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Since 2014, India has intentionally strived to build stronger ties in Africa. This is characterized by high-level visits, an increased diplomatic presence, and the integration of the African Union into the G20. The importance of the continent will only grow. India continues to deepen cooperation in the political, security, economic and socio-cultural fields and publicize Africa’s interests.
Foreign policy, as a tool to promote the national interest, is a dynamic and uninterrupted phenomenon, not static, and displays a sophisticated combination of continuity and replacement. Even if the fundamental interests of a nation, such as the imperatives of territorial integrity, sovereignty and security, remain unreplaced, other interests may also simply replace them in the case of a reinterpretation and replace them in leadership. This, in turn, adjusts the direction and speed of diplomacy. Thus, “continuity with replacement” is considered a useful adage to describe the evolution of India’s foreign policy since its independence. However, as far as the country’s African policy is concerned, it would possibly be fair to say that during the decade in question, i. e. 2014 to 2024, ‘replacement’ emerged as a more dominant trend than ‘continuity’. African policy has changed in its basic character, but they maintain that after reading the internal and external situation, policymakers in New Delhi have made planned decisions since mid-2014 to give higher priority to Africa; modify the policy if necessary; and allocate more resources to its implementation. From this point of view, the 2014 to 2024 era represents a vital break in the history of Indo-African relations.
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India’s active role in helping Africa free itself from colonialism and racial discrimination, helping it during the Cold War era through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and partnering with the continent to drive its socio-economic progress shaped India’s trajectory. Over the past decade, Africa has embarked on a new path of pan-African integration as it strives to update the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the African Union (AU) and redefine its vision of a new Africa, as stated, shortly thereafter, in its “Agenda 2063” document. This trend, coupled with India’s economic imperatives and China’s “new scramble” for Africa’s resources and friendship, has prompted India to intensify its African diplomacy.
In this context, the first seven years of the twenty-first century (2000 to 2007) saw the beginning of a series of new economic and diplomatic projects. One of them is the negotiations with the UA for the get, get get. A pan-African debate was initiated that could well complement India’s bilateral and regional international relations on the African continent. The suggestion to start a debate with Africa was widely accepted in New Delhi and led to two editions of the India-Africa Forum. Summit in April 2008 and May 2011, respectively. These summits were undoubtedly innovative projects that enabled India to increase its political attention and provide concessional financing and grants to Africa. However, the limitation of this technique was that both summits concerned the participation of only a handful of African countries on the basis of the Banjul formula. Moreover, after the second summit, the pace of implementation of decisions slowed down, leading to discontent among all.
The Modi Decade (2014 to 2019)
The first decade of the government led by Prime Minister Narfinishra Modi can be divided into two segments: the pre-Covid years and the Covid and post-Covid periods, with the end of 2019 as the dividing line. Between 2014 and 2019, several breakthroughs took place, demonstrating a new impetus in the expansion and consolidation of cooperation between India and Africa.
First, the third India-Africa Forum summit hosted through India was held in October 2015. Abandoning the restrictive Banjul formula of the last two summits, the Indian government invited all 54 African states. This was widely welcomed across the continent. Participation figures tell their story. All countries were represented at the 3rd summit in Delhi, totaling 41 among heads of State or Government. This turned out to be the largest physical collection of African leaders ever made in India. The summit was a message of renewed and increased mutual fear on the part of both sides. Talking about their ties, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said, “This is a partnership that goes beyond strategic fears and economic benefits. It is formed by the emotional bonds we share and the solidarity we feel between us. »[1] A galaxy of African leaders spoke at the summit, highlighting vital aspects of the India-Africa relationship and expressing their determination that it deserves to be further strengthened and taken to a new level. All the measures announced through Prime Minister Narendra Modi were substantial. It included new concessional credits of $10 billion for the period 2016-2020 and monetary aid of $600 million. The grant included: $100 million for the India-Africa Development Fund, $10 million for the India-Africa Health Fund, investment for 50,000 scholarships in India over the next five years, and budget for expanding the Pan-African Fund. African e-network and skills and education establishments across Africa. As a result, India’s footprint in Africa was going to be larger than had been expected at the last two summits.
