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At least three other helicopters are parked along the long taxiway parallel to the main runway, but images show whether they are also damaged in any way. There appears to be a significant amount of other activity along the east end of the runway. main runway, which would possibly reflect paintings in progress to remove broken and destroyed helicopters and other debris.
Images of unexploded submunitions have also been released on the ground in Berdyansk. It will take at least some time to safely deactivate them, which in turn may hamper efforts to get Forward Operating Base air operations back up and running at full capacity.
https://twitter. com/Osinttechnical/status/1714258740684157116
This facility has been used as a Russian air base for months. It is a hub known especially for helicopter operations. What appears to be a combination of Ka-52, Mi-24 and Mi-28 attack helicopters, as well as Mi-8/ Mi-17 hip transports (which may also be armed) have been observed there in previous satellite imagery.
The Ukrainian government said they had destroyed nine unspecified helicopters, as well as “special apparatus located on airfields, [a] air defense launcher [and] an ammunition depot. “
A quick dig of the current Planet Labs symbol does not clearly show damage to air defense systems or other “special equipment” or giant structures. However, cluster munitions such as those contained in ATACMS missiles conquered through Ukraine can cause significant damage or destruction. their targets in tactics that might not possibly be clearly visible through the satellite symbology we currently have. A radar antenna shattered by shrapnel, for example, would not necessarily be visual at the available resolution.
So far, the ATACMS missiles Ukraine has acquired are examples of the initial variant, known as MGM-140A, M39 and Block I. These missiles have a payload consisting of 950 small M74 submunitions. Although the domain over which the submunitions are dispersed depends on the launch height and predicted density dispersion, a typical profile declared for a single MGM-140A would see its payload fall over a circular area about 677 feet in diameter, covering 360,000 square feet in total.
https://twitter. com/UAWeapons/status/1714286709654143332
Regarding the M74 submunition, a 2002 article in the Center for Army Lessons Learned describes its design and function as follows:
“The M74 grenade is filled with Composition B explosives and is covered with a metal shell. . . Upon activation and detonation, each grenade shatters into a large number of high-velocity metal fragments that are effective against targets such as truck tires, missiles, projectiles, thin-film cars, and radar antennas. This submunition is not effective against armored cars. The M74 grenade also comprises incendiary curtains and has an anti-personnel radius of 15 m [just over 49 feet]. “
https://www. youtube. com/watch?v=Ipr_hPAcR_Qu0026t=3s
As The War Zone explained in detail above, airfields like Berdyansk, filled with “soft targets” such as helicopters, aircraft, and open-air air defense systems, are precisely the kind of thing that cluster munition-filled versions of ATACMS are. typing. Satellite images taken on the same day clearly demonstrate how effective the attack on Berdyansk was thanks to the functions presented by those missiles.
In addition, the MGM-140A, while having a shorter diversity than later versions of ATACMS, simply gives the Ukrainian military a greater ability to hit deeper targets in the country’s Russian-occupied internal spaces. Based on known frontline positions, the Block I ATACMS are more than capable of attacking Russian forces in most parts of the country, adding the northern component of the Crimean peninsula.
Ukraine, of course, has other characteristics to attack Russian forces at long distances within occupied areas, as well as within Russia itself. At the same time, ATACMS, like ballistic missiles, fall on their targets at high speed and from very high altitudes. Altitudes. Cluster munition variants also open up long before they succeed on the ground, making a primary risk into many smaller risks. All of this makes them harder to protect than other long-range strike features Ukraine has, adding subsonic cruise missiles and airborne missiles. and ground-launched drones, all of which are unitary warheads.
Ultimately, the biggest result for Russia is that the vast majority of air bases it operates from Ukraine are now directly threatened by a highly effective and hard-to-defend area-effect weapon. Russia has made extensive use of its complex air system. power, and in particular its attack helicopters, to limit Ukrainian advances in its ongoing counteroffensive.
Russia’s air defense assets, which also pose significant threats to Ukraine’s own air power, are now also threatened much deeper on the front lines. Considering what we have already noticed in Berdiansk, this may force Russia to withdraw various key assets to more safe areas. This would seriously restrict their potential contribution to the conflict. This is especially true for helicopters, which have a restricted range, and air defense systems that require varying proximity to potential targets to be effective.
Any soft-skinned vehicles, giant refueling areas, or outdoor worker gatherings are also threatened by the arrival of ATACMS loaded with cluster munitions. Achieving the same effects with long-range weapons equipped with unitary warheads would drain resources, and those weapons are valuable as well. And as we discussed earlier, those weapons are more vulnerable to interception than ATACMs.
It is unclear exactly how many ATACMS missiles Ukraine currently has, how many more it already has, and whether other variants could be included in future deliveries.
In any case, as The War Zone predicts, satellite photographs of Berdiansk airport clearly show that the appearance of missiles in the hands of Ukrainians is a priority for the Russian military, which will force it to rethink how and where they work in the country. .
Contact the author: joe@thedrive. com