This week on “Intelligence Issues,” host Michael Morell speaks with Georgetown law professor Mitt Regan about his new e-book “Drone Strike: Analyzing the Impacts of Targeted Killings. “They talk about the effect of drone movements on the search and expansion of al-Qaeda, the lack of systematic efforts to mitigate civilian casualties, and drone ethics moving out of a war zone.
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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS WITH MITT REGAN
PRODUCER: PAULINA SMOLINSKI
MICHAEL MORELL: It’s wonderful to have you on screen to talk about your new book, Drone Strike: Analyzing the Impacts of Targeted Killing. This is the best time to talk about your book, following the targeted assassination of al-The Emir of Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri. So the timing couldn’t be better.
MITT REGAN: Thank you for organizing it.
MICHAEL MORELL: So come on. What do you do in it and why did you write it?
MITT REGAN: What I’m doing in the book is looking at the fairly large number of studies on the effects of the U. S. target selection crusade. The U. S. military is located outside war zones, which is mainly located in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen in terrorist equipment. That is, how effective the movements were in weakening those civilian casualty teams, which was an abundant subject of verbal exchange among all local populations, especially the attitudes of the local population. And I was drawn to that because, as I am sure you know, in the debate, other people on both sides make necessarily factual claims about the impact of the movements, but without any reference to the evidence or rarely decide on the evidence. And so I really searched to get an idea of what we really know?According to the most rigorous studies, what is our most productive understanding of the impact of these movements?They have been highly debatable in some circles, but do we really know what?What’s going on? So that’s what motivated me to do the ebook.
MICHAEL MORELL: yes, that’s great. Before I jump to the conclusions you were able to draw from reviewing all the studies, let me ask you some fundamental questions about targeted drone killings. What is the legal basis for targeted killings outside a war zone?convincing foundation?
MITT REGAN: Well, the U. S. position is that they’re in an armed confrontation with al Qaeda, which means that the law of armed engagement, or known as foreign humanitarian law, applies anywhere an al-Qaeda member engages in that confrontation. This prompted complaints from the foreign network on the basis that this could be true in places where there were active theaters of combat, such as Afghanistan or Iraq. But to apply this logic necessarily to any position in the world where an al-Qaeda target might be located would be too expansive. This would make the legislation of war larger to spaces that are more commonly peaceful. crash.
But in 2013, the Obama administration released what’s called the Presidential Policy Guidance Standards that say the outdoor spaces of active hostilities are decided in this document. We will only adopt a strike when capture is unimaginable and more applicable to verbal exchange when there are civilian casualties, there is a virtual certainty that there will be no civilian casualties. Now, this is in contrast to the law of war, which says that you can accidentally cause civilian casualties as long as they are not excessive relative to the military merit you expect. Thus, the norm has been since May 2013 and in all probability even before the United States made moves only in those situations. And to the astonishment of some, the Trump administration, while relaxing some of those standards, has maintained this requirement that the capture be unimaginable and that there be a virtual certainty of no civilian casualties. So politically, not legally, for the last nine years or so, the United States has taken a more restrictive view of situations in which it will carry out movements outside of active conflict zones, so the law allowed it in a way different. .
MICHAEL MORELL: So what do you think of the legal basis for the killing of Qassem Soleimani by the Trump administration?Does that correspond to the legal basis you have just mentioned, or in your opinion, outside of it?
MITT REGAN: I have to say I think it was because of that. First of all, I think the most productive view is that we are not in an armed confrontation with Iran. Some theories recommend that the tug-of-war that led to it constituting an armed confrontation that necessarily allowed the U. S. to go into an armed confrontation. The U. S. government will treat Soleimani as an armed fighter. I think it’s a difficult argument to make. And if that’s not the basis, then the basis will have to be that the United States acted in self-defense to spare you a drapery risk of covering yourself. And the evidence, at least the ones that have been published so far, does. Do not recommend that there was an imminent risk to the United States. In other words, it was what the army would call a few steps to the left of the coup, so to speak. We can think of imminence as perhaps that last step before the bang. That’s a few steps before that. That is why it has been controversial, at least among lawyers.
MICHAEL MORELL: The Obama administration has some American citizens. Can you tell us about the legal basis for that?