Second, Africa has become a top destination for visits through Indian VVIPs, marking a marked break with the past. Between March 2015 and October 2019, 34 outbound visits were made through the President, Vice-President and Prime Minister to countries as varied as Ghana. , Mozambique, South Africa, Malawi and Sierra Leone. [2] They have led to interactions at the highest level, the signing of new agreements, the publication of progression projects and meetings with the business community and the Indian diaspora. In short, those visits projected the concept that Africa was now in the crosshairs. Amid India’s diplomatic concerns. At the same time, New Delhi remained a popular destination for African leaders. Between 2014 and 2019, around one hundred African leaders visited India on missions.
Thirdly, the Indian government has a subtle and subtle African policy and has taken advantage of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s scale in Uganda to articulate it to wonderful effect. On July 25, 2018, while addressing Parliament in Kampala, Prime Minister Modi laid out ten principles that would continue to influence India’s engagement in Africa. The first two principles were particularly important: “Africa will be one of our most sensible priorities,” Prime Minister Modi stressed. [3] In addition, he also made it clear to his African audience that the partnership for progress between India and Africa “will be consulted through its priorities”. [4] A much-quoted speech, the useful aim of which is to speed up the implementation of decisions relating to cooperation with Africa.
Fourthly, India has chosen to strengthen its diplomatic policy towards African countries by opening 18 new embassies and senior commissions on the continent between 2018 and 2022. This has helped to broaden the debate and cooperation in many ways. In addition, a recent resolution has been to expedite the distribution of defence attachés by moving them and locating some of them in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Côte d’Ivoire.
2020 to 2024
During the second period, from 2020 to 2024, the Indian government was primarily concerned with the COVID-19 pandemic and escalating tensions along the India-China border. But he turned the challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic into an opportunity and used it to address Africa’s pressing needs, even as India itself was battling the pandemic. The sending of medicines and medical supplies as gifts to 31 African countries was organized. In addition, donations and exports of pharmaceutical products were temporarily facilitated, including vaccines against COVID-19, confirming the nation’s role as the “pharmacy of the world. ” However, other diplomatic considerations and developments, coupled with the border standoff with China, contributed to the indefinite postponement of the fourth India-Africa Forum summit that was scheduled for 2020. In the last phase of this period, India was optimally engaged. to carry out their daily tasks similar to those of the G20 presidency. The significant opportunity of leading the G20, the world’s “premier economic forum”, has been widely exploited to publicize Africa’s interests in three identifiable ways, as shown below:
Through artistic and discreet diplomacy, New Delhi has created an environment in which consensus has been forged on the important factor of the AU’s admission as a permanent member of the G20. This is a historic achievement for Africa, which has earned India wonderful recognition. .
2. The Government of India held two “Voice of Global South” (VOGSS) summits in virtual format in January and November 2023. The first summit was held to consult with emerging countries on their wishes and expectations for the G20. The contributions obtained have largely shaped the timing of the G20’s deliberations during the year.
3. La second summit was an opportunity for India to inform the countries of the South about the tangible progress made in this regard. The President’s Summary of the VOGSS moment highlighted the ten spaces for “global collective action to achieve the vision of an inclusive, non-violent, and disgustingly rich society in the long term for all. “[5] These included cutting-edge measures to finance progress, which is human-centred: climate action, affordable transitions of power, and women-led progress towards achieving the SDGs.
2030 Roadmap
The above assessment of the last ten years is the story of a number of significant achievements. But it is also obligatory to mention long-term gaps and demanding situations and set realistic goals to elevate the India-Africa partnership to a higher level. This task was a complete success through the “Africa Expert Group” established through the International Vivekananda Foundation (VIF), under the leadership of the author. The organization submitted its report in June 2023. [6] It includes the “2030 Roadmap” which is still fully applicable today. This factor wants to be fully considered through the new government, which begins its five-year term in June 2024, as well as through other key actors. Basically, the report recommends focusing attention and action “to strengthen, deepen and diversify the India-Africa partnership” in four areas, namely political and diplomatic; defence and security; economic; and socio-cultural aspects. Some of their key recommendations are listed below:-
1. La India-Africa Forum Summit would possibly be held once every three years. The next summit will be held as soon as possible.
