When India chaired the G-20 summit in New Delhi in September, Chinese President Xi Jinping skipped the meeting, sending the country’s premier, Li Qiang, in his place. The Chinese government did not account for Xi’s decision to miss such a high-profile event, but some observers suspected that it was the summit’s location that made Xi reluctant to attend. After all, the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was using the G-20 as an occasion to style India as a champion and potential leader of the global South. Xi was wary of lending his stature to such messaging. Undeterred, India organized a “voice of the global South” summit in November, the second such gathering in the year, to which China was not invited.
Many U. S. politicians see India as an imaginable bulwark opposed to an ambitious and competitive China. In recent years, Chinese and Indian troops have clashed around the disputed border between the two countries, and Indian public opinion has become increasingly hostile towards its northern neighbor. In New Delhi they are concerned about Beijing’s economic and military advances in India’s backyard in South Asia, adding Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. As a result, the U. S. hopes to drag India, a country that has historically eschewed formal alliances and valued its autonomy, into closer alignment.
But the friction between India and China extends beyond their usual border and the region to a much larger space. The growing rivalry between the two countries reaches a festival of influence, even leadership, between the countries furthest from the South. It can be difficult to pin down precisely what constitutes the Global South, but the term sometimes refers to most countries outside historically industrialized economies (and former colonial powers): the countries of North America and Western Europe, as well as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. We find useful advice in the list of 125 countries that participated in the summits organized by India in 2023, an organization basically made up of Africa, Asia and Latin America, but also including seven Eastern European countries. China has a head start and significant benefits in the struggle for influence between those states. Beijing has gradually built its empire of influence through infrastructure and investment deals and high-profile diplomatic and cultural initiatives. For China, the Global South has apparent instrumental utility: the loyalty, or geopolitical goodwill, of more than a hundred countries around the world may well aid the country’s global ambitions.
New Delhi has realized this, too, but late in the day. For the last two decades, India has been busy courting the United States and other Western powers, allowing its solidarity with the global South—as exercised through ideological official rhetoric as well as high-level participation in the traditional forums of the global South, such as the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement—to wane. Now, however, New Delhi is once again invoking the global South, spurred in large part by China’s efforts. As president of the G-20 this year, India made repeated references to the group and highlighted the concerns of many developing countries, such as the sovereign debt crisis. The two global South summits organized by New Delhi in 2023 were also venues in which India could cast itself as a leader among developing countries.
This battle between two Asian powers has wider implications for the United States and its allies. China seeks to turn the global South against the U.S.-led order and enlist these countries in a Chinese-led counterpart, making the global South the base for China’s rise. India, by contrast, expresses concerns about the current dominant U.S.-led order but wants to see that order reformed, not overthrown. Through diplomatic and economic engagement, the United States can help India achieve a bigger role in the global South, frustrating China’s advances in the process. Taking more seriously the grievances articulated by India and other global South countries about, for instance, the inequities of global institutions, such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, will also weaken the appeal of a Chinese-led order. But without such proactive engagement, the global South could very well become China’s geopolitical backyard.
After the Cold War, the South seemed to disappear from the geopolitical map. The establishments that once explained and unified this vast group, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77, have become marginal. But today, the South is back. Disparate reactions to the ongoing war in Ukraine and Israel’s war in Gaza, the unfolding sovereign debt crisis, and the general disarray of the external order have highlighted how the Global South is charting its own course in geopolitics, in tactics that will thwart the United States and its main rival power. Porcelain.
The new Global South, however, is different from its Cold War-era avatar. The countries of the South are now well aware of the fact that the revisionist rhetoric of the Non-Aligned Era has been successful. Instead of clinging to an anti-colonial ideology and solidarity, these countries have embraced a certain post-colonial realism and a preference for adapting to current geopolitical realities. Southern states are becoming more agile in their dealings with primary powers and are even abandoning their former reluctance to take sides in larger geopolitical conflicts.
