The twentieth century witnessed two primary influenza pandemics after the devastating and unprecedented 1918, namely the “Asian flu” (H2N2) of 1957, which killed about 1.1 million people internationally, and the so-called Hong Kong flu (H3N2) of 1968, where the number of international deaths at least about 1 million international deaths I fix largely in the population over 65 years.
What is striking about the at least rapid reading of the newspapers of the time is that the political size of the pandemics was underestimated or discreet. This is the case when compared to Covid-19, which allegedly claimed around 600,000 patients through mid-July 2020, although knowledge in peak countries is of very questionable accuracy. It is now transparent that the death toll from this year’s pandemic is expected to exceed those of 1957 and 1968.
Moreover, it is already transparent that its economic, cultural and political consequences are already of a different order. It is to the point that it has led some, such as the conservative British philosopher John Gray, to claim (in a widely cited essay published in the New Statesman) that this is nothing less than a “turning point in history.” In the following paragraphs, I propose to question this characterization.
The reasons behind such an accusation are quite evident on some level. The 1957 and 1968 pandemics were allowed to run their course without major state intervention. We can go back to the reasons for this relative inaction below. It is also transparent that statistics that have been maintained on inflamed people and the number of deaths in the two years of the pandemic remain incredibly close.
It is not known whether there were rumours at the time that they suggested that these pandemics were the planned or unforeseen consequences of biological warfare, but those rumors do not appear to have been widespread. By contrast, the maximum non-unusual conceptions at the popular point seem to have liked theories such as an inevitable 11-year cycle for virus pandemics. Neither states nor submissive populations in the 1950s and 1960s expected primary regulatory intervention.
A first exception to this lack of conspiracy theories occurred in 1992, when a New York Times article reporting on the so-called Russian flu of 1977 stated that many scientists believed that “a 1950s influenza virus, stored in a lab freezer in a study center in China, launched around in 1977.” It is striking that the same story continues, adding nonetheless that “pandemic influenza traditionally originated in China – even the poorly called Spanish flu of 1918 had Asian origins – basically because the country has many ducks.”
Why have the pandemics of 1957 and 1968 had what, in retrospect, is such a boring public response to us, despite its surprising mortality? There are several imaginable reasons for this. The first, to which I will return later, is that the economic effect of these two pandemics has been relatively limited, even though US GDP fell in 1958 (the relatively short-lived “Eisenhower recession”). , with negative effects on the world economy.
By contrast, Raghuram Rajan, former leading economist of the International Monetary Fund, a few months ago that this year “Western countries [will see] a replacement in GDP expansion from around [positive] 2% to 3%, to negative. 4% or 5%, ” and China’s expansion figures are even more pessimistic lately.
The explanation for the moment is that the concept of large population losses was still considered “normal” after World War II. The years 1958 to 1962 saw the huge famine of the Great Leap coming in China, the genuine dimensions that the Chinese Communist Party controlled to remain hidden for a long time, and whose death toll would possibly have ranged from 20 million to 30 million (although statistics remain the subject of a lively debate).
At the same time as the 1968 pandemic, the civil war between Nigeria and Biafra would possibly have killed up to 2 million more people because of the famine. According to some, the 1971 clash in East Pakistan (soon to Bangladesh) claimed between 2 and 3 million lives. These are all man-made mistakes that may also have been avoided in other circumstances, but have not been avoided. The latter two have attracted some attention, but only in limited circles.
The third explanation is the limited resources that governments had to interfere socially in the 1950s and 1960s, and therefore the limited expectations that existed for them. There is little doubt that the state’s ability to interfere has increased significantly in the meantime, albeit very unequally, and in some cases (such as the former Soviet Union) would possibly even have diminished.
A fourth explanation of why it is the replacement in the role of the media, which reported on the pandemics of 1957 and 1968 only episodicly and in a technical and opaque language. This is very different from the current situation, where we have a 24/7 news policy cycle, in addition to many sites that offer a constant update of all kinds of more or less reliable statistics, as well as the massive role played through social networks of various types in publishing “human interest” reports.
