Indonesia jails cleric for months for COVID-19 violations

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Over the past six months, Indonesia has intensified its crackdown on radical Islamic groups.

A detention vehicle believed to be carrying cleric Rizieq Shihab arrives at the East District Court in Jakarta ahead of his sentencing hearing, in Jakarta, Indonesia, Thursday, May 27, 2021.

An Indonesian court sentenced arsonist Islamic cleric Habib Rizieq to eight months in prison for encouraging others to attend mass gatherings in violation of COVID-19 protocols.

In November, Rizieq returned to Indonesia from his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia and pledged to lead a “moral revolution. “At a hearing Thursday before 2,300 police and soldiers, a three-judge panel found him guilty of luring thousands of supporters to two primary events after his return.

As the leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (Pembela Islam Front, FPI), an Islamist self-defense group, Rizieq is a star figure in Indonesia’s radical fringe. An estimated 50,000 followers beat him upon his return from Saudi Arabia, where he fled in 2017 to escape various criminal charges, adding an alleged violation of the country’s pornography law.

Since its creation in 1998, the FPI has had a long history of harassment and intimidation, particularly against devout minorities and those accused of trafficking in “vice”. He was also one of the main drivers of the large street protests of 2016 that toppled the Jakarta government. Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok, accused (and later convicted) of desecrating the Qur’an.

After spending just six months in pre-trial detention, Rizieq is expected to be released soon. But his conviction marks the latest salvo in President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s crackdown on “radical” Islamic groups, which dates back to the downfall of Ahok, a close best friend and former deputy of Jokowi’s.

The crackdown intensified after Rizieq’s noisy return to Indonesia in November, which threatened to reinvigorate the FPI and its radical allies. Promising to lead a “moral revolution,” the cleric embarked on political activity, aiming to consolidate radical Islamic groups opposed to Jokowi’s government.

Police responded by accusing Rizieq of violating limits on public gatherings by inviting thousands of people to attend his daughter’s wedding and event at a mosque in the town of Bogor.

After that, tensions temporarily rose. On December 6, a clash between FPI members and police left six of Rizieq’s bodyguards dead. This was immediately followed by Rizieq’s arrest on a series of charges and the formal banning of the FPI, on the grounds that the organization frequented violent extremist organizations. In addition to the Islamic State. In February, most of the organization’s most level-headed leaders were bars.

So far, FPI members’ reaction to the group’s ban has been muted. The organization tried to circumvent the ban by reformulating new names with the same initials, but COVID-19 restrictions prevented it from holding the mass demonstrations that make up its political arsenal. .

At a press conference this week, the Jakarta-based Institute for Political Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) said the government’s crackdown on the FPI, which once enjoyed some coverage because of its close relationship with Indonesian police, was motivated by considerations about the developing political influence it has demonstrated in the crusade against Ahok. It also reflects Jokowi’s preference for offering Indonesia a strong and attractive destination for foreign investment.

However, IPAC warned that the government’s large-scale crusade against radical Islamic outfits risked trampling on civil liberties and restricting Indonesia’s democratic space. A proposed example is the prohibition of the FPI, which was issued by decree and not through the judicial procedure defined in Indonesian law. Law on Mass Organizations.

Another factor is the government’s increasing efforts to select civil servants and academics in public establishments to prevent the infiltration of “radical” elements. According to IPAC, Jokowi’s leadership has followed an elastic definition of the term “radical” that can be accompanied by a variety of criticisms of the government. Nor does it have a redress mechanism for the excluded.

More broadly, IPAC argues that by failing to address the deeper reasons for the development of political polarization and religious intolerance in Indonesia, its crackdown on FPI and other Islamic groups may ultimately backfire. “The danger now is that some of the FPI’s top militant members will be driven by a sense of injustice and persecution to deadlier violence,” the report concludes, “making the government claiming it is connected to terrorism a self-fulfilling prophecy. “

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An Indonesian court has sentenced incendiary Islamic cleric Habib Rizieq to eight months in prison for encouraging others to attend mass gatherings in violation of COVID-19 protocols.

