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Humanitarian cooperation highlights a possible path towards debate and de-escalation.
The Taiwan Coast Guard Worker Corps assists rescue team members of an inland fishing boat that capsized near the Kinmen Islands on March 14, 2024.
In a rare show of cooperation, Taiwan’s Coast Guard, at the request of the Chinese Coast Guard, has introduced search and rescue missions with its counterparts for surviving sailors after a fishing boat capsized near the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen and Matsu Islands, heavily fortified island groups, just a few kilometers from mainland China.
On March 14, Taiwan temporarily sent 4 coast guard vessels with rescue divers on board to the crisis near Kinmen, while China sent six helicopters and 3 ships. The next day, another Chinese fishing boat capsized near the Matsu Islands, prompting some of the other joint rescue operations on both sides.
In contrast to commonly depicted photographs of Taiwan’s remote islands, which show sharp anti-tank structures on beaches and heavy artillery weapons protected in underground tunnels, joint humanitarian cooperation efforts have highlighted the kind of cooperative environment that was most prominent a decade ago. Humanitarian assistance and cooperation will provide both sides with a potential springboard to reactivate channels of communication and ease tensions.
The rare glimmer of cooperation between Taiwan and China was preceded by a fatal collision between a Chinese fishing boat accused of entering a limited domain and a Taiwanese coast guard patrol boat near the Kinmen Islands. The collision resulted in the deaths of two Chinese fishermen. and the arrest of the other two survivors. China has accused Taiwan’s coast guard of “dangerous” acts of excessive force, while Taiwan has denied any misplaced conduct.
The incident prompted China to beef up coast guard patrols in limited spaces surrounding Taiwan, leading to the boarding of a Taiwanese tourist cruise ship sailing near Chinese waters. This incident shows the incredibly fragile state of relations between the two coasts at the present time and underscores the pressing need for greater culpable control of tensions to prevent incidents from escalating into wider conflicts.
Dialogue and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been severely stalled since 2016, when China ended official contacts with Taiwan following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In response, Tsai expressed her administration’s willingness to engage in discussions and resume exchanges with China if they are carried out on the basis of mutual equality and dignity. However, China refused to oppose this resolution unless Tsai accepted the 1992 Consensus, a purported agreement that emerged from an Assembly between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1992 to recognize Taiwan and mainland China as belonging to “one and the same entity. “China, each party has its own interpretation of what “China” means. .
Like Tsai, President-elect Lai Ching-te refused to settle for consensus, arguing that it would amount to conforming to China’s plan to rule Taiwan on Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” model.
Despite rising tensions between the two sides, cooperation on humanitarian aid – such as sea rescues – requires far fewer political preconditions than dialogues and exchanges. Humanitarian cooperation thus creates an exclusive opportunity for casual channels of communication. Dialogues on humanitarian aid can potentially open the door to dialogue on sensitive political, economic or security issues.
Dialogue that begins with non-governmental organizations is encouraged, as it leads to dialogues involving government agencies or semi-official organizations. Indeed, many advances in cross-border relations during periods of peak tension have traditionally been driven through civil and, first and foremost, controlled considerations. through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross.
The resumption of humanitarian aid and cross-Strait cooperation can also lessen the rise in nationalist pressures that are exacerbating tensions between the two skewers and goodwill by fostering people-to-people ties.
There are converging interests for both sides to resume informal dialogues on humanitarian issues, such as the control of intruding fishing vessels.
From the CCP’s perspective, any twist of fate brought about through the Chinese coast guard or fishing boats may worsen mainland China’s already waning appeal to Taiwan and increase aid to pro-independence governments and lawmakers. In addition, waves of Taiwan-centric nationalism are emerging. it can simply force CCP leaders to clamp down on Taiwan that threaten escalation at a time when the Chinese military is unprepared for an imaginable regional war around Taiwan.
Tensions between Taiwan and China have contributed to a sharp decline in foreign direct investment, which is imperative to alleviating China’s deepening economic crisis, which may ultimately threaten the CCP’s social stability. In contrast to China’s constant assurances about its goal of nonviolent development, fears of a war over Taiwan have also motivated China’s neighbors to increase defense spending and ties with the United States.
