By Chen Zhang and Maxence Poulin published on MRonline.
As WikiLeaks has shown, Nicolas Sarkozy’s involvement in the imperial attack on Libya was based on concerns that Muammar Gaddafi, the country’s revolutionary hero, would upgrade France as the dominant force in French-speaking Africa and upgrade the CFA franc formula to one based on the gold dinar. This would not only have destroyed most of the French influence in Africa, but would also have dealt a severe blow to the French bourgeoisie.
The independence of French Indochina after World War II unleashed a wave of independence in French-speaking African countries and gave the impression that France’s colonial foundations had suffered a severe blow in the early 1960s. the main tool of economic exploitation of its West African colonies, the CFA franc monetary system, a former appendage of its colonial empire, withstood the wave of decolonization. An obvious contradiction arises in the survival of an open colonial superstructure in Africa in an era of formal political independence. Therefore, this article will analyze French imperialism by carefully examining its main superstructural tool, the CFA franc system.
More than a currency, the CFA franc is an institutional economic formula controlled through the French government. It is divided into 3 subregions that cover other countries in Francophone Africa. First of all there is the CFA of the West African Economic and Monetary Union called the franc of the economic network in Africa, composed of 8 French-speaking countries of West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger , Senegal and Togo. Then there is the Economic Community of Central African States, known as the France of Financial Cooperation in Central Africa, which includes six Central African countries: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Chad. The last subregion is the Union of the Comoros, where the Comorian franc is used. These three subregions, all components of the CFA franc formula, use those three other currencies issued through other central banks: the Central Bank of West African States, the Bank of Western States of Central Africa and the Central Bank of the Comoros. 1 These 3 currencies are not directly convertible between them and will have to be exchanged through France, which has attributed a particular role of “guarantor”. 2
The progression of capitalism begins with the separation of the manufacturer from the means of production, what Karl Marx called primitive accumulation, i. e. , the transformation of society’s means of production and subsistence into capital, on the one hand, and the transformation of the means of production into capital. colonial: the direct plundering of newly discovered lands to bring assets back to France to be converted into capital. and the destruction of the colonies’ production strategies and relations of production to serve as markets for the sale of French workshops and crafts. The status quo of ties between France and Francophone Africa was an essential component of this process.
There was no systematic imperialist mission in Africa until the 1870s, but there was a faltering but unbroken political commitment to building army security and economic viability, a “progressive imperialism. ” 4 Only when productive forces, the advancement of anti-malaria drugs and steamships, allowed for a more effective incursion into the continent so that France could conquer gigantic portions of it. 5 In the 1870s and 1880s, Congress Berlin of 1886 stimulated and intensified the festival between France and other European powers, leading to the era with the immediate maximum expansion of the French empire. The era of imperialism was already marked by its monetary nature: French capital exports were concentrated in loans or bonds rather than production, allowing France to make enormous profits while maintaining a trade surplus. 6 French banking capital still It was not dominant and was still separated. productive capital. At the time of the First World War, the French empire under the so-called “usury imperialism” took shape: France accounted for 20% of the total foreign direct investment in the world and was the second largest exporter of capital in the world. 7 At that time, financial capital, founded on an express social relationship between borrower and lender, replaced the capitalist relationship between client and merchant in production and has become dominant, giving rise to the emergence of monopolistic organizations. 8 The French empire thus completed its transformation from colonialism, characterized by plunder and territorial control, to “usurious imperialism,” characterized by the export of monetary capital. It was the most gigantic empire in the world in terms of territory and population, reaching its peak at the Colonial Exhibition held in Paris in 1931. 9 French imperialism had from its origin a specific essence of banking capital, extending to foreign social formations.
