In October 2022, progressive Democrats in the U. S. Congress were able to win a major decision. The U. S. caused a stir by issuing a letter urging President Joe Biden to continue negotiations with Russia to end the standoff in Ukraine. The signatories called for a “proactive diplomatic push . . . Seeking a realistic framework for a ceasefire The letter was temporarily retracted and its publication was attributed to personnel error. Kyiv is unlikely to achieve additional military advances in the foreseeable future. Ukraine’s supporters reacted furiously, saying that negotiations inevitably meant a compromise with Russia and thus a victory for Russia.
But asking whether negotiations are smart or bad is a mistake. Negotiations are just a tool and, like any tool, are useful insofar as they can promote interests and lead to privileged end results. results for the USA U. S. and Ukraine not to negotiate?
Right now, the answer is still no. No agreement is imaginable between a Ukraine that is making steady progress on the battlefield and a Russia that denies this reality. Even calling for talks today risks reaping benefits for Moscow. But this stalemate must not be permanent. By keeping up pressure on Russia, Ukraine and its Western partners can begin to create the conditions for successful negotiations.
To determine whether a deal is imaginable, negotiators occasionally refer to a concept known as “imaginable agreement dominance” or ZOPA. The ZOPA is the difference between the actual effects of the parties in the negotiation, that is, the difference between the maximum absolute that one of the parties can be offering and the absolute minimum that the other can accept. It is in one aspect of this hole that lies the diversity of agreements theoretically appropriate for either party. The task of negotiators is to decide on one, with each. aspect that naturally seeks the most productive imaginable treatment for itself, which is occasionally as close as possible to the effects of the other aspect.
For a ZOPA to exist, there will have to be packages of possible agreements that are greater for either party than its actual outcomes: in negotiating jargon, your “best option for a negotiated deal” or BATNA. The BATNA, which determines whether a ZOPA exists, are not immutable. They are replaced as the underlying scenario replaces, through a planned action. If one party’s BATNA deteriorates, for example, because its customers on the battlefield shrink, the area for potential deals expands as a deal becomes a relatively larger selection for that party.
As things stand, there is no SPA between Russia and Ukraine: the maximum Russia is willing to settle for is lower, and probably much lower, than Ukraine is willing to settle. Ukrainian officials have indicated their goal of retaking each and every square. Inch of Ukrainian territory, adding occupied spaces before the start of the last confrontation in February 2022. For their part, Russian officials have said they are determined to retain key Ukrainian territories, such as Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. These positions do not appear to be mere positions. Rather, they reflect how both sides understand their true interests at this time.
To open up a ZOPA containing feasible and desirable agreements, the Russian BATNA will have to get worse, militarily and in a different way, so that Moscow agrees to settle for less. At the same time, the BATNA of Ukraine and the West will have to not get worse and deserve to be preferable, militarily, economically and in a different way, so that Kyiv does not feel the pressure to settle for mistreatment. Moving forward together on those goals, rather than constantly calling the parties to the table, is the most productive thing to do. path to customers for a negotiated settlement. As Russia’s BATNA worsens and Ukraine’s BATNA, diplomats can work to craft binding agreements that serve the interests of Washington and Kyiv.
Russia, Ukraine and the West use intelligence and research to discern the true net outcome of the other side. To evaluate the minimum offer that your counterparty will accept, a negotiator will need to perceive how the other party sees your interests. (and therefore what they value), and who among its various actors influences their interests to the maximum. These responsibilities are further confused by the fact that both sides have strong tactical incentives to exaggerate their actual effects in order to skew the talks in their favor, be it the negotiations and their preparation.
In the case of Ukraine and Russia, the true net outcome of either aspect is not easy to discern. While the standoff is primarily motivated by control of territory, which legally belongs to Ukraine, Moscow and Western officials have warned that any negotiated settlement deserves to be stopped. take into account other factors, such as a ceasefire, sanctions relief, prisoner exchanges, security relations between Russia and NATO, and Ukraine’s attitude towards the alliance and the EU. At first glance, this broader schedule would likely seem to complicate the client for a negotiated outcome. But several unresolved issues, which the parties likely weigh differently against each other, could be a boon, as they can prevent talks from turning into a sour zero-sum festival over a disagreement between singles.
It is already difficult enough for Ukraine and the West to assess their own interests and the BATNAs to determine what comprehensive agreements would be feasible and desirable. But to succeed in a deal, Western and Ukrainian negotiators will also want to perceive whose interests are driving Russia’s behavior. It’s less complicated said than done. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the ill-fated invasion of Moscow can have a complex realistic conception of the Russian national interest, given the enormous economic, diplomatic and human burden the country paid to achieve so little. However, as a dictatorship, Russia is probably guided more by the non-public interests of Preaspect Vladimir Putin, which appear to be driven by his preference for rebuilding the Russian empire and consolidating his grip on power. Some analysts have even warned that Putin has lost part of Russia’s far-right fringe. It presents a big deal for the West and Ukraine on how they think through the negotiations, and what kinds of deals could be struck in relation to BATNA on any aspect, whether it be Russia’s national interest, Putin’s staff, or the interests of other factions. which will find out the Russian positions.