The incoming DPP leadership, headed by Lai Ching-te, is also facing increasing pressure to stabilize cross-strait relations. The fatal collision in the Kinmen Islands drew harsh complaints from the opposition KMT party. Even though the PDP will remain in place in the executive branch for the next 4 years, its lack of a majority in the legislature imposes increasing demands on the incoming Lai administration to handle tensions with China more effectively. On the defense side, civilian maritime injuries may simply cause more gray-zone-level conflict that would drain the resources needed to deter a full-scale invasion.
The likelihood of cross-Strait discussion and cooperation on humanitarian issues will depend on Lai’s policy toward China and the CCP’s ability to interact with Taiwan at some point without political preconditions. So far, China’s muted reaction to Lai’s election victory suggests that Beijing has not ruled out getting involved with Lai’s administration. Similarly, Lai denied any plans for a formal statement of non-conformity and expressed hope for resuming talks with China after his election victory.
Taiwan and China want to perceive that, first, humanitarian discussions and cooperation carry very little political threat and therefore require virtually no political preconditions. Dialogue and cooperation also serve to deter either side from crossing their respective political red lines. It is built naturally when new channels of discussion are opened and favorable cooperative relationships are formed. Each aspect will then make greater efforts to avoid inflammatory political comments and military actions as mutual threat perceptions decline.
The United States plays a supportive role in fostering cross-Strait humanitarian cooperation and dialogue. Policymakers want to perceive that U. S. -China relations are strong. These relationships are not automatically synonymous with strong cross-Strait relationships. Moreover, peace between the United States and China depends heavily on strong relations between the two skewers. An outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait would likely prompt U. S. involvement in Taiwan’s defense. For this reason, the resumption of communications and exchanges between Taiwan and China is a prerequisite for reducing the threat of tensions between China and the United States. The competition turns into a military conflict.
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In a rare show of cooperation, Taiwan’s Coast Guard, at the request of the Chinese Coast Guard, has introduced search and rescue missions with its counterparts for surviving sailors after a fishing boat capsized near the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen and Matsu Islands, heavily fortified island groups, just a few kilometers from mainland China.
On March 14, Taiwan temporarily sent 4 coast guard vessels with rescue divers on board to the crisis near Kinmen, while China sent six helicopters and 3 ships. The next day, another Chinese fishing boat capsized near the Matsu Islands, prompting some of the other joint rescue operations on both sides.
In contrast to commonly depicted photographs of Taiwan’s remote islands, which show sharp anti-tank structures on beaches and heavy artillery weapons protected in underground tunnels, joint humanitarian cooperation efforts have highlighted the kind of cooperative environment that was most prominent a decade ago. Humanitarian aid and cooperation will offer both sides a potential springboard to reactivate channels of communication and ease tensions.
The rare glimmer of cooperation between Taiwan and China was preceded by a fatal collision between a Chinese fishing boat accused of entering a limited domain and a Taiwanese coast guard patrol boat near the Kinmen Islands. The collision resulted in the deaths of two Chinese fishermen. and the arrest of the other two survivors. China has accused Taiwan’s coast guard of “dangerous” acts of excessive force, while Taiwan has denied any misplaced conduct.
The incident prompted China to beef up coast guard patrols in limited spaces surrounding Taiwan, leading to the boarding of a Taiwanese tourist cruise ship sailing near Chinese waters. This incident shows the incredibly fragile state of relations between the two coasts at the moment and underscores the pressing need for greater culpable control of tensions to prevent incidents from escalating into wider conflicts.
Dialogue and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been severely stalled since 2016, when China ended official contacts with Taiwan following the election of President Tsai Ing-wen of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In response, Tsai expressed her administration’s willingness to engage in discussions and resume exchanges with China if they are carried out on the basis of mutual equality and dignity. However, China refused to oppose this resolution unless Tsai accepted the 1992 Consensus, a purported agreement that emerged from an Assembly between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1992 to recognize Taiwan and mainland China as belonging to “one and the same entity. “China, each party has its own interpretation of what “China” means. .
Like Tsai, President-elect Lai Ching-te refused to settle for consensus, arguing that it would amount to conforming to China’s plan to rule Taiwan on Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” model.
