In the wake of the death of Osama bin Laden in a U. S. special forces raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 1, U. S. lawmakers have raised specific questions about the legitimacy of Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts and the viability of fragile U. S. -Pakistan relations. The main detail of this dating is the billions of dollars in U. S. foreign aid to Pakistan, much of which goes to security-related programs.
Four experts offer a variety of perspectives on whether the U. S. deserves to continue this aid and, if so, under what conditions. CFR expert E. Candace Putnam argues that Pakistan wants to demonstrate its reliability as a strategic partner of the United States, but warns that “strong relief from U. S. aid will only jeopardize security cooperation,” while CFR’s Isobel Coleman points out that the U. S. It would gain advantages if it remained specifically concerned with “economic reform, power, and education, especially girls’ education. “Hassan Abbas of The Asia Society argues that history has shown that “Pakistan’s willingness to reach a non-violent and workable settlement in Afghanistan is indispensable” and that withholding aid would be “immoral” and counterproductive to U. S. interests. On the other hand, Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute believes that the United States deserves to reduce its foreign aid to Pakistan, but warns against abrupt relief that would “endanger U. S. military forces. “
The fact that Osama bin Laden has been hiding in Pakistan for five years shows that the Pakistani army is either complicit or incompetent. Either prospect is deeply troubling, but any further sharp cuts in U. S. aid will only jeopardize security cooperation that has been effective, if insufficient. to make America safer.
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The United States is constrained by three harsh realities:
— Closing terrorist safe havens and keeping Pakistan’s nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists requires sustained action in Pakistan.
— We fought in Afghanistan without 80% of the fuel and dry goods shipped through Pakistan. A guilty withdrawal of US forces depends on an Afghan political solution that Pakistan will influence.
— Pakistan’s stability affects India, Afghanistan, China and Iran. It is a country of 180 million Muslims suffering from weak civilian rule, high debt, and developing extremism fueled by widespread poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment. Sanctions would precipitate an economic crisis that could topple the current administration.
Pakistan hedges its bets, basically officially and unofficially supporting proxy terrorist forces that it uses for what it sees as existential strategic interests in Afghanistan and India. These proxies are killing our foot soldiers in Afghanistan and have global terrorist ambitions in the making.
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The United States has already cut off aid, with disastrous results. We funneled millions of dollars through Pakistan to drive the Soviets out of Kabul, but then cut off all aid for 12 years because of nuclear sanctions. After 9/11, we came back. with help mainly from the army and demanded that they fight the Taliban. Today, the rest of the Pakistani people suspect us as a climate-smart friend who supports military dictators. The emerging generation of Pakistani generals, excluded due to US sanctions, remains cautious. of cooperation at the very moment when we want Al Qaeda to be defeated.
Thanks to bilateral cooperation, more al-Qaeda leaders have been captured or killed in Pakistan than in any other country. But Pakistan is hedging its bets, mainly by officially and unofficially supporting proxy terrorist forces that it uses for what it sees as existential strategic interests in Afghanistan and India. These proxies are killing our foot soldiers in Afghanistan and have global terrorist ambitions unfolding. So the U. S. is also hedging its bets with unilateral moves like the attack on Osama.
The attack on Osama was a wake-up call: now it is Pakistan’s turn to demonstrate its reliability as an ally. Pakistan’s parliament, media and citizens are publicly wondering about a deeply embarrassed army and intelligence system. The United States has also demanded answers about the Osama aid network and is expected to contribute to an investigation that would transfer responsibility to the civilian government. An investigation will not publicly admit failure, but may simply lead to a reassessment of the strategic policy that would be in the interest of the United States. We will have to remain committed to making this happen.
Isabelle Coleman
Questions about how Osama bin Laden could have hidden for years alongside the Pakistani military in Abbottabad have highlighted the conflicting interests of the United States and Pakistan. David Headley’s upcoming trial (Reuters) is expected to reveal links between the Pakistani military and the terrorist organization that carried out the Mumbai attacks in 2008, and is very likely to cause additional tensions. Of course, the chronic double-playing of the ISI is nothing new. What is less identified is that the Pakistani military sees the global fundamentally differently than the U. S. military. Washington sees its aid to the Taliban as one of the fundamental reasons for terrorism, the same terrorism that has claimed more lives in Pakistan since 9/11 than in any other country. The Pakistani military sees its aid to the Taliban as very important to its own security: a source of leverage in Afghanistan when the U. S. inevitably leaves and a counterweight to India, its main rival. Nothing U. S. policymakers do or say will replace this dynamic.
The hard truth is that Pakistan is too strategic and too damaging for the U. S. to ignore. It is incumbent upon the United States to continue to engage in the spaces that can make the greatest difference, adding economic reforms, energy, and education.