For France, the end of the Second World War posed a triple challenge: first, the contradiction between economic reconstruction and the lack of monetary resources after the war. Secondly, the colonies, which formed the backbone of the French empire, were boosted through victory in the war against fascism and the war of national liberation in Asia and introduced an anti-imperialist and decolonizing campaign. Eventually, the strength of the franc and its foreign position were threatened by American imperialism. The status quo of Bretton Woods The 1945 formula marked the centrality of the dollar and the domination of US imperialism in the field of capitalist countries. France’s foreign influence and monetary strength are weakened.
In the face of these changes, France had to make do with the United States’ Marshall Plan, which meant the access of American finance capital to the depths of Western Europe. Since the basic contradictions of imperialism lie between the flexible festival and the monopoly, which coexist, the crisis of the economy is not governed through a homogeneous monopoly, but through other blocs of competing monopolies. 10 Cooperation between imperialist countries is only temporary, and their relations are basically contradictory, insofar as the evolved capitalist countries have a tendency to constitute their own bloc of capitalists Monopolists. with divergent interests.
To remain autonomous in the face of the expansion of American imperialism after World War II and maintain its prestige as a global hegemon, France had to preserve its African colonies, specifically after the loss of Indochina. 11 In 1945, France built the establishment of the CFA franc in Africa, using military and political means to force French-speaking African countries to sign it in exchange for non-violent political independence. 12 The CFA franc was used as a monetary tool to manipulate the economy and finances of French-speaking countries. Talking about Africa. to counteract the penetration of the American dollar in French-speaking Africa. By pegging the CFA franc to the French franc and then to the euro, France sought to exercise an exclusive over the region, following the example of the United States’ Monroe Doctrine, approximately two hundred years earlier. 13 France was then able to maintain its autonomy from American imperialism through exclusively French-speaking African countries by configuring their national monetary apparatus in their own interests, as well as in the interests of thecomprador elegance of African capitalist countries, such as Senegal, which opposed the dissolution. of the African Union. the CFA franc and the formation of local economic integration proposed through revolutionaries in Burkina Faso, Niger and other similar countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 14
The CFA franc system was, then, not only an answer to French imperialism to the wave of decolonial movements in the Global South, but also a direct answer to the risk of losing its hegemony in Africa to the U.S. empire.
One of the main resources of French hegemony in the global realm of hard work since the end of the Second World War is its continuity over the former French colonies; that is, the countries of French-speaking Africa. 15 The latter offer France not only a giant market for the sale of manufactured goods, raw fabrics important for the progress of modern industry, and fabrics for developing nuclear capacity. 16 This segment focuses on the CFA franc formula itself, to explain its starting point, its economic logic and its operating formula.
Although France claims that the CFA franc is French-speaking Africa’s own currency, far from being based on equality, justice, and voluntariness, the system was constructed unilaterally out of France’s efforts to achieve economic hegemony through multiple superstructural mechanisms, in a politically balkanized Africa and to maintain its imperialist rule.
First, there is the precept of constant exchange rates, according to which the exchange rates of the national currencies of the former colonies are entirely constant and are directed by the French political authorities. This means that the price of all their economic output is not decided through the legislation of the foreign capitalist market position nor through the national political authorities, but rather through the French economic bourgeoisie. 17 Unable to implement their economic policies, these countries do not have the economic strength to put in place an economic strategy that serves goals of progression and some of the vital equipment to fight inflationary or deflationary problems.