In November, Rizieq returned to Indonesia from his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia and pledged to lead a “moral revolution. “At a hearing Thursday before 2,300 police and soldiers, a three-judge panel found him guilty of attracting thousands of followers. to two main occasions after his return.

As the leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (Pembela Islam Front, FPI), an Islamist self-defense group, Rizieq is a star figure in Indonesia’s radical fringe. An estimated 50,000 followers beat him upon his return from Saudi Arabia, where he fled in 2017 to escape various criminal charges, adding an alleged violation of the country’s pornography law.

Since its creation in 1998, the FPI has had a long history of harassment and intimidation, particularly against devout minorities and those accused of trafficking in “vice”. He was also one of the main drivers of the large street protests of 2016 that toppled the Jakarta government. Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok, accused (and later convicted) of desecrating the Qur’an.

After spending just six months in pre-trial detention, Rizieq is expected to be released soon. But his conviction marks the latest salvo in President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s crackdown on “radical” Islamic groups, which dates back to the downfall of Ahok, a close best friend and former deputy of Jokowi’s.

The crackdown intensified after Rizieq’s noisy return to Indonesia in November, which threatened to reinvigorate the FPI and its radical allies. Promising to lead a “moral revolution,” the cleric embarked on political activity, aiming to consolidate radical Islamic groups opposed to Jokowi’s government.

Police responded by accusing Rizieq of violating limits on public gatherings by inviting thousands of people to attend his daughter’s wedding and event at a mosque in the town of Bogor.

After that, tensions temporarily increased. On 6 December, a clash between FPI members and police left six of Rizieq’s bodyguards dead. This was immediately followed by Rizieq’s arrest on a series of charges and the formal ban from the FPI, on the grounds that the organization frequented violent extremist organizations. In February, most of the organization’s most sensible leaders were bars.

So far, FPI members’ reaction to the group’s ban has been muted. The organization tried to circumvent the ban by reformulating new names with the same initials, but COVID-19 restrictions prevented it from holding the mass demonstrations that make up its political arsenal. .

At a news conference this week, the Jakarta-based Institute for Political Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) said the government’s offensive against the FPI, which once enjoyed some coverage due to its close relationship with the police Indonesia, was motivated by considerations about development The political influence it has demonstrated in the crusade against Ahok. It also reflects Jokowi’s preference to offer Indonesia a strong and attractive destination for foreign investment.

However, IPAC warned that the government’s large-scale crusade against radical Islamic outfits risked trampling on civil liberties and restricting Indonesia’s democratic space. A proposed example is the prohibition of the FPI, which was issued by decree and not through the judicial procedure defined in Indonesian law. Law on Mass Organizations.

Another factor is the government’s increasing efforts to select civil servants and academics in public establishments to prevent the infiltration of “radical” elements. According to IPAC, Jokowi’s leadership has followed an elastic definition of the term “radical” that can be accompanied by a variety of criticisms of the government. Nor does it have a redress mechanism for the excluded.

More broadly, IPAC argues that by failing to address the deeper reasons for the development of political polarization and religious intolerance in Indonesia, its crackdown on FPI and other Islamic groups may ultimately backfire. “The danger now is that some of the FPI’s top militant members will be driven by a sense of injustice and persecution to deadlier violence,” the report concludes, “making the government claiming it is connected to terrorism a self-fulfilling prophecy. “

An Indonesian court has sentenced incendiary Islamic cleric Habib Rizieq to eight months in prison for encouraging others to attend mass gatherings in violation of COVID-19 protocols.

In November, Rizieq returned to Indonesia from his self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia, vowing to lead a “moral revolution. “At a hearing on Thursday, overseen by 2,300 police and soldiers, a three-judge panel found him guilty of luring thousands of people. of followers on two primary occasions after his return.

Sebastian Strangio is Southeast Asia Editor at The Diplomat.

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