As tensions rise between the two countries, demands are mounting in the United States for Washington to end its aid to Pakistan. However, history reminds us of the risks of walking away. Deeply involved with Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear program, we did so in the 1990s. As the U. S. deteriorated, Pakistan maintained its ties with the Taliban, as part of its “strategic depth” initiative to counter India and bring “stability” to Afghanistan after the Soviet occupation. It has also pursued a competitive nuclear program, accompanied by disastrous global proliferation.
The hard truth is that Pakistan is too strategically vital and too damaging for the U. S. to ignore. It is incumbent upon the United States to continue to be concerned about the spaces that can make the greatest difference, including economic reform, energy, and education, especially girls’ education. At current fertility rates, Pakistan’s population of 180 million will double in less than three decades, meaning that all social, economic, educational, health, and environmental disruptions will only increase. On the security front, the U. S. will have to admit that Pakistan will never abandon the Taliban and will continue to divert U. S. military aid to its eastern border with India rather than its western border to fight the Taliban. Any military confrontation that assumes otherwise is a foolish mission.
Hassan Abbas, member of the Asian Society; Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
The precise nature of the U. S. -Pakistan relationship remains a mystery. Pakistan has been called the “most allied ally” or the “most intimidated ally” of the United States. The truth may lie somewhere in between. However, in this case in this context, one fact is verifiable: the ups and downs between the two states have largely backfired, even more so for the United States than for Pakistan. The security of South Asia and the world has also been affected by the sanctions. The interruption of aid to Pakistan proved especially damaging in the era of Afghan Jihad that followed the 1980s. During the 1990s, the internal situation in Afghanistan went from bad to worse and the A. Q. Khan gained momentum as the two states went through a difficult situation. Bilateral phase.
Unless the U. S. military’s presence in Afghanistan is intended to be permanent (which is highly unlikely), Pakistan’s willingness to reach a nonviolent and viable settlement in Afghanistan is indispensable.
There are also strong arguments against the above claims. Many Pakistanis say the U. S. military’s aid to Pakistan has shattered the country’s democratic potential. Some circles in the U. S. also argue that, despite U. S. investments in Pakistan over the years, the U. S. military’s status quo is geared toward China. Hence the question: “Why are we stuck with Pakistan?
Simply put, it is because critical US interests are at stake in and around Pakistan. Unless the US military presence in Afghanistan is intended to be permanent (which is highly unlikely), Pakistan’s willingness to reach a workable, non-violent settlement in Afghanistan is essential. There is no way out and, if in doubt, it is advisable to take a quick look at recent history. Strengthening the peace process between India and Pakistan will also benefit US economic and industrial interests in the region. Last but not least, Pakistan has paid a heavy price for the US-led “war on terrorism” since 9/11, whether in terms of the reaction of various militant and terrorist groups or in terms of impact negative. about its economy. While Pakistan itself has played a key role in its drift towards extremism, American mistakes have also contributed to the existing situation. Therefore, cutting aid, especially aid for progress, at this time would be immoral and negative for American policy goals.
Marvin G. Weinbaum
American aid to Pakistan deserves to be reduced. The question is when and why? Certainly, the United States has not achieved a full return of its military and economic aid to Pakistan, which has amounted to more than $20 billion since 2001. Pakistan’s assistance in suppressing militant outfits involved in the insurgency in Afghanistan and its preference for quelling extremist groups Domestic violence with broader ambitions is at best productive, incomplete. Anger over bin Laden’s location of a safe haven in Abbottabad sharply intensified doubts about the partnership. Despite our efforts, American aid has so far generated far more resentment and suspicion in Pakistan than the public appreciates. Our policymakers have struggled to decide how productive it is to achieve political impact and distribute aid effectively. Threatening to end aid may simply be the kind of surprise remedy that Pakistan wants to achieve with domestic profit-extracting policies that would make the country less dependent on foreign aid. It can also be argued that the United States could achieve more with industrial concessions than with monetary aid.
U. S. aid deserves to be an investment and a stimulus for a more self-reliant and democratic Pakistan. In this way, ending it may lay the groundwork for more authentic strategic dating than being perceived as a punishment for Pakistan.
But cutting aid to Pakistan now would endanger U. S. military forces in Afghanistan and weaken the Pakistani military’s ability to confront the terrorist outfits entrenched in the country that threaten us both. It may also make us feel less certain about the fate of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. A revised U. S. aid policy should aim to empower groups and institutions as much as possible to recognize that the real threats to Pakistan’s security lie within the country, coming from its extremists and social unrest. and unresolved economic disorders in the country. Our systems will likely have to fund civil society, personal sector and government spaces at most to drive political reform and long-term economic growth. Although assistance to the military deserves to continue, it deserves to be more conditional on preventing bad habits and expanding opportunities for a greater civilian role in the conduct of foreign policy. American aid therefore deserves to be an investment and stimulus aimed at achieving a more autonomous and democratic Pakistan. In this way, ending it could simply lay the groundwork for a more authentic strategic dating, rather than being perceived as a punishment for Pakistan.