Despite rising tensions between the two sides, cooperation on humanitarian aid (such as sea rescues) requires far fewer political preconditions than dialogues and exchanges. Humanitarian cooperation thus creates an exclusive opportunity for casual channels of communication. Dialogues on humanitarian aid can potentially open the door to dialogue on sensitive political, economic or security issues.
Dialogue that begins with non-governmental organizations is encouraged, as it leads to dialogues involving government agencies or semi-official organizations. Indeed, many advances in cross-border relations during periods of peak tension have traditionally been driven through civil and, first and foremost, controlled considerations. through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Red Cross.
The resumption of humanitarian aid and cross-Strait cooperation can also lessen the rise in nationalist pressures that are exacerbating tensions between the two skewers and goodwill by fostering people-to-people ties.
There are converging interests for both sides to resume informal dialogues on humanitarian issues, such as the control of intruding fishing vessels.
From the CCP’s perspective, any twist of fate brought about through the Chinese coast guard or fishing boats may worsen mainland China’s already waning appeal to Taiwan and increase aid to pro-independence governments and lawmakers. In addition, waves of Taiwan-centric nationalism are emerging. it can simply force CCP leaders to clamp down on Taiwan that threaten escalation at a time when the Chinese military is unprepared for an imaginable regional war around Taiwan.
Tensions between Taiwan and China have contributed to a sharp decline in foreign direct investment, which is imperative to alleviating China’s deepening economic crisis, which may ultimately threaten the CCP’s social stability. In contrast to China’s constant assurances about its goal of nonviolent development, fears of a war over Taiwan have also motivated China’s neighbors to increase defense spending and ties with the United States.
The incoming DPP leadership, headed by Lai Ching-te, is also facing increasing pressure to stabilize cross-strait relations. The fatal collision in the Kinmen Islands drew harsh complaints from the opposition KMT party. Even though the PDP will remain in place in the executive branch for the next 4 years, its lack of a majority in the legislature imposes increasing demands on the incoming Lai administration to handle tensions with China more effectively. On the defense side, civilian maritime injuries may simply cause more gray-zone-level conflict that would drain the resources needed to deter a full-scale invasion.
The likelihood of cross-Strait discussion and cooperation on humanitarian issues will depend on Lai’s policy toward China and the CCP’s ability to interact with Taiwan at some point without political preconditions. So far, China’s muted reaction to Lai’s election victory suggests that Beijing has not ruled out getting involved with Lai’s administration. Similarly, Lai denied any plans for a formal statement of non-conformity and expressed hope for resuming talks with China after his election victory.
Taiwan and China want to perceive that, first of all, humanitarian discussions and cooperation carry very little political threat and therefore require virtually no political preconditions. Dialogue and cooperation also serve to deter either side from crossing their respective political red lines. It is built naturally when new channels of discussion are opened and favorable cooperative relationships are formed. Each aspect will then make greater efforts to avoid incendiary political commentary and military action as mutual perceptions of threat diminish.
The United States plays a supportive role in fostering cross-Strait humanitarian cooperation and dialogue. Policymakers want to perceive that U. S. -China relations are strong. These relationships are not automatically synonymous with strong cross-Strait relationships. Moreover, peace between the United States and China depends heavily on strong relations between the two skewers. An outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait would likely prompt U. S. involvement in Taiwan’s defense. For this reason, the resumption of communications and exchanges between Taiwan and China is a prerequisite for reducing the threat of tensions between China and the United States. The competition turns into a military conflict.
In a rare show of cooperation, Taiwan’s Coast Guard, at the request of the Chinese Coast Guard, has introduced search and rescue missions with its counterparts for surviving sailors after a fishing boat capsized near the Taiwan-controlled Kinmen and Matsu Islands, heavily fortified island groups, just a few kilometers from mainland China.
On March 14, Taiwan temporarily sent 4 coast guard vessels with rescue divers on board to the crisis near Kinmen, while China sent six helicopters and 3 ships. The next day, another Chinese fishing boat capsized near the Matsu Islands, prompting some of the other joint rescue operations on both sides.
Philip Hou is president of Peace for Taiwan, a Washington-based nonprofit that focuses on Taiwan-related policies aimed at reducing tensions and reducing the threat of war. Hou graduated from Swarthmore College with a Bachelor of Arts degree.