MITT REGAN: The Supreme Court has said that U. S. citizens who have necessarily allied themselves with an American enemy can be considered combatants and therefore can be a lethal force targeted. There are certain constitutional needs that will have to be met through due process. And his conclusion was that if there was a senior official who decided that someone, an American citizen, then Awlaki, of course, is a paradigmatic case. Someone who is operational in drawing up plans of attack and who is obligatory to carry out an attack that, in a sense, satisfies due process considerations.
MICHAEL MORELL: Let’s take a look at the conclusions you’ve drawn from all those studies. Let’s start with its effectiveness, its effectiveness. And while you’re doing it, while you’re communicating about it, maybe you can communicate it from an anti-Qaeda perspective. I know it’s bigger than that, but I think it provides a vital benchmark. And before we talk about effectiveness, can you tell us a little bit about the history of drone use in opposition to al-Qaeda?
MITT REGAN: Oui. La first open-air strike in a war zone opposed to al-Qaeda took a stand in 2002 against al-Harazi, a member of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, suspected of being involved in the attack on the USS Cole in 2000.
MICHAEL MORELL: And in Yemen, right?
MITT REGAN: So the movements continued under the Bush administration, albeit at a low level. There were several coordinated attacks across the al-Qaeda core after September 11. And there have been significant plots that have been thwarted and coordinated across the core of al Qaeda. It is mandatory to accentuate movements in tribal spaces to try to weaken the core of al-Qaeda and prevent it from coordinating such attacks. And so it was in 2008 that movements accelerated considerably, especially in tribal spaces, while they took place elsewhere. And for the next 4 or five years, there was a pretty extensive crusade there.
MICHAEL MORELL: So it was right at the end of the Bush administration, and then the first term of the Obama administration, basically.
MITT REGAN: Exactement. Exactement. So, at the end of that period, in 2013, the Obama leadership put into practice those rules that I mentioned earlier, which operate longer than the law of war allows.
MICHAEL MORELL: And what has happened to the movements since 2013, in number and place?
MITT REGAN: They declined in Pakistan’s tribal spaces after about 2013. In 2012, they were part of a Yemeni army effort in the south opposed to AQAP. They recently resumed when the UAE joined the fight in 2017, 2018, to those operations. Thus, in Yemen, the result was the combination of movements and the broader military crusade that weakened AQAP. In Somalia, they resumed in their teens. And recently, President Biden legally opposed a number of al-Shabaab leaders in that country. I would therefore say that the measures so far have been significantly reduced. But I know management is looking at what’s happening in Afghanistan.
MICHAEL MORELL: What conclusions can we draw from the effectiveness of these attacks?
MITT REGAN: Studies indicate, first of all, that movements opposed to al-Qaeda leaders have sometimes had no effect on the continuation and expansion of al-Qaeda or on the number of movements made through the al-Qaeda network. In other words, he has by no means defeated al-Qaeda. This might have been, at least implicitly, America’s hope when the movements began, but in fact it didn’t. In fact, al-Qaeda has more fighters today than it did before September 11. And that’s consistent with the studies, other studies that I looked at in the e-book on how to attack mature terrorist organizations. They have systems, routines, procedures in position that can make them quite resistant to those types of movements. . So no real effect on al-Qaeda as a whole.
MICHAEL MORELL: And it’s al Qaeda on a global scale that you’re talking about.
MITT REGAN: It’s Al Qaeda
MICHAEL MORELL: I get it.
MITT REGAN: However, I think there’s an explanation for why the movements in tribal spaces that I discussed during that period, from roughly 2008 to 2012, probably helped decrease the risk of attacks in the United States. And that’s because al-The core of Qaeda, throughout the life of the al-Qaeda organization, attacked and prioritized attacking the West, especially the United States. The confidence is that in order to identify Sharia law in the Islamic world, al-Qaeda will first have to eliminate U. S. involvement. The U. S. government supports regimes that al-Qaeda considers heretical. So if you take a look at bin Laden’s correspondence, for example, it’s part of the West Point collection that was captured during the Abbottabad raid. It is full of references to the precedence given to the so-called remote enemy. And Zawahiri continued after bin Laden’s death.