Secondly, the precept of centralization of foreign exchange reserves. This precept is based on the “Operational Account”, a partnership between the French Ministry of Finance and the three central banks responsible for issuing the CFA franc. Each central bank is required to deposit a specific percentage of the foreign exchange reserves of the member countries of its region in the operating account founded in Paris and controlled through France. 18 This mandatory deposit, which reached 100 percent at the beginning of the CFA franc system, was reduced to 65 percent in 1973 and again to 50 percent in 2005. 19
Thirdly, the precept of unlimited convertibility means that the CFA franc can be converted into French currency without restriction. On paper, any country applying the CFA franc formula could borrow from France denominated in francs or euros if it did not have a secure foreign currency. foreign exchange reserves. 20 France ensures that the three central banks have sufficient foreign exchange reserves to maintain their foreign exchange reserves. However, France does not allocate any of its annual budgets to bolster the foreign exchange reserves of the three central banks or to lend to these countries, as the French Treasury is a member of the European System of Central Banks and therefore independent of the government. 21
Finally, the precept of flexible movement of capital means that movements of sources of income and capital are flexible. 22 They are not limited by the CFA currency rate and can circulate freely between CFA member countries and France. Revenue movements basically come with remittances from foreign personnel and the repatriation of profits and dividends, while capital movements basically fear the acquisition of securities or economic investments. 23 Since the CFA franc is limited to the policy of the three central banks, it is not convertible compared to other foreign currencies and has a low economic value. Only French capital has direct access to invest in the country, all other capitals will have to first convert their euros into CFA francs. Any flight of capital will have to pass through France in order to reach the foreign market freely.
The essence of the CFA franc system can be understood as a French tool for the control of the external economic relations between its former colonies and the outside world. France thus shapes, with the help of these four principles and the operating account, the imports and exports of the member countries of the franc zone to limit the influx of foreign capital from other countries and help its bourgeoisie monopolize these regions. For example, when a member country receives foreign currency through the export of raw materials, it must transfer half of the foreign currency received to the central bank of its region within a set period and convert it into French currency.24 Similarly, when foreign capital wishes to enter the countries of the CFA franc zone, it will need to be converted into CFA francs in the Paris foreign exchange market. The consequence is that, under the control of the French Ministry of Finance and the central banks, the member countries of the CFA system do not have the right to keep the full amount of their foreign currency and cannot decide how to use it. CFA franc countries do not enjoy an independent monetary policy as the currency as the policy of a fixed parity rate between the eurozone, and the CFA franc is the chosen policy of the French government. This keeps these African countries from being able to finance freely domestically as it would upset the fixed parity rate because companies that would receive credit and invest productively would purchase foreign equipment due to their incomplete industrialization.25 By keeping the exclusive right of the guarantor of the system and middleman between its former African colonies and the world, France robs these countries of economic independence while bolstering the strength of its economy.
Although the exchange rate will have to be fixed, France has manipulated the exchange rate three times more than the history of the CFA franc system. Far from being a gesture of stabilizing the economies of the CFA franc countries, the resolution was adopted out of structural interest. of the French economy.
The exchange rate between the CFA franc and the French currency has been determined unilaterally by the French government since the birth of the Bretton Woods system in 1945, when the exchange rate between the French franc and the U.S. dollar was established based on which the ratio between the CFA franc and the French franc was set at 1 to 1.7.26 The first exchange rate change took place in 1948, when the French government, facing a fragile economy far from recovered from the war, decided to devalue the French franc by 44 precent while maintaining an exchange rate between the two currencies of one CFA franc to two French francs. In other words, the CFA franc was now twice the value of the French franc, which made French manufactured goods cheaper and export considerably less competitive than other Global South countries.27 The relationship of dependency between the colonies and France was thus greatly expanded from the war period when the CFA franc countries diversified their trade relations and reduced by more than half their imports from France and their exports from about one quarter.[28] As a whole, France increased its exports between 1947 and 1948 from 85 million to 94 million while its import decreased from 107 million to 103 million.28 The share of French exports to West Africa increased from 59 percent in 1938 to 69 percent in 1949, while its imports remained practically unchanged.30 As the data shows, France was able to increase its exports to the CFA franc countries while keeping its import at the same rate. The consequence of this first change in the exchange rate is the lowering of the export capabilities of the CFA franc countries in favor of expanding imports from the metropole, thus positioning West Africa as an exclusive market for French manufactured goods and thereby putting pressure on African petty commodity production. In this period of French economic reconstruction, the export of commodities regains its importance and became the primary function of the CFA franc.
