show, for once, ingenuity and flexibility. They can simply settle for a negotiated political commitment, if only because of the concern that other countries precede them by jumping on the “peace train” without them. At this stage, Emirati leaders liked to use levers of influence to stop or eventually stop the Israeli annexation and maintain the comfortable (albeit vulnerable) Israeli-Palestinian prestige.
Some would possibly see the United Arab Emirates as the country that lately influences the direction of regional progression perhaps more than any other Arab state, and rightly so. However, it should not be forgotten that some of his regional movements in recent years, such as the Qatar embargo, the war in Yemen and the intervention in Libya, have not been entirely fortunate. It is therefore transparent that Emirati leaders have sought significant good fortune to solidify their leading regional status.
Israel’s political statement, which is not expressed at the national level due to coalition and election-like considerations, is clear: Netanyahu has complied with the precept that he has fought his whole life: land for peace. In this case, there is no annexation of Land of the West Bank, for peace. As the annexation of the table took flight, it aligned himself with the path laid down by United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which shaped the basis of all political negotiations (successful and unsuccessful) between Israel and its country. Matrix From this point of view, Netanyahu, who has continually zigzagged between “two states for two peoples” and “no status quo of a Palestinian state” over the past decade, is following in the footsteps of his predecessors in the prime minister. office: Menahem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert. All understood, internalized, and took steps to shape Israel’s borders around a Jewish majority and democracy, while renouncing territorial aspirations.
Israel’s economic stability and the monetary and economic strength of the United Arab Emirates also played a central role in the agreement, which has the capacity to realize immense economic and advertising potential for all stakeholders. The price of Israel’s existing exports to the United Arab Emirates is only around $300,000 consistent with the year. In line with estimates, it is estimated that the scope of Israeli long-term exports will be between $300 million and $350 million according to the year, but even this figure underestimates the actual price of the agreements between the two countries. Israeli imports are likely to grow at a comparable rate. Among other things, this is likely to involve coherent cooperation and investment in areas such as cyber-technology, medical equipment, communications, monetary technology, agriculture, defense and intelligence.
The Palestinians, on the other hand, have not identified adjustments within Arab states that prioritize their own progress and interests rather than adherence to an Arab strategy for Palestinians opposed to Israel, which has effectively shrunk over the more than two decades. Palestinian official, the Palestinian Authority and its spokesmen, were angry about the Emirati measure, and Palestinian leaders compared the agreement to a “backstab.” However, the Palestinian public in the West Bank does not appear to be part of this sense of insult and victimization, and the Israeli-Emirati standardization agreement has in fact given hope of replacing an Israeli-Palestinian agreement under the patronage of the Gulf-Arab. Critics at the front of the house, adding former status quo figures such as Sufian Abu Zaida, have made basic criticism of the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, which did not seized the opportunity that had fallen to its knees and used the agreement to resume discussion through a Track.
Above all others, Muhammad Dahlan, the sworn enemy of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his associates. This, of course, is nothing new. However, reports from Dahlan, a bin Zayed protégé, as the honorary boy in the settlement, cause Fatah’s status quo to go crazy. The published reports describe him as treacherous and characterize the Israeli-Emirati “despicable” agreement as a bankruptcy in a line of conspiracies and collaborations between Dahlan – the “chouchou of the Emirates” – and the Israeli security apparatus.
Gaza, which, with the encouragement of Hamas and other factions, is marching towards a controlled escalation, has ignored normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. In recent weeks, Israel and Hamas have exchanged violent blows, and the assessment there and in Jerusalem is that a high-intensity return can be expected.
In conclusion, the agreement is undoubtedly a vital step in Israel’s relations with arab states and in America’s relations with the Gulf States. However, if no effort is made to interact in the discussions in the region and elsewhere to achieve a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, only economic, military and political benefits remain for the parties to the agreement. Israel would be sensible in helping the Palestinians get out of their breaking point of anger and perpetual rejection, through a slow resumption of security coordination and the opening of a political discussion for a long-term settlement. This can be done simply by using a revised and updated Arab peace initiative as a framework.
Along with the transience or permanent abandonment of Israel’s unilateral annexation of territory in the West Bank, it would make sense for the Israeli government to invest in an effort to delimit, albeit temporarily, the border between Israel and the Palestinians. This would be a first step towards separation into two geographical regions, even if a full peace agreement has not yet been concluded. The aim is to succeed on a defensible frontier covering a democratic geographical region of the Jewish people, founded on the values and ethics of the Quasi-Constitutional Declaration of Independence of 1948. Today, following the Israeli-Emirati advance, it turns out that Israel is more likely to succeed in a broader agreement between Arab states on the following general principles, which are consistent with their national interests:
First, a solution to the historic clash between the other Palestinians, the Jews and Israel. Second, a redistribution of the former territory of Palestinian British proxy between a sovereign Palestinian state in 22% of the territory and the State of Israel by 78%, on the basis of June 4, 1967, agreed lines with agreed changes, adding the incorporation of maximum Jewish settlers into the main settlement blocks to be annexed to Israel , and payment of this through land exchanges.
Third, a definition of the Palestinian state as the national home of the other Palestinian Arab people and a definition of the State of Israel as the national home of the other Jewish people.
Fourth, no recognition, under any circumstances, of the right to return to Israel for refugees. Palestinian refugees will be rehabilitated in their current state of residence, in the Palestinian state and in other states expressing their willingness to absorb them. International mechanisms will be put in place to rehabilitate refugees and lend a hand to the Arab states that absorb them in their territory.
Fifth, the Jerusalem region will serve two capitals: the Yerushalaim Jewish and the Arab al-Quds, who will be separated through a transparent and explained line of sovereignty. The historical basin surrounding Jerusalem’s Old City will be administered through a special and perhaps foreign regime that will guarantee some freedom of access to worship for all religions. In addition, security arrangements should be based on the fact that Palestine is a demilitarized state, as well as long-term foreign promises to achieve some regional stability.
Finally, the beginning of a peaceful schooling and coexistence between the two peoples will have to be encouraged.
All policy projects in the end lead to the same fundamental principles for an agreement. The time has come to act on the trends reflected in the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, as well as in the agreements that are likely to follow.
Gilead Sher is Isaac and Mildred Brochstein’s Fellow for Peace and Security in the Middle East in honor of Yitzhak Rabin at the Baker Institute of Public Policy at Rice University. Staff leader of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and a high-level peace negotiator. He is currently principal investigator at tel Aviv’s Institute of National Security Studies.
Dr. Yoel Guzansky, principal investigator of the Institute for National Security Studies, has served in the Israel National Security Council, the Prime Minister’s Office and as a representative in several ministries. His most recent book, Fraternal Enemies: Israel and the Gulf Monarchies, co-written with Clive Jones, published through Oxford University Press in 2020.
Image: Wikicommons (Photo via TaBaZzz)