Mass protests in Belarus continue to defy the final results of the country’s recent elections, which gave leader Alexander Lukashenko a crushing victory. This is not the first time in his six terms as president that other people take to the streets. But this time, the protests are motivated by a series of economic points that were not foreseen in 2001, 2006 and 2010.
The deep economic crisis caused by the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and annoyed by the Russian currency crisis of 1998 followed a decade of economic growth. But the decade after the 2008 currency crisis brought back memories of the 1990s.
In 2011, Belarus in the midst of an economic crisis, which sparked mass protests. A currency crisis in 2014 and the “social parasite tax” in 2015 sparked national protests in 2017.
After watching more than a hundred interviews with ordinary Belarusians on non-state television channels about the presidential crusade and following the evolution of the demonstration closely, it is transparent to me that a decade of economic stagnation is at the heart of the ongoing protests. Lukashenko’s re-election and that others have no hope that he will solve the problem.
Economic expansion in the 2000s was basically driven by favorable external points rather than Lukashenko’s “market socialism,” which many economists are no longer viable. While neighboring Poland and the highest of the former republics of the USSR, adding up the Baltic States, began the transition to a market economy, Lukashenko was not enthusiastic about this kind of reform.
One of the main reasons is the country’s close ties to Russia, as a long-term supplier of reasonable crude oil and fuel and other subsidies in exchange for The integration of Belarus into a “State of Union” with its neighbour. But Lukashenko used this merit to locate new revenue resources.
More recently, ties between Belarus and its main business spouse have tightened. Lukashenko recently fought Vladimir Putin and Russia played the ball with his subsidies. This coincided with a fall in GDP expansion from an average of 8% before the crisis to 2% after the crisis.
Other poor resolutions adopted by Lukashenko’s government in recent years come with the resolution of raising the country’s average salary to $500 a month. It’s a pre-election promise made by printing money. It contributed to a currency crisis and the Belarusian ruble devalued by more than 60% in 2011.
Inflation then reached 109% and wages fell 38%, from US$530 to US$330. Further falls in their currency followed.
In 2015, Lukashenko took another unpopular resolution to impose taxes on other unemployed people. It is an attempt to take strong action against tax evasion and other people running in the informal sector. But as the tax deadline approaches in 2017, only 11.5% of the 470,000 other people had paid.
Then the economy suffered long before the coronavirus arrived. The World Bank predicts a serious surprise to the Belarusian economy of COVID-19. But Lukashenko’s reaction to the pandemic was to advise others to move to the saunas and drink vodka. It didn’t happen well.
Belarus, one of the most pro-consistent regions of the post-war Soviet Union and, after its collapse, was the peak moment when an independent state developed in terms of GDP in line with the capita. It is characterized by having other highly professional people and a well-developed commercial and agricultural base. But the declining economy is pushing more people to emigrate, depriving the country of many of its major assets.
The good fortune of Hi-Tech Park, a center of generation and innovation developed through Valery Tsepkalo, a presidential candidate who was unable to run in the recent elections, is a test of how economic reforms can realize the perspective of human capital in this country. Array Home to lucky foreign programs like Flo and Viber, as well as popular video games, in addition to World of Tanks, the park has one of the largest IT outsourcing providers in Europe and has made a significant contribution to the country’s GDP.
But after a decade of economic stagnation and additional contraction due to coronavirus, others have had enough. That’s why they’re protesting.
Even the staff of the giant state-owned enterprises, which have historically been the backbone of Lukashenko’s economic model, have heard calls for an opposition strike. They make monetary sacrifice in the short term, hoping for a greater economy in the long run. They are joined by professionals from all sectors, adding journalists and officials.
Meanwhile, Lukashenko is running out of options. With others queuing exchange rates and suffering to withdraw cash from their accounts, the country is on the brink of the currency crisis.
At this, Lukashenko wants money. It will be difficult for him to unload the IMF budget, as it has not implemented the agreed economic reforms that accompanied the borrowings in 2011. Loans from Russia or China will not lead to reforms for greater dependence.
If the existing protest fails, anger about the country’s entrenched economic unrest will increase. It leaves little room for manoeuvre in Lukashenko’s government.
This article has been republished from The Conversation, a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yerzhan Tokbolat works, consults, holds shares or obtains investments from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has revealed any applicable associations beyond his university appointment.