The second replenishment took place in 1960, when, following the Algerian War of 1958, the replenishment of the internal government and the intervention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), France attempted to increase its purchasing power without causing economic contractions. and establishes a new charge in francs one hundred times greater than the previous one. 31 The ex-replacement rate between the CFA franc and the new franc is then 1 CFA franc per 0. 02 francs. This replenishment once again benefits France, which has just recovered from the Second World War and which urgently needs raw fabrics for its commercial development. It is very reasonable for France to buy commercial and military raw materials from the newly independent countries of the CFA franc zone without having to deplete its export reserves abroad. For the member countries of the franc zone, this meant not only an increase in the cost of living, but also an increase in the cost of their external debt, which harmed their fragile and dependent outward-oriented economies. 32 France At that point we will buy a lot more from those countries, but those countries may buy a lot less from France. At that time, France could produce all of its trade goods at a lower production rate and thus compete with the American and German trade strength. However, the newly independent countries were paid much less for the raw fabrics they sold to France, which slowed down their marketing process. Reducing the cost of production inputs has become the function of the CFA franc, thus expanding the profit rate of the French economy and helping its capitalists to be more competitive in the global market.
The most recent replenishment took place when the countries of the CFA franc zone were in the grip of a debt crisis in the 1990s, following the oil crisis of the 1970s and 1980s. The African countries of the zone of the CFA franc, like most Southern countries, benefited in the 1970s thanks to the frenetic expansion of liquidity created thanks to the new petrodollar. American banks had to lend cash at very low interest rates to the countries of the South, which took advantage of this opportunity to embark on the path of commercialization. The Volcker surprise in the United States – which limited the source of cash to increase the inflation rate, in an attempt to save the cost of the US dollar – made the debt of the countries with the largest deficits unusable. 33 FranceArray, which also suffers from global inflation, has not contributed any money to the member of the CFA franc zone and has renounced its promise to be a guarantor of the CFA franc. It chose the path of the IMF’s structural adjustment policy for the CFA franc zone and opted to devalue the CFA franc by 50%, resulting in 1 CFA franc costing 0. 01 franc in 1994. For example, Senegal fell into the debt trap around 1975, when , which had borrowed a lot of cash at a reasonable price, was bogged down by the skyrocketing cost of the US dollar and could not pay it off. 34 Senegal, like most other countries sub-Saharan, had to undergo structural adjustment policies in 1983, while the amount of its debt service peaked in 1988 at 6. 3% of its gross national income source. 35 This had positive consequences for France, but negative for its former colonies. This doubled France’s monetary ability to obtain goods from the CFA franc zone at partial cost. 36 Meanwhile, CFA franc zone countries had to import their agricultural, commercial and consumer goods, and rising costs doubled, causing homes to collapse. purchasing power. 37 As a result of France’s monetary manipulations, both the State and the ordinary population of the CFA franc countries suffered a sharp relief in their sources of income. The CFA franc was thus used as a mechanism to impose deflation as a source of income on the French periphery. As Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik have argued, source of income deflation is one of the main mechanisms of imperialism imposed on the productive design of the South, through which the effects of emerging costs can be offset to increase the profit rate of the South. capital in the South. North. Array38
Far from being the guarantor of stability in CFA franc zone countries, France uses this system as a guarantee of French interests at the expense of francophone Africa.39 The historical function of the CFA franc must be understood considering the conditions of the French economy.
In the face of the new international political and economic environment from the 1970s onward, France intended to use the CFA franc system to perpetuate and consolidate the center-periphery model, the pillar of French imperialism.40Imperialism is the culmination of the struggle in the division of labor, taking the specific form of a struggle between nations.41 The construction of the CFA franc system was a way for France to crystalize a particular division of labor between its former colonies, the periphery, and itself, the center, to acquire surplus value and remain competitive against other imperialist countries.
