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Colombian-Venezuelan guerrillas: how the Colombian migrated to Venezuela
Over the past two years, Venezuelan states along the border with Colombia have experienced firsthand the death and destruction of a war they had spent part of a century watching from a distance.
Colombian Marxist guerrilla teams have been welcomed in Venezuela for a long time, at least since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998. But now, some factions have been markedly unwanted and subjected to sustained offensives through Venezuelan security forces, resulting in airstrikes, shootings, assassinations, landmines, kidnappings, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, torture and abuse. The evils of the Colombian civil war left their mark on Venezuela.
For decades, Colombian rebels have used a porous border, isolated terrain and friendly government to use Venezuela as a sanctuary beyond the success of the Colombian military.
But over the years, the guerrillas’ presence in Venezuela has evolved, a procedure that accelerated with the demobilization of Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), in 2016.
SEE ALSO: Ex-FARC Mafia Profile
Today, dissident factions of the FARC, collectively known as the ex-FARC mafia, and the last remaining national insurgency, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), not only station their forces and harbor their leaders in Venezuela, but also control drug routes, illegal mining operations, and other corrupt economies on Venezuelan soil. They fill their ranks with Venezuelan recruits, build networks among the Venezuelan population, and position themselves as the de facto government in Venezuelan communities abandoned or ignored by the state. . And they fight for resources and territory. The factions and guerrilla fronts operating along the border are now as Venezuelan as they are Colombian. They are binational groups and represent a risk to binational security. sanctuary and they are experiencing the revolution that they may never make in Colombia,” Luis Trejos, an educator and expert on Colombia n conflict, said of the ELN. “That’s why he bet so much on Venezuela. “
Although the FARC and ELN began using Venezuelan territory in their crusade to overthrow the Colombian state as early as the 1970s, it was the events of the early 2000s that triggered their evolution into binational groups. First, the collapse of a peace process between the FARC and the Colombian government in 2002, which saw the rebels lose their safe haven in the demilitarized zone, granted them negotiations. Then came an unprecedented military crusade ordered by former President Alvaro Uribe and financed with U. S. aid.
Military tension drove the guerrillas to the far reaches of Colombia, including the border with Venezuela, where they discovered a best friend in leftist President Hugo Chavez. The insurgents and the president not only shared political views, they also shared enemies: the right-wing Colombian government and its patron, the United States. As the courtship between the insurgents and the Chavez government deepened, the rebels went from using Venezuela as a mere hideout to turning it into a vital base of operations. The country presented the guerrillas with new territory to finance themselves through drug trafficking and other corrupt economies, secure access to weapons and supplies, and carry out political work. Also, their leaders can simply plan military campaigns without worrying about persecution. But the peace process between the FARC and the Colombian government, which officially began in 2012 with Venezuela acting as facilitator and guarantor, served as a catalyst for the guerrillas to take before a definitive peace agreement was signed in 2016, several fronts of the FARC rejected the negotiations and separated. Dissident teams along the border, such as the Acacio Medina Front in the Venezuelan state of Amazonas and the 10th Front in Apure, have found the greatest strength, economic interests and leadership in Venezuela but not in Colombia. Three years later, the FARC’s deputy and leader of the talks, Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” deserted the peace process and rearmed. He tried to rediscover the FARC by calling it the Second Marquetalia (Second Marquetalia), named after the position of birth of the FARC in the 1960s. He settled in Venezuelan territory, building his headquarters on the border of the state of Apure . The FARC peace process has provided the ELN with a historic opportunity to expand into territories formerly held by the FARC and seized by the rebels, whether in Colombia or Venezuela. They invaded Venezuelan regions rich in criminal opportunities in the states of Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Amazonas. By the end of 2020, according to the Colombian military, more than 70% of ELN and ex-FARC guerrilla leaders were discovered in Venezuela. The ELN had about 900 fighters stationed in the country, representing at most 40% of its total estimated strength, and the ex-FARC had about 500, representing about 20% of dissident fighters. Today, those guerrillas are not only in Venezuela seeking a safe haven from the Colombian security forces, but also defrauding multi-million dollar interests. Since the demobilization of the FARC, InSight Crime investigations in Venezuela have revealed evidence that guerrillas profit from drug trafficking, illegal mining, smuggling, and extortion in at least 8 other states in the country.
But beyond seeking strategic and economic merit, the Colombian guerrillas are also spreading and deepening their roots, filling their ranks with Venezuelan recruits and building political networks in Venezuelan communities. As in Colombia, the guerrillas take advantage of the excessive misery, exacerbated by years of economic crisis in Venezuela, to recruit among the desperate. “They come to be offering non-political talks still money and food, which are scarce in Venezuela,” a human rights defender from Amazonas, in southern Venezuela, who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons. reasons, he told InSight Crime. “People are picky about it, they say, ‘I don’t get any help from the Venezuelan state, and I’m starving, so you better hang out with those other people. ‘ and intelligence networks in Venezuela. While those incorporated civilian cells are known as militias in Colombia, in parts of Venezuela they are known by a more Venezuelan term: colectivos, referring to armed sociopolitical teams allied with the Chavista political movement. “They began to recruit other young people between 15 and 20 years old and trained them as the leading collectives, these teams are now the first line of action for the guerrillas,” said a local government official in Táchira, who spoke to InSight Crime under The condition of The guerrillas have also imported the sociopolitical style that they refined in their strongholds in Colombia and are replicating it in deserted corners of Venezuela, where they assume governance purposes in the absence of the State.