In other words, the first pandemics of the mid-century, government inaction came here with very low political value (and perhaps not at all). This would not have been the case in 2020, apart from the fact that all the signs recommend that Covid-19 is by far the deadliest of the three, and may simply, in the absence of travel restrictions, social estrangement and other blocking measures. – have produced a death toll of tens of millions (2.2 million in the United States alone, according to the statistical style of London Imperial College).
In turn, the fact of a large state intervention means that it is the greatest “political” virus since 1950, the policy has been carried out in various ways. Several other political dimensions of Covid-19 must be exposed, before reaching the express implications in terms of political economy.
The first is foreign policy and interstate competition. As we know, the government of the People’s Republic of China first tried to minimize the effects of the virus by January 2020, denying that it was highly contagious, probably as a way to divert foreign criticism. Subsequently, he shrewdly attempted to take victory from the jaws of defeat, claiming that he had made a draconian and bachelor blockade in Wuhan (and hubei province in general), thus dramatically resolving his own virus challenge in a short time.
However, many outside observers questioned the veracity of China’s statistics, namely the stabilization of around 4,600 deaths from 83,000 cases through mid-April, as well as the trajectory in which the virus had virtually disappeared from early to mid-March. The expulsion of several foreign press correspondents has only added doubts, although one may legitimately wonder whether it would be imaginable (with the Internet and social media still in operation, though censored) to organize a large cover-up of the deaths. .
But what is remarkable is that the People’s Republic of China has now presented itself around the world as a style for dealing with these pandemics. Similarly, it is not uncommon to compare the functionality of other governments and rate them according to the answers they propose (the ephemeral fascination with Sweden is an example). Chaotic and strangely uncoordinated policies in the United States, for example, can be perceived as a lousy exposure to the political formula in that country.
A simplistic political conclusion can be drawn that democracy is a luxury in the face of such a pandemic, and that totalitarian governments are the most productive to deal with it. In any case, they would possibly be more well equipped to publish official statistics tailored to their stories. Still, Putin’s Russia and the current Iranian government have admitted well their inability to deal with the problem, and social media suggests figures even higher than disastrous official statistics.
There is no doubt that knowledge and data are manipulated around the world through agencies, some of which are government. This inevitably leads us to a political dimension at the moment, which is in terms of a wide dissemination of conspiracy theories, especially in Western countries, and with a profound acquisition in much of the excessive right and excessive left of the political spectrum. These are divided globally into two categories.
The first set, supported for a time by such influential figures as the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, stated that Covid-19 is neither more contagious nor more fatal than seasonal viruses that occur every year, and that they cause many sick people without much attention. Array From this perspective, based on the theoretical writings of Carl Schmitt and Michel Foucault (although much rougher than one or the other’s conceptions), Covid-19 is just an opportunity for the ancient democratic states of Western Europe and elsewhere to interact in a notorious “biopolitical” of surveillance, control of the subject framework, and lasting closure of various political and cultural resistance posts. In short, Covid-19 is just another (albeit very effective) weapon in Big Brother’s arsenal.
Another view, which enjoys great popularity in parts of France and the United States, is that Covid-19 was actually a laboratory creation, which was militarized. Here, we have the opportunity to decide on your villain: the U.S. government, The Government of the People’s Republic of China, George Soros, pharmaceutical companies, etc. If one should believe in the first of these theories, of course, it is a strong motivation to forget about any “blocking” instruction, as a form of civil disobedience. This is possibly due in part to the wonderful difficulty (although there are other contributing factors) that many governments face in ensuring that social estrangement measures are followed or “stay home.” It has also exacerbated border tensions among others who do not and do not respect regulations.
This brings us to a third political dimension, which is how the spread of Covid-19, in a relatively short era, has contributed to defensive nationalism as well as its more excessive incarnation in the form of xenophobia. European solidarity was one of the first potential victims of the pandemic. Those who have at all times opposed global economic integration as a motion (both far left and far right) are now taken into account justified; because in fact Robinson Crusoe would have been saved through Covid-19.