Historically, France used the CFA franc system so that the prices of its imports and exports with the countries of the CFA franc zone and itself were not regulated by the international market, but were determined by the French government during the colonial period. This made it possible for France to purchase raw materials from the countries of the CFA franc zone at prices far below those of the international market by making these countries overproduce raw materials and forcing them to buy finished French products at prices of 20—30 percent higher than those of the international market.42 The function of creating market dependency on France after the Second World War made it so the price of raw materials for French capitalists rose due to the rising price of the CFA franc compared to the franc; meanwhile, the selling price of the French manufactured goods became cheaper in French-occupied Africa. This function became important again in the ’60s, as monopoly capitalism in France became solidified after its partial destruction. The goal of this period was to increase the profit rate of French capital, which could be achieved by creating income deflation in the countries responsible for producing the inputs of French production. In this way, France could compete against the industrial production of more productive economies like Germany and Japan, but could also compensate its global trade deficit.43 It also creates a propensity for CFA franc countries to import more than they export, because of the fact that the CFA franc was pegged to a much more powerful euro, in turn hurting the competitiveness of their exports and local producers and promoting the imports of foreign manufactured goods.44 More importantly, the CFA franc system is made so trade between countries does not need the U.S. dollar. Idn this way, it provides France a barrier between her imperialism and the U.S.-dominated world system. The franc zone thus allowed French imperialism, based on a center-periphery model, to be maintained, while also providing France with the leverage to counteract the dollar and retain an independent political and economic position without having to operate entirely within the framework of U.S. imperialism.45
One of the main objectives of the CFA formula is to create dependency between France and its former colonies and encourage the accumulation of surplus value. In fact, this blocks the industrialization process of the CFA franc countries. The financial formula deprives French-speaking African countries of their financial rights, meaning that member states cannot finance their progress through credit creation. 46 It also restricts the right of its members to freely dispose of foreign currencies, preventing them depend on export earnings for the initial accumulation of capital used for industrialization. It makes “stability” the first precept of the CFA formula, that is, the maintenance of a constant exchange rate between the CFA franc and the euro and the maintenance of the annual inflation rate at a very low point, without worrying about Economic Progression of the countries of the euro zone. franc zone, where cash creation plays an important role in the progressive state progression model. 47 This creates a scenario in which the foreign exchange reserves of those African countries are between 95% and 105%, which reveals a strong capacity for imports and productive investment while remaining tied due to lack of investment through the CFA franc policy. 48
It is in this service – debt and loan – that the essence of the CFA franc is reflected in purer tones, without necessarily being the dominant appearance most of the time. This service is where cash seems to multiply, appearing as M—M. ¢.
France is an important bilateral creditor in Africa, ahead of all European Union countries, while the United States (historically) and China (recently) being the most important in the world.49 A large part of the CFA franc countries’ debt is not held by China but by France. If we account for both French bilateral debt, which sits at U.S. $1.125 trillion, plus private-sector debt, $443.1 million, versus $1.343 trillion for the bilateral Chinese debt.50 When looking at the debt data from the CFA franc countries, France is sometimes either the main holder of the debt or not very far behind the leading debt holders. This is explained by the privileged position France holds as the guarantor of the CFA franc, as the risk of an aggravation of foreign debt because of devaluation is eliminated, since the CFA is pegged to the euro.51 Historically, France contributed immensely to the debt-trap situation these countries are in because of the devaluation of the CFA franc, last having occurred in 1994, which made the total amount of the debt owed by these countries to foreign lenders multiply as the value of their currency fell.52 As domestic credit lending is severely discouraged by the policies of the central banks, CFA franc countries have no other choice but to finance their spending with foreign lenders.53 In this way, debt servicing is actively forced by France on the CFA franc countries, thereby increasing the amount of surplus value obtained by banking capital, M—M¢ in its pure form.