For many communities, the ELN or ex-FARC are now de facto authorities, enforcing their social norms and regulations, regulating economic activities, and even establishing their own parallel justice systems. “They have their own legal system. If you break the rules, they take you to court,” said a local journalist in Táchira, who asked to remain anonymous to give an explanation of the security reasons. “When you see a corpse lying on the trails [illegal border crossings], it is because they made a decision in court that this user deserves to be executed. ” – Worry that at any time and for any explanation as to why you would possibly be the next casualty of their wars. “Living on the border is not easy. It is sleeping with one eye open, being aware that at any moment you can also be the victim of a bullet or a shooting that has nothing to do with you,” said a local politician. of Apure state, who spoke to InSight Crime on condition of anonymity. “Today, anyone who lives on the border will have to be prepared to have relationships with the armed teams there. It is an obligation, no matter what you have to do,” he added.
While the ELN and ex-FARC factions in the border region are now indisputably binational armed teams, what is less transparent is what kind of armed organization they belong to when they cross the border into Venezuela. Are they pro-government insurgents or paramilitaries?” The ELN is a binational guerrilla organization, but it is also a bipolar guerrilla organization,” said Charles Larratt-Smith, a teacher specializing in shock and guerrilla teams in Colombia. “The ELN has been a Marxist guerrilla, an insurgency that demands Colombian state situations. On the Venezuelan side of the border, however, the ELN still has the role of enforcing order in communities and civilians. But at the same time, it is not in confrontation with the Venezuelan state.
SEE ALSO: ELN as Colombian-Venezuelan Army
Far from seeking to overthrow the Venezuelan government, the guerrillas occasionally present themselves as protectors of the government of Nicolás Maduro and the Bolivarian Revolution of Hugo Chávez, according to citizens, local governments and human rights defenders in the border region. he is here with the authorization of the government, that Chavez gave him permission to be here, and that he is here to protect the country opposed to the empire [United States] and the Colombian oligarchy,” said an indigenous rights activist in Amazonas. , who did not need to be known for security reasons. The guerrilla’s commitment to preserve rather than overthrow the government goes far beyond rhetoric. During investigations in each of the border states, InSight Crime has amassed sufficient evidence that the guerrillas have established links with local political leaders in order to function with impunity and have acted to keep their allies in power. These links were exposed. in several states during the regional elections that took position in November 2021. The ties were most noticeable in the state of Táchira, where the ELN intervened in the close contest for the governorship between the incumbent aligned with the opposition and Freddy Bernal, a staunch Chavista who allegedly colluded with guerrilla teams since the 2000s. The ELN ordered citizens to vote for Bernal, threatened electoral witnesses, and maintained an armed presence at polling stations, according to several local sources who spoke with InSight Crime. “They held meetings to organize other people to vote for Bernal. They were talking about how other people deserve to vote for ‘Comandante Bernal,’” said a municipal official in northern Táchira, who asked to remain anonymous. for security reasons. In addition to being political allies, the guerrillas are also business partners with elements of the Venezuelan state in the border region. Sources across the border describe the same dynamic: guerrillas pay state agents so they can traffic drugs with impunity and a percentage of the profits from smuggling, extortion and illegal mining. the profit-sharing operation in the Yapacana region, a center of illegal gold mining and a bastion of the Acacio Medina Front of the ex-FA RC. “And it is divided between the FARC, the ELN, the National Guard and the Army,” he said. The guerrillas’ political and economic ties to the Venezuelan government laid the groundwork for strategic cooperation with state security forces, acting as surprise troops or playing dirty cadres for the state. After a fierce conflict, the Venezuelan army launched an attack against the Rastrojos that forced them to seek refuge on the border with Colombia, according to La Opinion. The ELN was already in position, waiting for the army to hand them over. A social leader from a border domain that was the epicenter of the clashes, who spoke on condition of anonymity, showed months later that the ELN had taken control of the border crossings. and they overthrew them”, said the social leader. “Now the ELN regulations with the cover of the army. “
The guerrillas’ movements in Venezuela have thrown them into a terrifying and familiar role for Colombians. They take the form of their worst enemies: the counterinsurgency paramilitaries who have allied with the state to wage a dirty war against the rebels and their supporters in Colombia.
Like the ex-FARC and ELN in Venezuela, the now-demobilized Colombian counterinsurgents were allies of the Colombian security forces army and corrupt business partners with corrupt elements of the state. Their tentacles penetrated deep into Colombian politics and they were allowed to brutalize communities and enemies in the establishment’s call for protection. “In Venezuela, the ELN is a paramilitary organization, not an armed insurgency. There they are the government, while here in Colombia they fight against it,” Trejos said. However, many Colombian paramilitary teams have only used counterinsurgency as a cover to build drug trafficking empires. And with the ELN as well, one wonders if the guerrillas are actually ideologically committed to protecting the Chavista government and the Bolivarian revolution, or if it is an alliance of convenience and profit. “Here in Venezuela, their goals are different. It’s a scoundrel organization, a gang [and] an armed organization looking for business,” Liborio Guarulla, a former governor of Amazonas, told InSight Crime.
Whether insurgents, paramilitaries or simply criminals, the ELN and the ex-FARC mafia constitute the greatest security risk in Venezuela and Colombia. They have the ability to help communities, forge alliances with security forces and political networks, and manage corrupt economies. And they are hardened through decades of struggle.
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