Echoes of this can be discovered even in John Gray’s more moderate essay cited above, which turns out to celebrate the return of more muscular nationalism as an imaginable end result of the pandemic. Brexit supporters would possibly argue that they were right after all, despite the fact that the National Health Service is densely populated by immigrant doctors and nurses, adding those who were at the bedside of Boris Johnson’s hospital when he was hit with the virus.
India’s reports recommend the inevitable reaction to migrants in the metropolitan cities of northeastern India, which seem somewhat “Chinese” to their neighbors. In the United States, Donald Trump has also continually returned to xenophobic issues, this is not a novelty in his home. Despite what might seem like an erratic and incoherent strategy, its popularity has not yet suffered primary damage in the country, and there is still a different option from his re-election in November 2020 (the money is lately on his opponent, Joe Biden).
The political implications of such defensive nationalism are more likely to occur quite temporarily is in the European Union. Tensions between the south (Greece, Italy and Spain) and the north will be exacerbated, and Germany’s relative good fortune in combating the virus can only be stereotyped as “stronger” and “weaker” partners.
But where this can also tip the scales is with respect to the already fragile government of Emmanuel Macron, who has already suffered two blows with the Yellow Jacket movement and the extended movements of 2019. Macron would possibly now seem like a wonderful survivor. , however, he suffers from it. a huge lack of legitimacy in terms of “street credit.” His television appearances, complaining and cajoling French audiences for a modicum of respect for the rule of law under Covid-19, have made a rather pathetic spectacle.
However, it is imaginable that Macron will be re-elected in 2022, but what concerns is that this can only open the door to really important achievements through the National Marine Le Pen Rally, which may even have strength. with the involuntary complicity of the excessive left and his Oedipal politics of Vatermord presidential. With a Europe led by right-wing nationalist parties country after country, it is hard to believe how the European Union will remain more than just a shell in the 2020s.
But none of these elements make the Covid-19’s surprise a true “turning point”; on the contrary, they recommend that surprise only accelerates the processes they already provide or embryos (such as the possible sinking of Macron), rather than reversing a very explained trend that moves elsewhere. The genuine factor to be solved is that of the global political economy, where several primary questions remain, in terms of variables (policies) that are exogenous and endogenous.
There are three large unknowns: the duration and number of waves of the pandemic; their ability to strengthen in tropical and semi-tropical regions such as Brazil and India; the rate at which effective medications and/or vaccines can be found. What is transparent on the political point is that strong “blocking” measures are in fact not viable for long periods in many parts of the world (particularly in the south) and will soon have their limits, even in extremely rich regions.
There are painful decisions on the horizon to prevent what is still a recession from becoming a global depression comparable to that of 1929. Economists such as Nobel laureates Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo propose a return to Keynesian deficit financing responses to rebuild demand, at least in economies like India. But many conservative governments will be reluctant to do so and prefer distributions to companies in the hope of generating “secondary” responses. Inevitably, there will be a variety of responses around the global and very little coordination among other national policies.
My crystal ball is not much clearer than that of the others, however, it seems clear to me that the net effects of this surprise will not be distributed lightly around the world for the next 3 to five years. States with greater over their work and a specific hybrid form of state capitalism and crony capitalism like China would possibly be better able to deal with this typhoon than the United States or the United Kingdom. In India or Indonesia, genuine concern is in terms of the direct human burden of mortality, as is the case in parts of Brazil and Latin America, and can also become so in sub-Saharan Africa.
However, when the dust has settled a little around the disaster of this pandemic, say in 2022, it is hard to believe in a brave new global nation-states. Rather, it will be a world of ever-larger, interdependent but competing powers, some very close to empires, in an acceleration of trends already visible in 2010 or 2015. That’s why the 2020 crisis probably wouldn’t be a “turning point.” (at most the sign of the derived settings), but at most one inflection point.
He is a professor of history at the University of California, Los Angeles.