As a superstructure connected to bank capital, the CFA franc formula is not only capable of fulfilling its number one objective, that is, increasing its price by diverting the productive sector of the economy, but, in the monopolistic phase of capitalism, this superstructure works actively. in concert with banking capitalism. other forms of French capital in Africa. This takes the form of blocking debt, aid and investments. Funds acquired through CFA franc countries to promote limited infrastructure progress through debt relief and progression contracts or directly through bilateral loan agreements are provided to French transnational corporations. This allows French merchant capital to monopolize the position of the African market vis-à-vis its local and foreign competition. 54 As is often the case, capital tends to move from unevolved monetary market positions to evolved market positions. 55 The superstructure of the franc CFA is one of the main elements that the French bourgeoisie used to cause an influx of capital in its direction. Between 1970 and 2008, this amounted to $850 billion, preventing franc zone countries from accumulating enough capital to expand their economies through savings and investments, which then had to rely on external debt. 56 It is therefore vital to realize that debt is, in fact, a means to drive capital outflows. Studies have shown that between 47% and 62% of the budget that enters the CFA franc formula as external debt is repatriated to creditor countries as capital outflows. 57 For every dollar that enters Africa as external debt, there are a capital of 60 cents . 58 For France’s productive capital, access to new competition in Africa has made the banking infrastructure of the CFA franc incredibly vital to combat the downward trajectory of its market position shares, which fell from 10. 1% in 1990 to 4. 7% in 2011. 59 Finally, the African compra elite also contributes to this of capital, as it has a tendency to collect foreign assets to anchor its strength outside of any local political competitors and position their interests in the same basket as their imperial overlord. 60 This promises thecomprador elegance the assistance of the force of the French army in the event of a threat. 61 The alliance between the French bourgeoisie and the Africancomprador bourgeoisie will then have to be understood as the anchor that helps keep these countries in a deep capitalist logic and prevents them from embarking on a deep capitalist logic. on the path towards progressive capitalism and socialism. 62
The CFA franc system should therefore be understood as an essence, differentiated by four main manifestations. As an essence, it is a superstructural outgrowth of banking capital, born during colonial times to siphon off value by credit. In the monopoly stage of capitalism, however, where banking and production tend to unite into finance, the banking superstructure becomes a conduit for the reproduction of both banking and productive capital. Therefore, its appearances are the four main functions I analyzed above and indicate that the changes in the economic level, as well as the consolidation of banking and production transformed the CFA franc into a tool of the whole French bourgeoisie to facilitate in multiple ways the expansion of production by creating direct and indirect mechanisms for the increase of surplus value.
This article discusses the history and role of the CFA franc formula in Africa as a design for its surviving colonial empire in Africa. We show that the CFA franc formula constitutes an exclusive type of imperialism used through France to maintain its prestige as a hegemonic force in a global formula dominated by the United States. This unique type of imperialism is itself shaped by the former dominance of French banking capital and its fashionable evolution into finance capital.
In the stage of imperialism in which the financial branch of the bourgeoisie obtains complete dominance over the French state, surplus value is obtained less by increasing the productive capacity of its economy because of the rising organic composition of capital, but rather by capturing the surplus value by purely financial relations and creditor and debtor. The CFA franc system was put in place as a tool to maintain both the dwindling postwar industrial capacities of France in its competition against more productive capitalist economies, and to siphon value from its former colonies. As far as industrial capital, the CFA system supplies the French economy with cheap raw materials for the production of consumer, industrial, and military goods, but it also provides industrial capital a market where they are the sole monopoly and can sell goods at prices above those of the world market. For banking capital, the CFA franc system allows total control of the flow of capital in these regions and manipulation of the exchange rates in order to control French inflation by constraining the demand in the CFA franc zone countries. The CFA franc has become a tool for the entire bourgeois state and the financial bourgeoisie.
[1] Fanny Pigeaud, Ndongo Samba Sylla and William Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Currency: The History of the CFA Franc, (London: Pluto, 2021), 20.
[2] Michael T Hadjimichael and Michel Galy, “The CFA Franc Zone and the EMU” (Working Paper, Africa Department, International Monetary Fund, 1997), 7.
[3] Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1 (London: Penguin Classics, 1992), 874.