These countries now basically make explicit their belief in their national interests through non-ideological language, abandoning the rallying cries of an earlier era, such as calling for popular resistance to capitalism and globalization and denouncing colonial and racist practices in global governance. coalitions and cross-cutting initiatives, thus depriving ideological solidarity (of which very little remains). However, there are spaces of the foreign formula that want to better serve the interests of the vast majority of the world’s population. States pursue these objectives unilaterally and multilaterally, with or without collaboration with other partners in the South. These agreements can be fluid and binding only through the acceptance of the pursuit of national interests. Therefore, India and China are fighting for new ground, either seeking to take advantage of the emergence of what is now a new Global South.
New Delhi and Beijing’s respective visions of the South differ on vital points. As China seeks to supplant the Western-led foreign order, India needs to reform it. India sees itself as a bridge between the South and the evolved world, seeking to foster meaningful conversations and ensure that the voice of the former reaches the highest tables of global governance. On the other hand, China considers itself the most sensible option between a global order – what it calls a “not unusual community of destiny” – compared to the one built through Western powers and seeks to enlist the countries of the South in the ranks of its allies. CoalitionArray Take its Global Civilization Initiative, launched in March, as an example. The initiative promotes the concept that cultural values can be relative, an implicit rejection of the supposedly universal values espoused in the West. India’s right-wing government also seeks to snatch away the former glory of the country’s civilization and has criticized the foreign human rights regime. But such a position basically responds to internal political objectives; Modi has few preferences for creating a new global order driven by concepts of Hindu civilization.
Beijing’s vision of South-South cooperation revolves around its megaproject, the Belt and Road Initiative, a vast infrastructure investment program that has spent $1 trillion over the past decade. Western leaders have largely stopped attending the annual Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. however, the summit is becoming a key area for networking among leaders from the Global South: the forum hosted representatives from some 130 countries in October and focused on discussions on issues similar to those in the Global South. Through the Belt and Road Initiative and a number of other initiatives announced progress and security programs, Chinese officials aim to deepen South-South cooperation and get countries of the South to join China’s bandwagon.
India, for its part, wishes to accompany countries outside the South in their action with those of the South. For example, India and Japan are jointly engaged in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka on issues of progress, with the broader goal of selling a flexible and open Indo-Pacific. India and Germany are cooperating in Africa and Latin America to help countries achieve their Sustainable Development Goals and related climate targets. That cooperative and mediating role was also evident at the G20 summit in New Delhi. where India sought to present itself as a leading foreign player and highlight how it can help the Global South. As Modi said: “If the South has to make that big leap, India can be that shoulder to propel it forward. It would do so, according to the Indian prime minister, by serving as a “bridge, so that the links between North and South are more powerful and the South itself can be more powerful”.
Another key area of difference lies in the respective conceptualizations of the Global South of India and China. India retains to some extent its understanding of the Non-Aligned Era in terms of how racism, colonialism and economic exploitation have shaped the global order and disparities between and within countries. of global institutions. But New Delhi no longer adopts the ideology of the regime of that previous era to combat those old inequalities and injustices. Instead, New Delhi is seeking an advanced prestige quo, with an existing foreign formula expanded to go further with India and other countries. Today, India is challenging the prestige quo, not because it harbors deep anti-colonial grievances, but because it needs to become a bigger player in that prestige quo.
China, on the other hand, has a somewhat old-fashioned view of the Global South. Clearly, China does not share the exclusive colonial experience of much of the Global South: the Qing dynasty probably had to make many formal concessions to Western powers in the 19th century and the country suffered from the Japanese rush in the 20th century. However, China was never conquered or colonized like so many other regions of the world. China was also not a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Chinese officials like to invoke ancient (and perhaps legendary) ties to the South, such as the voyage of a Chinese fleet to the east coast of Africa in the 14th century. In truth, China has little to do with many countries in the Global South. At $16. 8 trillion, China’s economy is now the largest in the world; It is a middle-income country and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which is an integral component of the institutional prestige quo that the Global South has struggled with. China benefits from the unequal global order of which it is a leading guardian, while preaching the virtues of a chosen global order. Their claims of kinship with the countries of the South are cynical and somewhat artificial.
