I just returned to the US last week, after my first return to China since Covid. It was only one week, split between Shanghai and Beijing, and then Singapore for another week, so the conclusions may be a bit superficial. But from the street’s point of view, China is back up and running. Cities are bustling, department stores are open, restaurants are packed, and if you’re not keeping an eye on the time, you’ll likely end up stuck in the kind of traffic jams that plague every major city. In short, Covid disruption is indeed a thing of the past.
Of course, this street view might miss other dislocations, such as a factory shutdowns or shaky consumer confidence. But at least on the surface there is a lot of good news in the Chinese economy. China’s economy might only grow at 3% this year, but my guess is that means Beijing and Shanghai will grow at 5%, not a bad number.
However, there is a background to these economic figures. Why is there ill will between the United States and China? There is probably more than one reason, but let me address a central aspect of the problem: the other approaches to foreign relations. I made this point in a lecture at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. Simply put, the two countries have very different approaches to national security, derived from other ancient experiences.
The hard lesson of Chinese history is that security is improved by being more powerful than its neighbors. When China was no more powerful, it was a subordinate force and risked being victimized. There is not much history in which China has achieved stability through a balance of forces. Nor is there much history in which China and its neighbors have treated each other as equals or built a relationship based on acceptance as true and mutual benefit. Throughout China’s history, the foreign formula has failed to provide security; only hard force made it. There has never been an Asian security formula based on inclusion and compromise, although, as Professor Tommy Koh points out, there are sub-units, such as ASEAN, where that technique has worked quite well. Unsurprisingly, China has learned the lessons of its history. Hard force works.
This contrasts with American history, in which foreign control has decided our security. The United States has only been concerned with foreign leadership for about 80 years and the main technique has been building a coalition opposed to global threats. , the two great successes of American leadership were World War II and the Cold War. Yes, hard force has also produced effects in both cases, but thanks to a foreign coalition.
These are two alternative schools of international behavior: do you seek stability through supremacy or through a system that provides each nation with benefits and incentives to maintain stability? In game theory, we would describe this systems-based approach as N-sum. Any nation can join and benefit, and such participation does not weaken the position of any other nation. You are secure because your neighbor is also secure. In contrast, we would describe the strategy of supremacy as zero-sum. As you enhance your security through a build-up, you are necessarily weakening someone else’s security.
The other technique in China is reinforced by regional asymmetry. For much of fashion history, Western powers were about the same length in terms of economy and population. This is not the case for China and its neighbors. France and Britain then learned that they had to find a way to coexist. It’s not so obvious when there’s a big difference in length. China does not want to coexist with anyone in its neighborhood, at least in the way that the European powers wanted.
We can summarize several thousand years of Chinese foreign relations in two undeniable statements. The first is that China has never said to a technical power, “We’re glad you’re here. “The moment is that China’s neighbors have rarely said to a technical China, “We’re happy here. “The same history that makes China disenchanted with the technique of the powers may also make its neighbors disenchanted with China’s technique.
China is returning to general social and advertising life post-Covid, which is great to see. Whether China will be able to calibrate its moves to its national interests, even as other countries pursue their interests, is a story in the making.