[4] Richard J. Reid, A History of Modern Africa: From 1800 to the Present (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2019), 151.
[5] B. F. Howard, “Some Notes on the Cinchona Industry,” Chemical News (1931): 129—33; Gerald S. Graham, “The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship 1850—85,” Economic History Review 9, no. 1 (1956): 87—88.
[6] Claude Serfati, “Imperialism in Context: The Case of France,” Historical Materialism 23, no. 2 (June 2015): 56.
[7] Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820–1992, (Washington, D. C. : Development Center Studies, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995), 65.
[8] Serfati, “Imperialism in Context,” 59; V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: Dover, 1987), 73.
[9] H. R. Tate, “The French Colonial Empire,” Journal of the Royal African Society 39, no. 157 (1940): 322—30; Dauda Yillah, “The Predatory Economics of Imperialism and Neo-Imperialism: Some Post-War Metropolitan French Intellectual Perspectives,” Forum for Modern Language Studies 53, no. 4 (2017): 484.
[10] Lenin, Imperialism, 114.
[11] Serfati, “Imperialism in Context,” 69-70.
[12] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 11.
[13] Xavier Renou, “A New French Policy for Africa?”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 20, no. 1 (2002): 6.
[14] Ndongo Samba Sylla, “Fighting Monetary Colonialism in Francophone Africa: Samir Amin’s Contribution,” Review of African Political Economy 48, no. 167 (2021): 32—49.
[15] Serfati, “Imperialism in Context,” 73.
[16] Assanvo K. M. Newson Mian. , “African Democracy and Western Imperialism (Part 1): Crisis of Democracy in Africa,” Rev IV Hist. , no. 19 (2011): 73-75. ; Jeanny Lorgeoux and Jean Marie Bockel, Africa East Our Future (Briefing Report No. 104, Senate Regular Session 2013-14, Paris, 2013), 237.
[17] Pigeaud, Sylla and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 21.
[18] Anne Marie Gulde and Charalambos Tsangarides, “The CFA Franc Zone: Common Currency, Uncommon Challenges” (International Monetary Fund, 2008).
[19] “The CFA franc: French imperialism in Africa”, London School of Economics (blog), July 12, 2017.
[20] Kai Koddenbrock and Ndongo Samba Sylla, “Towards a Political Economy of Monetary Dependence: The Case of the CFA Franc in West Africa” (MaxPo Discussion Paper, No. 19/2, Max Planck Sciences Po Centre on how to cope with instability in Western Africa). Sociétés de marché, Paris, 2019), 10.
[21] French Republic, “Law No. 2017–1837 of 30 December 2017 onwards for 2018 (1)”, 2017–1837 § (2017).
[22] Koddenbrock and Sylla, “Toward a Political Economy of Monetary Dependence,” 10.
[23] Pigeaud, Sylla and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 21.
[24] International Monetary Policy, “West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA): Common Policies for Member Countries – Press Release; Staff report; and statement through the Executive Director of the WAEMU”, International Monetary Fund, Country Reports 2018/106 (Washington, D. C. International Monetary Fund, 2018), 34.
[25] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 33-34.
[26] Pigeaud, Sylla and Mitchell, 12.
[27] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, 13-14.
[28] Rémi Godeau, The CFA Franc: Why the 1994 Devaluation Is Everything (Saint-Maur France: Éditions Sépia, 1995), 35.
[29] The value of the U. S. dollar in 1939 is used here. United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, World Economic Report 1948 (Lake Success, NY: United Nations, 1949), 156.
[30] K. E. R. , “Economic Development in French West Africa,” World Today 6, no. 12 (1950): 538.
[31] Olivier Feiertag and Jean-Noël Jeanneney, Wilfrid Baumgartner: A Great Finance Clerk at the Crossroads of Powers (Paris: Institute of Public Management and Economic Development, 2013), 555—96.
[32] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 67.