2. Se Establish an annual strategic debate involving the Chairman of the AU Commission and the External Affairs Minister of India.
3. Se should forge greater maritime collaboration with African regional mechanisms.
4. Se can organize a discussion at the National Security Adviser/Deputy National Security Advisor level with as many African countries as needed.
5. La option of a formal mechanism for cooperation between India and the African Continental Free Trade Area (EPA) could only be actively explored.
6. Se was expected to accept the proposal to create an Africa Growth Fund to address the lack of financing for Indian companies.
7. Se Indian corporations should be encouraged to assist African countries by setting up container shipping corporations in joint ventures in the form of public and personal partnerships.
Given the growing importance of the mining sector, there is a need for the governments involved to cooperate by creating a pooled fund or bringing together several private parties to achieve economies of scale.
9. Se will allocate an adequate budget for African studies in India.
10. I will continue to open new educational establishments in Africa, instead of offering scholarships to African academics in India.
11. Establish a network of think tanks between India and Africa.
Conclusion
In terms of demographics, market size, regional integration, clients for peace and conflict, foreign competition, and strategic importance, Africa’s importance and relevance to India will grow in the coming years. Therefore, the Indian government, the business network and the entities of The “Third Space” deserve to give top priority to the sustainable progress of multidimensional cooperation with African states. The next decade will be very important in this regard. As Thabo Mbeki, then Vice President and then President of South Africa, so aptly observed: “Yesterday is a foreign country, it belongs to us!” [7]
Rajiv Bhatia is an Emeritus Fellow in the Department of Foreign Policy Studies at Gateway House and a former Ambassador.
This article was first published through the International Vivekananda Foundation.
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References:
[1] “Prime Minister’s Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Third Summit of the India-Africa Forum in New Delhi (October 29, 2015). “Speeches and statements. Department of Foreign Affairs (MEA). Government of India. October 29, 2015 https://www. mea. gov. in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/25977/Speech_through_Prime_Minister_
[2] For more details, see: Rajiv Bhatia, India-Africa Relations: Changing Horizons, Routledge, Oxon, UK (2022), p. 81.
[3] “Prime Minister’s Address to the Parliament of Uganda on his State Visit to Uganda”. Speeches and statements. Department of Foreign Affairs (MEA). Government of India. July 25, 2018.
https://www. mea. gov. in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/30152/Prime_Ministers_address_at_Parliament_of_Uganda_during_his_State_Visit_to_Uganda
[4] “Prime Minister’s Speech to the Parliament of Uganda on his State Visit to Uganda”. Speeches and statements. Department of Foreign Affairs (MEA). Government of India. July 25, 2018.
https://www. mea. gov. in/Speeches-Statements. htm?dtl/30152/Prime_Ministers_address_at_Parliament_of_Uganda_during_his_State_Visit_to_Uganda
[5] “President’s Summary: 2nd Voice of the South Summit (November 17, 2023). “Bilateral/multilateral documents. Department of Foreign Affairs (MEA). Government of India. November 21, 2023.
https://www. mea. gov. in/bilatéral-documents. htm?dtl/37278/Chairs_summary_2nd_Voice_of_the_Global_South_Summit_November_17_2023
[6] Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF). 2023. Achievements, challenges and roadmap of the India-Africa Partnership 2030″. VIF Report. Report of the Panel of Experts on Africa.
https://www. vifindia. org/sites/default/files/India-Africa-Partnership-Achievements-Challenges-and-Roadmap-2030. pdf
[7] “Statement by Vice-President Mbeki to the African Renaissance Conference, Johannesburg, 28 September 1998”. International relations and cooperation. Republic of South Africa. He noted that he had heard this specific word from “some of our country’s young Afrikaner leaders to hear their perspectives on the long-term of our country. . . ». http://www. dirco. gov. za/docs /discursos/1998/mbek0928. htm