On March 12, the U. S. Treasury Department sanctioned four Americans for supporting the Iranian-linked Al-Ashtar Brigades in Bahrain. The four Bahrainis live in Iran and are believed to support the militant organization Al-Ashtar through financial, technical and other assistance.
Given Washington’s close security cooperation with Manama, this U. S. announcement may simply suggest that relations between Iran and Bahrain are on the verge of deteriorating. But in reality, this is unlikely to happen, at least not as long as the détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia continues, which remains the case. For now.
Iran considers Bahrain’s foreign policy to be largely determined by Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s strategy towards Bahrain is strongly linked to its overall interest in reducing tensions with Riyadh. For the time being, those considerations outweigh any interest in Tehran supporting Bahraini Shiite Islamists who have traditionally turned to Iran for patronage.
Why al-Ashtar now?
It was Trump’s leadership that first designated the al-Ashtar Brigades as a terrorist organization in 2018. This begs the question of why Biden’s leadership is enforcing those new sanctions now, when Washington has provided no new evidence that al-Ashtar is a problem. imminent threat.
The most likely explanation for this moment has to do with rising regional tensions. The al-Ashtar Brigades and other similar Iranian-backed Arab teams have in recent months been an outspoken critic of the United States for its opposition to Israel in its war. Al-Ashtar offered his condolences after the U. S. killed a senior leader of a pro-Iranian Iraqi defense force in February who was linked to attacks on U. S. forces.
In other words, the resolve to sanction those four Bahraini Islamists probably has nothing to do with a new imminent risk that the organization poses to the United States or the Bahraini state. Rather, it is part of a preemptive crusade through Washington to deter Iran and its Arab militants, warn them to think twice before any attempt to escalate tensions in the region or attack a critical Western component among the Persian Gulf Arab states.
Bahrain is home to U. S. military bases, specifically the U. S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Unido. No It is coincidental that London designated al-Ashtar as a terrorist organization in 2017; and the March 12, 2024, sanctions against al-Ashtar were in fact coordinated between London and Washington.
But beyond housing the U. S. and British armed forces, this small island kingdom is also notable for Manama’s unabashedly stated commitment to confronting the Houthis in Yemen. Bahrain and the Houthis have been at loggerheads since the Yemeni motion took over the country’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014, with Manama joining the Saudi-led coalition opposing the Houthis the following year; King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa even promised then that he would send his own sons to fight. – Houthis, backed on the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Bahrain was the only Arab country to sign up for Operation Guardian of Prosperity, the U. S. -led coalition’s effort to deter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.
Tensions between the Houthi and Bahraini rulers date back at least a decade. However, while the dispute between Bahrain and the Houthis runs deep, Tehran does not need to let it dictate its official policy stance on Manama, given Iran’s overall geopolitical push to reduce tensions with the Gulf Arab states.
The Bigger Picture of Iran-Bahrain Relations
Bahrain is lately the only Arab-majority country in the Gulf region that does not have diplomatic relations with Iran. Manama broke off relations in January 2016, after the Saudi embassy in Tehran was set on fire by an organization of thugs connected to the Iranian regime. motivated by Riyadh’s execution of a Saudi Shiite dissident.
Although the Iranian and Bahraini sides have held several official meetings over the past year, Manama has yet to resume diplomatic activity with Tehran, even after Riyadh and Tehran normalized in March 2023. In this context, two basic realities emerge.
First, there is no love lost between the Shiite Islamist regime in Tehran and Al Khalifa’s circle of Sunni relatives in Bahrain, even though diplomatic pleasantries are rarely exchanged. In recent years, relationships have most likely reached their lowest level. point in 2011, when protests erupted in Bahrain and some of the country’s Shiite opposition activists sought out Iran’s ideal leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Khamenei has continually lumped together the other peoples of Bahrain, the Palestinians and the Yemenis as oppressed Muslims who deserve Iran’s help and intervention. This kind of stance, in which Tehran claims to be forced to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring states, is precisely what Manama has pointed to as the main cause of its tensions with the Iranian regime.
The current reality, however, is that Tehran is facing a complicated moment of decision. Although over the years it has invested heavily in supporting multiple Arab militant and opposition groups, including those in Bahrain, Iran is now willing to hold diplomatic, economic, and even geopolitical talks with all major Arab states, adding Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.
Tehran’s leaders recognize that openness to Arab opposition teams is the main impediment to a genuine Iranian peace with the Gulf Arab states. And Tehran also knows full well that Bahrain’s stability is a particularly sensitive fear for the Saudis: any unrest in Bahrain is likely to spread. temporarily to the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where the country’s Shiite minority is concentrated. In this sense, Iran’s restraint over Bahrain is aimed more at satisfying Saudi expectations than involving Al Khalifa’s circle of relatives in Manama.
And yet, to date, Tehran has not been serious enough — at least not from the point of view of many on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf — to relinquish its role as a sponsor of some Arab Islamist groups. an impediment to Iran-Bahrain relations, but also a silent and stubborn impediment to Tehran-Riyadh relations, even after their formal reconciliation in March 2023.
For Bahrain’s ruling elite, the Iran factor is even more sensitive. Bahraini Islamists living in Iran explicitly support Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” model, the casual Iranian-led coalition that aims to drive the United States out of the Middle East and overthrow the existing regional political order.
Not only is Bahrain’s majority population Shiite – many of them opposed to the concept of political Islam as practiced in Tehran – but Iran did not relinquish its territorial claims to the island until March 1970. Abraham Accords with Israel in 2020, Manama has a clever explanation for why to worry about the antagonism of Iran’s Islamist regime.
That said, Iran has so far shown no signs that it is seeking escalation vis-à-vis Bahrain. Not only has Iran accepted well the truth of Bahrain’s close security ties with the United States and its relations with Israel, but it has been silent on Bahrain’s resolve to join the US-led anti-Houthi naval coalition. As an example, Tehran announced last December that Bahrain would be among the 33 countries whose citizens no longer want a visa to enter Iran.
The Islamic Republic says the visa-free policy for Gulf states is part of its broader efforts to expand relations and cooperation, especially in the area of strengthening people-to-people ties. The challenge for Bahraini officials is how to manage an imaginable détente. with Tehran without creating opportunities for the Iranian regime to interfere locally in Bahrain’s sensitive political balance of forces or to raise concerns among its Western strategic components.
Alex Vatanka is Director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute and Senior Researcher of the Black Sea Program at MEI.
Photo via ATTA KENARE/AFP Getty Images
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