[33] Radhika Desai, Capitalism, Coronavirus, and War: A Geopolitical Economy (London: Routledge, 2022), 94-96.
[34] Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview, 1995), 63-64.
[35] Stephen R. Weissman, “Structural Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from the Experiences of Ghana and Senegal,” Global Development 18, no. 12 (990): 1624; “Total Debt Service (% of GNI) – Senegal”, World Bank 2021.
[36] Bruno Coquet and Jean-Marc Daniel, “Historical Perspective,” African Politics, no. (1994): 11-18.
[37] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Currency, 66—67.
[38] Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik, Capital and Imperialism: Theory, History and the Present (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2021), 78-80.
[39] François-Xavier Verschave, De los angeles Françafrique à los angeles Mafiafrique, 1st ed. (France: Tribord, 2005), 10.
[40] Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 2011), 13—14.
[41] Domenico Losurdo, Class Struggle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 14.
[42] Federico Tadei, “Measuring Extractive Institutions: Colonial Trade and Price Gaps in French Africa,” European Review of Economic History 24, no. 1 (202): 1—23; Alexander J. Yeats, “Do African Countries Pay More for Imports? Yes,” World Bank Economic Review 4, no. 1 (1990): 1—20.
[43] Serfati, “Imperialism in Context,” 72.
[44] Rémy Herrera, “Who from the CFA franc?”, AfriqueXXI, 3 June 2022.
[45] Sam Gindin and Leo Panitch, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy Of American Empire (London: Verso, 2013).
[46] Sebastian Dullien, “Central Banking, Financial Institutions and Credit Creation in Developing Countries” (discussion paper no. 193, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 2009.
[47] “The CFA Franc”, 2.
[48] Herrera, “Who of the CFA franc?
[49] “Major Bilateral Developments of African Economies in 2019,” March 2021, statista. com.
[50] “International Debt Statistics 2022,” International Debt Report, World Bank.
[51] Prêts pour l’Afrique d’aujourd’hui? (Paris: Institut Montaigne, 2017), 98.
[52] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 88.
[53] Herrera, “Who from the CFA franc?
[54] Pigeaud, Sylla, and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 89.
[55] Aloyslus Ajab Amin, “Long-Term Growth in the CFA Franc Zone States”, Research in Progress (Helsinki: United Nations University World Research Institute for Development Economics, 2000), 14.
[56] Demba Moussa Dembélé, “Le franc CFA en sursis,” Le monde diplomatique, July 1, 2010, 12; Nicolas Agbohou, “Le Franc CFA et Le Développement De L’Afrique” (2011), slide 19.
[57] Jean-Marie Gankou Fowagap, Marius Bendoma, and Moussé Ndoye Sow, “The Institutional Environment and the Link Between Capital Flows and Capital Flight in Cameroon,” African Development Review 28, S1 (2016): 65–87; “Between 47% and 62% of the CFA franc that enters Cameroon in the form of external debt is repatriated in the form of capital flight”, Investir au Cameroun, 7 January 2019.
[58] Léonce Ndikumana and James K. Boyce, Africa’s Hateful Debt: How Indebtedness and Capital Flight Bled a Continent (Dakar: Amalion Publishing, 2013), 90-91.
[59] Pigeaud, Sylla and Mitchell, Africa’s Last Colonial Coin, 91.
[60] January D. Nkurunziza, “Capital Flight and Poverty Reduction in Africa,” in Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects, and Policy Issues, ed. S. Ibi Ajayi and Léonce Ndikumana (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 81–110.
[61] Assanvo, “African Democracy and Western Imperialism. “
[62] Francisco J. Pérez, “An Enduring Neocolonial Alliance: A History of the CFA Franc,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 81, no. 5 (2022): 851-87.
Chen Zhang is a Ph. D. graduate. Candidate at the School of Foreign Languages, Peking University, People’s Republic of China. About Maxence Poulin
Maxence Poulin is a PhD candidate at the Department of political Science of Université du Québec, Montréal, Canada.
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