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If the matter were so serious, Iran could be called the child of return.
In the fall of 2022, as protests temporarily spread across the country following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini, many observers predicted (and wished) the end of the Islamic Republic. A year later, in the wake of Hamas’ atrocities in Israel and the Houthi attacks on advertising ships in the Red Sea, Tehran is being portrayed as the all-powerful evil, the region’s biggest recent upheaval.
Reality, it seems, is more mundane. The regime remains fragile at home, but it skillfully exploits any and all opportunities abroad to increase its influence. Like a giant with feet of clay, according to the biblical reference to the Persian Empire of antiquity, he looks immense but is also vulnerable.
In fact, the past two years have seen significant adjustments at three levels: regional, global, and national. The European authorities want to take note of these adjustments and adapt to them. The old conceptualizations of the Islamic Republic are no longer useful.
Regionally, Iran most commonly makes its presence known through the so-called proxies it supposedly controls. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to Hamas in Gaza, from the Badr Organization and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq to the Houthis in Yemen, Tehran works intensively with organizations that are committed to the Houthis and the Houthis. , basically those emanating from a percentage enmity with Israel and the United States.
However, the degree of Iranian control over the movements of those teams is sometimes exaggerated, as evidenced by the years of confrontation with Hamas when the Palestinians rejected Iran’s best friend in the Syrian civil war, or when Tehran worked to reduce tensions. through a fatal attack by an Iraqi defense force on a U. S. base in Jordan in February of this year.
More fundamentally, Tehran has used the momentum of recent years to pressure its neighbors to cooperate rather than pit each other against each other. When the Gulf states adamantly opposed removing Iran’s pariah status under the 2015 nuclear deal, they began to reach out to Tehran. it came here after Washington failed to come to its aid following a series of Iranian-sponsored attacks on its territory in 2019. It is noteworthy that while a number of Arab countries sought to normalize relations with Israel as a component of the Abraham Accords, they also sought engagement with Iran in very practical terms, industry, and maritime security issues. A little over a year ago and with the facilitation of Beijing, Riyadh and Tehran re-established diplomatic relations that had been interrupted in early 2016 following a sectarian conflict.
Internationally, Iran no longer seeks success in the West, as it has done in decade-long negotiations over its nuclear program. The U. S. withdrawal from the so-called nuclear deal under then-President Donald Trump and his refusal to reinstate it Joe Biden’s presidency demonstrated, in Tehran’s eyes, America’s utter unreliability. Meanwhile, Europe watched helplessly from the sidelines, pointing out the futility of the continent.
Instead, Iran has firmly entrenched itself in both the “East” and the anti-Western camp, or at least the camp of “alternatives to the West. “
Exhibit A, from a European perspective, is Tehran’s emerging military cooperation with Russia, which goes all the way to the source of drones and, apparently, missiles for the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. This poses a direct risk, and not just hypothetical, as in last summer, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization led by China and Russia, which has moved away from its original Central Asian concentrate to join India and Pakistan. Since 2024, the country has been a member of the BRICS along with Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates, marking the proximity to doubling the number of member countries of the organization and its significant expansion in the Middle East.
Finally, the current Islamic Republic focuses solely on the survival of the regime, leaving little or no room for the ultimate fundamental considerations of the population. Recent parliamentary elections have made it clear that leaders no longer care about the veneer of popular legitimacy they once championed. . He erased the electoral lists of all candidates who did not fit the few shades of conservatism he allowed, resulting in a record turnout (41%) and many invalid votes. Since the parliament remains under the command of the ideal leader, all eyes are on it. on next year’s presidential “race”, in which the confirmation, as is customary in the Islamic Republic and despite his unfortunate government, of the incumbent president, Ebrahim Raisi, is expected for a second term.
This will pave the way for the inevitable transition to the top, given Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s age (he is approximately 85 years old) and his questionable health. Upon his death, the Assembly of Experts will appoint a successor, and this framework has just been filled with radical clerics for an eight-year term. Given that the last such transition took place thirty-five years ago, following the Iraq-Iran war, this will be a momentous and decisive moment.
For Europe, this means that it will have to see Iran as it is, and not as it needs it to be, whether it is a bogeyman or a doomed villain. The regime is now much less isolated regionally and around the world than it was. A few years ago, with high-ranking friends and neighbors doggedly pursuing their interests while holding their noses. The regime is also more concerned about its own long-term than its brutal but successful crackdown on the months-long feminist revolt in 2022. 2023 suggests.
At the same time, the EU’s own technique (sanctions and even more sanctions) is at an impasse. Only with a sober and thorough assessment of the full range of demanding situations that Iran poses to Europe will Brussels be able to devise a solution. a policy that has the potential to be effective on the ground.
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