For each party to rationally accept an agreement, that agreement will have to look hornier than its BATNA. Basically, the BATNA in any of the aspects is formed through their own perceptions, which do not want to make sense to other observers. Today, Ukraine, based on its recent successes on the battlefield, sees the army’s victory as its most productive option for a negotiated settlement. This does not mean that the negotiations are useless for Kyiv, but that, in his opinion, the talks deserve to produce the same or greater outcome at a lower cost. On the other hand, Moscow would possibly have lost confidence in its ability to achieve a general army victory, but it still turns out that it can hold on to Ukraine’s key territories through stubborn resistance and degrading Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. He would possibly consider the costs, adding the domestic political costs, of saying yes to a realistic agreement as outweighing the costs of continuing the war.
Therefore, one way to open up a ZOPA is to replace Russia’s functionality by worsening its belief in the opportunities of a negotiated settlement and thus making it more attractive. It is clear that Moscow’s vision of what it can achieve without negotiations has already been obscured, thanks to a mixture of fierce Ukrainian resistance, assistance from the Western army, economic sanctions, German rearmament and the planned expansion of NATO to come with Sweden and Finland. While Russian officials spoke casually at the beginning of the invasion about capturing Kyiv and replacing the Ukrainian government, today they show little conviction about their ability even for the weak territorial anchorage they have outside Crimea and Donbass.
Western and Ukrainian policymakers deserve to note that Russia is also seeking to undermine Ukraine’s BATNA. Moscow understands that Ukraine has gained confidence in the option of an absolute victory of the army since Russian forces have been repulsed. Russia has tried to undermine this acceptance as true by signaling its commitment to the struggle, for example through the official annexation of Ukrainian territory through fictitious referendums and the recruitment of Russians into the armed forces, despite the unpopularity of this latest resolution in their country. Russia’s nuclear threats are also most likely aimed at shaking Ukraine’s confidence. The use of nuclear weapons would not be in Moscow’s general interest, given the threat of retaliation, but if such threats make Western officials think again and moderate their results, they will have achieved their goal.
Indeed, the fact that so many Russian threats are directed at the West rather than Ukraine indicates something else that complicates this conflict. The characteristics to worsen Russia’s BATNA, whether economic or military, are not only in the hands of Ukraine. The clients of the Kiev army do not count. It depends only on the ability and courage of its troops, but also on Western help. Similarly, the United States, Europe and other partners impose sanctions that erode BATNA and limit Russia’s economy and war functions. And while the West and Ukraine are sometimes well aligned — Kyiv needs to regain its territory, and Washington and Brussels must demonstrate that the nutransparent armed aggressors cannot simply take over by force — the differences between them are evident. territory, adding Crimea and Donbass, while U. S. officialsThe U. S. has made it clear that Ukraine will only recover territories seized through Russia from February 24, 2022.
The dilemma for Ukraine is therefore that the moves it might take to worsen Russia’s BATNA may also backfire and worsen its own by widening the differences between Kyiv and its Western backers. For example, Kyiv’s rush in November 2022 to characterize a missile attack in Poland on Moscow than its own errant air defenses: dangers that amplify Western considerations about escalation. Europe risked reaping benefits Moscow by revealing cracks between its adversaries.
On the other hand, when US and European officials publicly express fear of an escalation or a nu-transparent war with Russia, or ask Kyiv to negotiate with Moscow a desirable deal without transparent clients, they would possibly inadvertently sign that Russia’s efforts to escalate Ukraine’s BATNA are Most likely, such statements recommend that the West reassess what a victory of the Ukrainian army would cost. making territorial commitment more favorable in comparison. No wonder, then, that Moscow declared itself willing to negotiate, while Ukraine necessarily refused. Moscow’s real purpose is probably not to open talks, but to widen the perceived vacuum between Ukrainian and Western interests and weaken those of the latter for the continuation of the conflict.
Given the glaring lack of overlap between what Ukraine and the West would consider appropriate and what Russia would demand, there is little explanation as to why going to the negotiating table right now would produce final results that would benefit Western or Ukrainian interests. But Western officials deserve to be reassured. In the battle of BATNA, Ukraine is winning. Ukrainian forces have fared much better, and Russia much worse, than anyone imagined before the conflict, and Moscow’s hopes for what it can achieve militarily worsen with every inch of territory it takes and holds. If the United States and Europe want Russia to leave Ukraine after a negotiated settlement, they must, paradoxically, convince Moscow of its commitment to allow Ukrainian foot soldiers to expel Russian troops by force. and to redouble other sanctions against Russian aggression. This means keeping pressure on Moscow, backing Ukraine relentlessly, and keeping disagreements with Kyiv secret. Only when such paintings begin to open a ZOPA, diplomats can effectively achieve artistic agreements.