On 3 November, members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will meet to discuss the extension of the mandate of Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under this name, the European Union has maintained a force, known as EUFOR, in the Balkan country since 2004 to keep the peace after the end of the Bosnian war.
In the midst of the war in Ukraine, there are fears that Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, will act as a spoilsport and veto the extension. Their goal may only be to put more pressure on the EU and the US. The US to avoid supporting Ukrainian resistance to its army’s aggression.
While, at first glance, such a move might seem like a damaging precedent that may also destabilize Bosnia and, by extension, the rest of the Western Balkans, a Russian veto of EUFOR may also become smart for the country. .
When Bosnians think about their desires for security today, they think of what happened during the war and genocide.
In early July 1995, the commander of Bosnian Serb insurgent forces, Ratko Mladić, presented his attack on the UN-designated area of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia. Over the past 3 years, Srebrenica and its defenders resisted repeated attacks, protecting the thousands of Bosniaks who had fled the advancing Serb forces and sought safe haven there.
Mladić and his troops marched on Srebrenica on 11 July and, in front of television cameras, vowed to “take revenge on the Turks,” referring to the Bosniaks. Fleeing prowling Serb forces, thousands of Bosniaks sought refuge at a UN base in Potočari, near Srebrenica, hoping that the Dutch battalion stationed as a component of the UN peacekeeping project (UNPROFOR) would accept them.
But it didn’t. The refugees were handed over to Mladić’s troops. The men and boys were separated from the women and summarily executed. Seeing the writing on the wall, thousands of Bosniaks tried to break the siege to succeed in the territory controlled by the Bosnian government. Bosnian Serb forces bombed them and carried out mass executions of those they captured.
The Bosnian genocide taught Bosnians a lesson: not to accept Europeans as true for their cover and not to rely on foreign institutions, such as the UN. Self-sufficiency and autonomy had to be established, but until then, the country needed strong coverage. opposed to foreign forces.
This happened in December 1995 in the form of NATO’s Operation Joint Endeavour introduced under the Dayton Accords. It has deployed a multinational force of 60,000 troops — adding 20,000 Americans — to implement the peace deal.
Unlike past or future U. S. interventions, there were no casualties as a result of hostile fire. The US-led interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s were the ultimate success of the post-Cold War era.
From 1995 to 2004, this physically powerful military presence and, in particular, the deployment of US troops ensured Bosnia’s security and stability, enabling state-building. Then, in 2004, the Bush administration entrusted the project to the European Union. and its EUFOR. At the time, large numbers of American infantrymen were involved in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Bosnia was considered secure.
This withdrawal from Bosnia had long-term implications for the country’s security.
The absence of U. S. troops has left a security vacuum. All actors in Bosnia knew very well that the American presence represented a commitment to a functioning Bosnia. Without this, American influence was destined to decline and those who opposed a solid Bosnia would be strengthened.
Indeed, two years later, in 2006, extremist Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik stormed the Republika Srpska, one of the two entities established through the Dayton Accords, and has been an undisputed leader in that part of the country ever since. He undermined the establishments and purposes of the unified Bosnian state and, in combination with other Bosnian politicians pursuing their own interests, sabotaged the building of a strong Bosnian army that could protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country.
In addition, the forces deployed across the EU to upgrade the NATO continent have been insufficient. For many Bosniaks, those troops brought back memories of UNPROFOR, the UN Protection Force it protected.
Today, 18 years after EUFOR came to power, the Bosnians still feel safe. Fears over Bosnia’s security have grown since Dodik took serious political and legislative steps towards secession in 2021. In response, the US and UK imposed sanctions on the separatist politician. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Dodik, who sided with Moscow, said his secession plans had been put on hold.
Another Russian supporter, Bosnian Croat leader Dragan Čović, also said he was seeking a “territorial reorganization” of the country. Many analysts in Bosnia agree that Čović’s ultimate purpose is to divide the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one of two entities within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to identify a “third entity” – essentially, a Bosnian-Croat edition of Republika Srpska. In pursuit of this purpose, Čović is sent through Croatian President Zoran Milanović, who has expressed in favor of Croatian autonomy in Bosnia.
With its clients, Dodik and Čović, in place, Russia may simply seek to destabilize the Western Balkans. One way to do this may be to veto the UN Security Council resolution to extend EUFOR’s mandate.
Many saw EUFOR as a reassuring presence in the country. However, EUFOR in Bosnia has lately only 1,100 troops from 20 countries. This is a far cry from the overwhelming 60,000-strong force deployed in Bosnia after the war. In other words, today’s EUFOR is not prepared to face a real security challenge. It has had good luck so far because, fortunately, it has never been tested and provides a false sense of security.
In this context, Russia’s veto of EUFOR is probably not bad news. Such a move would be a clear signal for Washington and NATO to pay more attention to the Balkans. The end of EUFOR may also mean the resurrection of the NATO project in Bosnia. , which would be a spice for the country’s security and drive away secessionist ambitions.
Tellingly, Dodik went to Moscow in September to ask Russian President Vladimir Putin not to veto the renewal of EUFOR’s mandate. You may also worry that a much larger peacekeeping deployment, i. e. a US-led NATO redeployment, merits European forces leaving. .
It is clear that the way forward for Probosnian political leaders is to accentuate cooperation with NATO and to advocate tirelessly in Washington and Brussels for an early Alliance club. This will be the main objective of the next Bosnian government.
But even if a NATO deployment does not materialize, the demise of EUFOR should not be deplored. A weak foreign force apparently deployed to maintain security in the country may undermine the judgment of Bosnian decision-makers and the general population. For my generation of Bosnians, it is far better not to have illusions than to have a false sense of security.
The perspectives expressed in this article are those of and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial position.