This interview with Dr. Dan Steinbock from the new report, “The Worst Is To Come,” suggests that the demanding situations of COVID-19 are far from over. The pandemic is still spreading and may become more virulent. Many primary economies face “lost years.”
Q: Are there symptoms of an end of the pandemic?
A: Not soon. At this rate, the accumulated instances shown can exceed 25 million by the end of August. Without slowing down, those cases can increase to 50 million and deaths to 1.3 million to 1.7 million until the end of the year. Worse, due to limited evidence and inadequate data, a large number of cases and deaths remain undetected, especially in the poorest economies. By default, official estimates minimize the actual effect on the pandemic.
QUESTION: You predicted the foreign escalation of COVID-19 in early February, the contraction of coronavirus in mid-March, and the next U.S. pandemic crisis. Has the quo taken a step forward in the United States?
A: Not yet. With the effects of the pandemic on top, the economic damage from the collapse continues to worsen. Due to overdue mobilization and useless responses, faulty collective immunity has been promoted in complex primary economies and poorer countries, as evidenced by the resurgence of COVID-19 in the United States and the Americas. While the U.S. states were sovereign entities, in August they accounted for 23 of the 25 peak economies affected by the virus in the world, they showed impact-consistent instances.
Q: Wasn’t Trump’s direction involving the epidemic?
A: Yes, but that’s falling short. In addition, the planned departure from the World Health Organization’s leadership is likely to exacerbate new pandemic dangers over time.
Q: Recently, a “more infectious” coVID-19 strain was discovered in samples analyzed in Quezon City, metropolitan Manila. In his report and in his previous comments, he called for monitoring for this strain to be maintained in Asia, Africa and some other primary regions.
A: Yes, I do. Surveillance is surely mandatory because the progression of COVID-19 would possibly have been amplified through an unwanted mutation. In the Philippines, Quezon City is one of the hardest-hit cities, but we don’t know enough about the samples. In small quantities, this strain has existed, which too many tabloid titles have recently ignored. The real challenge is dominance.
Q: Can you give more details?
A: Sure. As my report points out, in Wuhan, China and Asia, the virus was first controlled by the original “D” variant. In March, a more virulent “G” variation evolved in Europe and then in the United States and infections dominated in the nearest spaces after March. If the effects of these studies become valid, Asia and Africa and some other regions, especially poorer economies with fewer resources and weaker fitness systems, may soon also face more competitive virus strains that Western restrictions and restrictions have controlled so far. In addition, the G strain would possibly complicate the effectiveness of the vaccine.
Q: In his first report, he argued that the International Monetary Fund’s benchmark scenarios were too optimistic. This turned out to be the case. In June, the IMF published updated scenarios that recommend deeper contractions. Are they in line with reality?
A: No, not yet. Reference scenarios still underestimate collateral economic damage for 3 reasons. The IMF update minimizes the effect of the past dark global economic landscape. It underestimates the destructive effects of secondary viral waves, which began in the summer. And this largely suspends the most likely negative effect on the escalation of the US Cold War as opposed to China and several other countries.
Q: So will the warranty continue to get worse with the “lost years”?
A: yes. The effect was relatively worse on primary economies that already faced demanding situations before the coronavirus contraction. Among high-income economies, Maximus would likely face four to 7 years of lost progress, as evidenced by significant revenue erosion consistent with captain. In some economies, beyond demanding situations, they contribute to further falls (e.g. in Italy, Japan). Among rising middle-income economies, China and, perhaps, Indonesia can also simply weather the crisis without a negative downturn. But peak countries have already lost between five and seven years of progress, and in some cases, Brazil and Argentina generally, lost years may also be worse than expected.
Q: What about the poorest economies?
A: Among low-middle-income economies, even the most productive have already lost between 3 and 4 years (India, Kenya, the Philippines and Vietnam), while others are at risk of losing a decade (Nigeria). Among the best-performing economies, the most productive performance economies lost between five and seven years of progress (Ethiopia, Mozambique). Some have suffered losses of up to 20 years (Madagascar) or more than two and five years (Yemen). These countries suffered a decline in living criteria long before the pandemic, due to political instability, civil war and foreign invasions. But the pandemic can simply contribute to “perfect storms.”
Q: Why is it so hard to involve COVID-19?
A: With epidemics, time is vital. Key countries have the capacity, but they have not had the will to take the pandemic seriously enough. In Asia, the SARS EXPERIENCE has “taught” others the importance of taking these outbreaks very seriously. Therefore, from very early on, masks, social estrangement, adequate disinfection and other measures were followed. In the United States and some European countries, the technique has been very different, which has proven to be costly and deadly. Despite China’s state-of-the-art quarantine measures since late January, the United States and Western Europe did not begin to fully mobilize against the virus until last March. The first responses proved futile and the releases were introduced too soon. Worse, polls recommend that, with a vaccine, many in the West would refuse to use it.
Q: What to do?
ANSWER: An effective foreign reaction would require strong leadership and multilateral cooperation, which is still weak. Consider this: WHO’s updated fundraising target represents only 0.01% of cumulative (current) production loss worldwide. However, several key economies continue to avoid long-term preventive strategies. Strong global multilateral action would be preferable (and only a fraction of the cost) of unilateral actions, which aggravate the damage of the pandemic.
Q: What do we need?
A: Multilateral cooperation between all primary economies and through political differences. Global pandemics are not overcome by political ploys, re-election campaigns and other personal benefit efforts. Second, only evidence-based decision-making based on fashion science can provide the foundation of success.
Q: Have we learned the kinds of past mistakes?
A: Before COVID-19, many thought so. But it’s Pollyannish. With the Spanish flu, it was not the first wave that proved fatal, but the second. If we haven’t learned this lesson yet, we may need to relearn it after a primary crisis: a longer pandemic and a multi-year global depression.
Dr. Dan Steinbock is a global strate strater identified in the global multipolar and founder of Difference Group. He has worked at the Institutes of India, China and America (USA), the Institutes of International Studies in Shanghai (China) and the EU Center (Singapore).
Difference Group conducted this interview. The reviews expressed herein are those of the China Daily and the China Daily website and do not constitute the reviews of the website.