So what we have in 2008 is a central organization in the tribal spaces that has a precedent of attacking the West and the United States. He has a safe haven in the tribal spaces where he can train other people to carry out those operations, and he can plan and coordinate those operations. And that is what led the Obama administration to step up the moves in 2008. The evidence suggests that there are no quantitative studies addressing exactly this. But there is ample evidence in al-Qaeda correspondence that these moves eliminated key leaders of the organization who were difficult to update and severely limited the leaders’ communication and mobility with the rest of the network. Array Y is striking that since 2013 no conspiracy has been attributed to the core of Al-Qaeda. Certainly no successful attacks, no major attacks since London 2005, but not even attempted attacks. This is not to say that other elements of al-Qaeda have not been active, but those elements are generally, with some exceptions, focused on local issues. So by forcing al-Qaeda to evacuate tribal spaces, I think that helped reduce the threat to the United States. Now, I deserve to say that I think the biggest culprit in this decline is probably how the United States has strengthened its defenses against terrorism. since 9/11. The intelligence sharing that happened, the disruption of terrorist financing, the watch list, a whole host of things. I think most people think that’s the main culprit. But I think those moves had the effect of contributing to this decline.
MICHAEL MORELL: Did you come to the same conclusion regarding anti-AQAP movements in Yemen and anti-Shabaab movements in Somalia?Or is it another result?
MITT REGAN: It’s a little more ambiguous, partly because in Yemen you have another kind of use of movements, mainly for air aid and military operations. So they helped, I think, but in combination with pretty gigantic military operations. So it wasn’t the kind of case you had in tribal spaces where, for the most part, movements were the main instrument. It has received assistance from Pakistan for intelligence sharing and some regular law enforcement and military operations. But it was above all the movements that were the instrument. In Yemen, you have movements as one asset among others in Somalia. I think at this point, it’s probably fair to say that the moves haven’t had a significant effect. Somalia is now considered, as you probably know, Al-Qaeda’s largest associate. About a year and a half ago, an accused user had taken flying lessons in the Philippines in preparation to withstand a September 11 attack in the United States and was a member of al-Shabaab. And there I think the effect was much less significant.
MICHAEL MORELL: What about civilian casualties? A lot of debate about it.
MITT REGAN: A lot of debate about that. I think it’s fair to say that the U. S. In the early years of the program, until 2012, the U. S. Department of Health did not perform well in terms of civilian casualties. I believe, however, that the 2013 presidential directives I mentioned, probably in combination with innovations in targeting procedures, have reduced the number of patients. Let me give you some figures. New America estimates that from 2002 to 2012, the percentage of civilians among victims was about 11 percent. From 2013 to 2020 it is around 3%, a little more than 3%. Similarly, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates that between 2002 and 2012 it was around 23%. This decreases from 2013 to 2020 to just over 4%. And in recent years, the percentage of patients has decreased even more.
That’s not to say mistakes don’t happen. We have known since the attack in Kabul in August last year that this can happen. At the same time, although the rate of civilian casualties has declined overall, which I think refutes the concept people say kill as many civilians as militants, this is simply not true. At the same time, the United States adheres to the near-certainty rule that there will be no civilian casualties. And there are those who point out that at least when it comes to military and probably CIA moves, there is no systematic effort to mitigate civilian casualties. The Pentagon is devising such a plan. But there’s a lot of literature that suggests that what you want to do is make sure you get intelligent knowledge about what’s going on in the first place.
Now, because the movements occur in remote spaces where the U. S. UU. no has floor assets. The fight undermined the subsequent assessment, which, among other things, attempts to assess civilian casualties will be limited to video resources. And that has limits. However, there are local teams, there are NGOs on the floor that have access to the data. And I think it’s fair to say that, over the years, the U. S. has not been able to do so. to supplement the data resources they get. And so you see those periodic stories about the United States claiming there were no casualties in an attack, and then on the ground, an investigation that builds that there were, in fact.
