Russian President Vladimir Putin is not a fan of revolutions. While large protests and movements are shaking up the cities of neighboring Belarus, he likes what he sees. The question in everyone’s brain is what they’re going to do about it.
Putin has little affection for the widely hated Belarusian president, Alexander Lukashenko, who won the presidential election on August 9, which observers say were fraudulent. Over the years, the Belarusian strongman has alternately timed Moscow’s attendance and played the anti-Russian card to meet at home. Just a few weeks ago, he arrested a team of Russian mercenaries transiting through Minsk and threatened to hand them over to Ukraine, where some were accused of terrorist activities.
But as a wave of protests over electoral fraud threatens to overthrow Lukashenko’s regime, there is much at stake for Moscow.
With Ukraine, with the exception of Crimea and the Donbass region, now firmly in western orbit, the “loss” of the Slavic republic under Russian rule would be humiliating for Putin and many others around him. Although Belarus does not have the cultural resonance of Crimea, its history strongly links it with Russia.
A region of the Tsarist Empire, Belarus was one of the first Soviet republics and the site of bloody world war II battles. For many Russians, Belarus is, as Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, a “sister land” inhabited by a “brotherly people” said Wednesday.
The crisis is also catching up with Putin at a difficult time. In the city of Khabarovsk in eastern Russia, giant crowds have spoken out for weeks against the Kremlin’s arrest of a popular governor. Putin’s control over the coronavirus, through shifting duty to regional governors, feels like weak leadership. In April, his approval rate fell to just 59%, his lowest point since he took office.
In the face of all this, some see the danger of Putin forcibly interfering in the Belarusian crisis in the hope of reviving his intern with a repeat of the Crimean episode.
It’s possible, but unlikely. Any action to save Lukashenko or promote the integration of the two states would not be popular in Russia. Lukashenko’s provocative brutality in recent days has surprised many. And, unlike the case of Crimea, the maximum Russians do not need to see Belarus annexed. According to a recent survey, only 23% of Russians join Belarus or the two countries’ accession to a new state under non-unusual government.
Any intervention by the Russian army would also provoke a furious reaction from the Belarusian public, which until now remains well disposed towards its greatest neighbor. Polls recommend that three-quarters of Belarusians be in favour of friendly and visa-free relations with Russia. But 4% would like their country to join as a Russian region.
At this point, Putin is indecisive. So far, Russian state media and pro-Kremlin politicians in the Duma have expressed a diversity of views. This suggests that they have not yet obtained transparent commands from above.
If Moscow were to intervene, it would have more effective levers than a transparent force. In the age of hybrid warfare, it can sometimes shape through the networks of influence that Russian security has built over the years. A Russian government aircraft used to send the head of the FSB, the Federal Security Service, was seen flying in Minsk from Moscow and returning on the night of August 18.
The media is another lever. After staff began leaving the Belarus-based television company to protest against censorship, two Russian planes arrived on Tuesday with groups of television crew to update them, according to the company’s former director. Then there’s the economic pressure. Belarus relies heavily on reasonable Russian oil and gas, which it re-measures with a profit margin, which generates huge profits. Whether it’s Lukashenko or not, the country’s leader will want Russia’s continued cooperation.
What could prompt Putin to more open action would be the symptoms of Western interference. Calls for closer relations with the European Union or NATO can also provoke a brutal response.
In phone calls with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron on Tuesday, Putin warned that any outdoor intervention would be “unacceptable.” Peskov’s spokesman complained this week that “attempts at direct intervention are underway.”
To reassure Moscow, the new coordinating council of the Belarusian opposition on Wednesday issued a promise not to replace the country’s “constitutional order and foreign policy.” He called on Lukashenko to end the violence, release political prisoners and hold new elections as a component of a new electoral commission.
Meanwhile, EU leaders said wednesday that they would not recognise the effects of August’s nine elections. But echoing Putin’s comments, they also insisted that there would be no outdoor interference. “Belarus will have to be located in its own way,” Chancellor Merkel said.
This path will require a deft balancing act. Lukashenko survived for 26 years facing Russia opposed to Europe while concentrating strength at home. But the civic adulthood demonstrated through Belarusian protesters suggests that society is too great for its dictator. Lukashenko’s day would probably end, if not now, soon. But their successors will want the skill and toughness to build a prosperous democracy while keeping Russia at bay.
Daniel Treisman is a professor of political science at UCLA. He is the editor of “The New Autocracy: Information, Politics and Politics in Putin’s Russia.”