Quietly, the Israel Defense Forces are preparing for a third imaginable war in Lebanon against Hezbollah.
The biggest risk posed by Hezbollah is its gigantic arsenal of rockets and missiles, which are precision and long-range weapons.
In the event of war, the Israeli Air Force, in combination with the Israeli ground forces, will have to face this grave risk to the front of the house.
In the initial phase of a war, the IDF will want to be able to launch air and ground movements of types to target Hezbollah’s long-range projectiles.
If necessary, the ground forces will have to, in parallel with those attacks, move into Lebanon to succeed in the liberation zones and quell the fire opposed to Israel.
The IAF has a great ability to operate under fire, even with Hezbollah as an air base. Israel has the most complex air defense systems in the world.
These systems will protect the State of Israel, adding critical civilian infrastructure, and will also be to protect themselves against Hezbollah’s expected attempts to damage Israel’s air defense batteries.
The IDF has a doctrine of total struggle to function under this kind of risk and is fully aware that it would be a primary target of Hezbollah’s firepower in a long-term conflict.
Offensively, the IDF has built a vast database of other types of targets. It is the product of incessant intelligence work, aimed at enabling the IDF to attack the initial phase, as the fighting progresses and until the end of the war.
Israel will have to be able to target Hezbollah’s statistical and precision projectile launchers, as well as its diversity of unmanned aerial vehicles, which themselves are components of Hezbollah’s precision strike capabilities.
One of the main objectives of the IAF in such a situation will be to shorten the duration of the war. This can be done through Hezbollah leadership, command centers and other points of tension, adding targets belonging to the Lebanese state.
The IDF’s meticulous arrangements come with such operational planning.
The IAF can reach thousands of targets in 24 hours and knows the exact coordinates of its targets. All he wants to do is prioritize the goals that will be achieved first, and those priorities will consult the IAF’s movements in any war.
Moreover, in such a scenario, the IDF will have to be able to deal with Syria’s disruptive activities, such as electronic warfare incidents. While the IDF has an interest in isolating the Lebanese arena in a long-term war, they will also have to be ready for scenarios such as Syria and Russian interference operations, unlikely to be kinetic.
During a war, Iran can be expected to attempt to resupply Hezbollah with weapons through cross-border smuggling from Syria to Lebanon. This means that the IDF will have to be able to stumble upon and disrupt those resupply efforts, just as it does with periods of regime of its interwar crusade.
Russia remains a major force with the ability to influence what Israel can and does in the northern arena.
This means that Israel will have to coordinate with Russia in the event of a war with Hezbollah by communicating what Israel is doing, where and when, and that it is transparent that this contradicts Russia’s strategic interests. This will minimize Russian interference operations.
If Israel reaches a war theater in Lebanon in which it has to strike targets in Syria, such as Damascus, Aleppo or along the Syrian-Lebanese border, due to Iran’s weapons source efforts, its aerial platforms may face disruptive measures from Russia. .
Israel will have to exercise caution in such scenarios.
A floor maneuver component in Lebanon will be imperative to win the war temporarily and effectively. It means lying to the enemy and landing forces in a way that surprises them, while deploying forces where they are needed.
The Lebanese state will also end up paying the value of hosting Hezbollah. At the same time, the IDF will do everything possible to avoid harming civilians.
Informing the Lebanese population will be a vital purpose of the IDF. The army will talk to the Lebanese why they are being evacuated from Hezbollah-controlled spaces and that Lebanese skies will be closed for a while.
The IDF will also tell the rest of the Lebanese people that Hezbollah threatens Lebanon’s maximum critical infrastructure and disrupts the daily lives of the rest of the people.
Communications will therefore be a component of Israel’s strategy, so that Hizbullah is responsible for the suffering caused to Lebanese civilians.
Communications with partners such as the U. S. The US and UK will also be vital, and Israel is already their Western friend for those scenarios.
Israel’s existing crusade between the two wars, a shadow crusade to keep Iran’s roots out of Syria, contributes substantially to Israeli deterrence, and is a deterrence that would possibly only postpone a third war in Lebanon, for now.
Retired Israeli Air Force Brigadier General Avishai Levi is an expert at the MirYam Institute. He concluded his career as the IAF’s Chief of Intelligence and Reconnaissance. He held this position from 2007 to 2010, at which time the Syrian nuclear reactor was destroyed.
The perspectives expressed in this article are those of the author.
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