So I think more recently, I think Secretary Austin has emphasized the importance of everybody getting involved with those teams to get as much data as possible. But once you figure it out, preferably what you do is you group it together, and then you start looking at the root causes. And there are patterns. There are other kinds of things that take place that are more likely to cause civilian casualties than others. And then preferably spread that throughout the government, at least to the agencies involved in the kinetic operations. And then you incorporate that into the trades to review them and cut losses. This is held periodically in some theaters. It happens with the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, where General McChrystal issued a tactical directive that was later modified by General Petraeus. So there have been periodic occasions where the United States has focused on civilian casualties and shown that it can reduce them. But there has not been a systematic, continuous and consistent approach to this. And sadly, that leaves the United States open to complaints that it doesn’t meet its own criteria for civilian casualties.
MICHAEL MORELL: How do we reconcile, as you discussed earlier, administrations that claim very low civilian casualties?You are John Brennan’s speech when he was in the White House. How do you reconcile what you discovered with what the administrations have said publicly?
MITT REGAN: That’s a very smart question, Michael. I think the United States is very defensive and very touchy about it. However, in a way, he is a victim of his own narrative, because on the one hand he has emphasized how surgical and exact those movements are. So the symbol you get is that of a sniper who can kill someone sitting in a cafe without hurting the user next to them. Drone movements are not exactly like that. So this defensiveness, I think for many years, meant that instead of engaging with local teams and NGOs, there was an adversarial attitude there. And I think also, however, I think it’s fair to say, going back to what I mentioned earlier, the resources that are used to assess civilian casualties have their limitations. Sometimes these are just aerial means. Often, for various reasons, it is not conceivable to get to the scene of a hit. And investigations through teams that really fell apart read about ammunition, interviewed people. They provide a much richer image. I think it would be really healthy for the United States to recognize that civilian casualties will happen infrequently. It is not an absolutely very productive type of operation, however, it does its best to minimize them.
MICHAEL MORELL: I wonder to what extent it is possible that I have detected a bias in the component of the organizations that conduct these investigations. Do you think they have any bias?
MITT REGAN: That’s also a smart question. I think they do a smart job by interviewing other people and on site and orders, as I mentioned. An attractive dynamic is that there is a more general trend with military operations, not just drone strikes, to focus on civilian casualties as if any civilian casualty is a violation of the law. And at least in theaters of combat where the laws of war apply, there may be unintentional civilian casualties as long as they are not excessive in relation to the army’s expected advantage.
I think what’s going down to some extent is that this popular casual is emerging that is alien to the law. In other words, many teams today and some members of the foreign network expect modern and technologically complicated military forces, capable of minimizing civilian casualties, of not fulfilling their obligations if they only ensure that civilian casualties are not excessive. And I think it’s a product that I suspect a lot of. But the 24/7 news cycle, the availability of videos, social media. You see, with the war in Ukraine, you know, civilian casualties come into our living rooms.
There’s a sense in which the Pentagon and the foreign network are talking to each other in some way. The Pentagon rightly says we are proud to abide by the laws of war. And the law of war says that casualties can occur as long as they are not excessive. But there is this other expectation that is more demanding. I think that’s probably why it took a while for the Pentagon to prepare its civilian casualty relief plan, because I suspect there’s an ongoing debate in the Pentagon right now about this. .
MICHAEL MORELL: What about the effect on other local people and their perspectives on the United States, their potential support for the terrorist groups that we’re targeting?Can you talk about that?
MITT REGAN: One of the things we hear is that for every militant who kills a drone strike, he creates two more because of resentment in the United States. It is vital to thoroughly analyze what the evidence establishes here. On the one hand, it is quite transparent that movements are felt through a giant component of the population where they occur. There is some resentment towards the United States, which unfortunately can backfire if the United States tries to help a local component or the government in a fragile state. This resentment can also undermine the legitimacy of this government. It’s a cost.
At the same time, the evidence does not identify that other people are radicalized in those spaces through movements. The fact turns out to be that they don’t like movements and they don’t like militants, terrorist groups. Certainly, although they may blame the U. S. In the U. S. operations, they are also bothered by the way militants live, undermine local authorities, etc. I believe that this resentment of movements in general, even if they do not radicalize the population, is something that will have to be taken into account given the conditions in which prices and profits are weighed. This begs the question, well, are there other counterterrorism measures that could be effective but wouldn’t have that impact?