Indian and Chinese methods of relating to the South also differ. India seeks to use existing platforms such as the G20, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations Climate Change Conferences, the G77 and the United Nations General Assembly to affirm the positions of the Global South. . During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, India and South Africa went to the World Trade Organization to request the suspension of intellectual asset rights on COVID-19 vaccines, treatments, and tests so that low- and middle-income countries could simply gain greater access to this potentially life-saving material. China, on the other hand, is seeking to create choice forums led through China, such as the Belt and Road Forum, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the World Civilization Initiative, etc. In their rhetoric, Chinese officials also highlight the use of implicitly anti-Western and anti-American language, rejecting hegemony and the U. S. -led foreign order, a far cry from India’s more moderate reformist stance.
The challenge for New Delhi is that China’s rhetorical posturing and largesse are likely to win it more friends in the South than India’s softer criticism of the foreign order. Chinese revisionism, backed by Beijing’s ability to respond to the economic desires of the Global South, would likely prove more exciting to many countries. India alone does not have the resources to adapt to China’s economic proposals towards the South. Furthermore, India’s focus on global institutional reform is unlikely to produce significant effects in the near future. In fact, China has become more willing to exploit the deep dissatisfaction of many Southern countries with the foreign policies of the United States and the EU. China’s official statements criticize global institutions, its explicit impatience with the war in Ukraine and the ongoing war in Gaza, emphasize the need for a more equitable form of globalization, and profess respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (even as its own forces invade the territory). territories of their neighbors). Much of this is music to the ears of the South, at a time when many others see double standards in the West’s reaction to the war in Ukraine and Israel’s war in Gaza. New Delhi fails to square with Beijing’s vehement positions. Countries value sharp speeches rather than cautious attitudes when feelings are running high.
India also wants to compensate for its resolve over the past decade to diminish its relations with the Global South. The increasing attention paid to India’s relations with the United States and the West has led to a concomitant decline in interest in South-South cooperation in New Delhi. . India was once at the forefront of global activism in the Global South. This is no longer the case. The Indian Prime Minister no longer attends the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement. Top Indian leaders also skipped this year’s G-77 summit in Havana. India would possibly have a position in the Global South in more than one tactic, but that’s not the case. Where he sees his future: He wants to be part of the club of tough states that manage global governance. But China’s drive for influence and leadership in the Global South, which has become more zealous and effective in recent times, has shaken India and caused a shift in its rhetoric, international relations and politics.
This festival does not deserve to seem remote or marginal in the eyes of Western policymakers. This is crucial. Neglecting the South would be counterproductive to America’s broader geopolitical goals. The lack of positive engagement may simply further deepen feelings of exclusion and unease among many countries in the Global South, making it more difficult to find answers to non-unusual global demands. situations such as climate change. But what is more certain is that Western inaction may simply push the Global South to become servants of China’s global ambitions. China’s rise as the self-proclaimed superpower of the South demands that Western powers pay more attention to the political narratives circulating in the South.
Supporting India’s efforts in the Global South will help thwart China’s grand ambitions. The U. S. and the West will need to work with India to facilitate economic and infrastructure assistance to emerging countries. They also pay attention to India’s sober arguments about the difficult situations facing the Global South in restructuring sovereign debt, waiving vaccine patents, and reforming global institutions. Washington will have to perceive that it is far more important to reform the existing global institutional order than to imagine a rival and expanding global order led through China.
The United States, for example, takes the lead in relaying the debt burden of Southern states. After all, for all that the West communicates about the nefarious nature of China’s “debt trap diplomacy,” much of the South’s sovereign debt is held by Western creditors. Washington could also help speed up reforms of the U. N. Security Council to include more permanent members from the Global South. This will not only bring some much-needed stability to the global order but, more importantly, publicize Beijing’s position. hypocrisy given that China is unlikely to agree to expand the Council’s permanent membership, even if it advocates greater inclusion in global institutions.
A global South led by Beijing will be far more antagonistic to the United States and the West than one in which India plays a larger role. Despite New Delhi’s increasingly instrumental view of the global South, its nonideological approach to the developing world could also help bridge the gap between poorer countries and the developed world. As a powerful global South country and an aspirant for great-power status in the prevailing order, India has the ability to traverse major fault lines in the international system. Washington must make use of this unique role that New Delhi can play in world politics. Treat the new global South like a geopolitical opportunity, not a cantankerous old pest.