Ahead of this week’s assembly between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Sochi, it is worth trying to make sense of the vital, albeit complex and puzzling, relationship between Russia and Turkey. The key to understanding this lies in their intertwined interests and aspirations. in Eurasia.
Russia and Turkey have a long and occasionally conflicting history. The rivalry between the Ottoman and Russian empires saw the two powers clash in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially in the Balkans, where Moscow positioned itself as the defender of Orthodox Christians opposed to Russia. Turkey and Russia/Soviet Union were, for the most part, at odds throughout the twentieth century, adding during the Cold War, when Turkey was a key frontline best friend of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) along the southern borders of the USSR.
With the disintegration of the USSR, relations between Russia and Turkey, especially economic ones, evolved rapidly. At the same time, as Turkey sought to expand its presence and influence in the newly independent states of the South Caucasus, the Balkans, and Central Asia, the former geopolitical tensions between Russia temporarily resurfaced, and Moscow distrusted Ankara’s intentions.
Personal affinities are also important: Putin and Erdoğan assign photographs of populist strongmen, sharing nationalist perspectives.
What motivates the relationship?
Trade and investment links are vital. The bilateral industry totaled US$26 billion in 2019, basically Turkish imports of force and grains, while Russia is a vital market for Turkish agricultural producers. Russians make up the largest number of foreign tourists in Turkey: about 4. 7 million (20% of the total number of visitors) in 2021. In addition to supplying about forty-five percent of Turkey’s herbal fuel and a fourth part of its oil, Russia is also building the country’s first nuclear power station.
But, especially over the past 15 years, intertwined geopolitical interests and strategic aspirations have shaped relations between Moscow and Ankara. Both Russia and Turkey seek to rebuild their position and influence as key Eurasian regional powers. In addition, they prefer to minimize the role of external powers and multilateral establishments in managing the affairs of their neighbourhood.
Personal affinities are also important: Putin and Erdoğan assign photographs of populist strongmen, sharing nationalist perspectives. The two leaders know each other and can work together. But their regional ambitions inevitably create frictional problems when the two countries rub shoulders with each other. For example, Russia and Turkey oppose camps in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus. However, they have sometimes controlled themselves to manage their rivalry pragmatically. They cooperate when their interests align, but make fun of each other when they don’t, building a modus vivendi that avoids direct confrontation.
The trilateral format of Astana established by Russia, Turkey and Iran to deal with Syrian issues is an example, going through the UN peace process. Another is the ceasefire agreement negotiated by Moscow to end the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia by the end of 2020, of which Russia and (implicitly) Turkey are the guarantors, unlike the old procedure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which included the United States, France and Russia.
Even as events threatened to derail the bilateral, adding Turkey’s downing of a Russian Su-24 fighter near the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2015 (prompting severe Russian sanctions against Turkey for some time) and the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara. in December 2016, either country addressed the challenge effectively, minimizing damage to their wider hip.
It’s not binary dating, but it works for both countries.
Good relations with Moscow allow Erdoğan to pursue his strategic autonomy purpose: to leverage Turkey’s strategic importance to position Ankara as an influential force that plays a balancing role as a key state between the West and Russia, Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. Although officially a NATO ally, Erdogan’s foreign policy technique is pragmatic and transactional and sometimes contradictory.
Although frustrated by Erdogan’s moves in Syria and elsewhere, Russia will have to negotiate with Turkey to manage its regional interests.
Turkey does not need to move away from the West and remain uncomfortably dependent on Moscow, whether for economic or security reasons. But Erdogan will not allow the U. S. to allow the U. S. to do so. The US and Europe take Turkey for granted. And you won’t have forgotten that they didn’t do it without delay. helping him in the failed coup of 2016 (on the other hand, Putin’s quick show of help earned Erdoğan’s gratitude).
It’s a juggling act.
Erdoğan calculates that Turkey’s independent stance gives him influence with the US. The U. S. and Europe, which it is willing to use, as evidenced by its difficult tactics related to the membership of Sweden and Finland in NATO. Turkey’s efforts to find a middle way are evident in its technique for War in Ukraine. Ankara temporarily joined its Western allies in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but refused to join them in imposing sanctions on Moscow. Instead, Turkey positioned itself as a mediator, recently negotiating at most (with the UN) the agreement that facilitates Ukraine’s grain exports.
There is a detail of internal politics for Erdoğan. Facing a difficult re-election contest next year, Erdogan hopes his high-level efforts to improve Ankara’s foreign prestige and sway the favors of the Turkish electorate will offset the crippling effect of the economy. Deteriorate
What’s in it for Russia?
Although rarely frustrated by Erdogan’s moves in Syria and elsewhere, Russia will have to work with Turkey to manage its regional interests. In any case, he knows that Turkey cannot be seriously out of the game with Russia, especially for economic reasons. , but also because Moscow may simply complicate Ankara’s efforts to counter Kurdish teams in northern Syria. As long as the irritants are manageable, Moscow will tolerate them, believing that Russia’s broader strategic interests are being served by encouraging Erdogan’s unpredictability within NATO, thus complicating relations within the Western alliance.
It is clear that the complex but significant dating between Moscow and Ankara, which combines rivalry and competition, will continue to shape geopolitics in Eurasia.
The interpreter provides in-depth research and expert observation on the most recent foreign events, published daily through the Lowy Institute.