MICHAEL MORELL: When you take all of that into account, everything you’ve been able to conclude through the search in all those studies, where are you with respect to the ethics of drones for targeted killings outside of a war zone?
MITT REGAN: I think they’re moral when they’re used under pretty strict rules outside of war zones. And I think the presidential political orientations are more or less correct, that is, reading about whether it is imaginable to capture a target. I said no. Try to do as productive as possible to make sure there are almost no civilian casualties. And in some cases, an attack will result in less loss of life than, say, an army operation, for example. Now, he also wants to compare it not only to army operations, but also to other types of counterterrorism measures that might not be kinetic. But I think I mean, if you look at the attack on Zawahiri, it’s said that a lot of measures were taken to verify and minimize any kind of damage to anyone who is nearby. A smaller Hellfire missile was used.
The challenge here is one that has existed since 9/11, and that is how to deal with an organization that has the stated goal of attacking the United States and prevent it from gaining the capability to do so. Especially if it is able to function. somewhere in a safe haven. And it’s like going back to what I was saying about the Al Qaeda core and the Zawahiri attack. I think if Zawahiri was in Yemen or Somalia, I’m not sure his death would have done much. to make America safer. However, the fact that he is in Afghanistan, I think, is intended to send a signal to the Taliban that the United States will not settle for the Taliban allowing Al Qaeda to identify some other safe haven. And as I said before, the possibility of the Al Qaeda core identifying a safe haven because of its declared intent to attack the United States would conflate intent and capability in a way that can be uncomfortable. In general, I think it can be moral if used wisely and other opportunities are considered.
MICHAEL MORELL: I guess I agree that the more transparency there is, the better. That it’s vital for America to say why we think we want to do this. It is vital that we say what we have done that we publish civilian casualty figures. It is vital for us to communicate how we seek to minimize them. I think he would agree with all that.
MITT REGAN: Yes, definitely, Michael. actually do And as you know, more than me, there’s always the fear of committing resources and strategies when you do that. But as transparent as the United States could be, I think it would be vital to provide as much evidence as you can imagine as to why the United States concluded that a specific target posed a threat. Be as transparent as you can imagine about the effects of the attack, adding civilian casualties and measures taken to minimize them. I think it’s vital. And I have to say that I think the Obama administration in particular has been quite admirable in the sense that it has also issued rules that outline the basics of its use of force, not only with movements but also in operations in other areas. And I think as long as that can continue, the United States, first of all, I think it’s the right thing to do in a democratic country. But I also think the United States can probably also gain more legitimacy and support, not only locally but internationally.
MICHAEL MORELL: That was President Obama’s view in 2013, when we were drafting this document that you talked about, that targeted assassinations were something that the United States would have to do for a while. And to do that, we needed at least one foreign agreement and the way to get that is to be as transparent as possible.
MITT REGAN: Yes, I think that’s probably correct.
MICHAEL MORELL: If you were the National Security Council’s legal suggestion or you were the attorney general and you were sitting around the table in the stage room and there was a discussion about targeted killing, what are the two or 3 things that you would like the team to think about before making a decision?
MITT REGAN: I’d like to think, how are you going to explain to the public the need for a strike against this user? How does this user pose a risk to the United States? What is the nature of the operations to which they are engaged? What do we have in it? Wherever imaginable, we can possibly reveal this. I mean, I’d start thinking about how you’re going to justify it after the strike. Frankly, are there other measures that might be feasible to restrict the risk in a way that is not, that is not kinetic? I also believe that we have taken every conceivable precaution to ensure that there are no civilian casualties. Virtual certainty of not causing civilian casualties? I think in the end the United States has to settle for being under the microscope. This is the case of liberal democracies. I mean, Putin doesn’t really have to justify anything to the people about him. But in a democracy, of course, he is a fortress. I think we think that’s a strength. That is why the United States has more allies than China, Russia or Iran. But you will have to do everything you can to live up to those values.
MICHAEL MORELL: It’s a smart position to finish. The e-book is Drone Strike: Analyzing the Impacts of Targeted Killing. He is Mitt Regan. Mitt, thank you so much for joining us.
MITT REGAN: It’s been a pleasure, Michael. Thank you.