In the days since Hamas announced its ferocious October 7 terrorist attack on Israel and began its major backlash in the Gaza Strip, Arab governments have found themselves in a difficult impasse. Several Arab countries have concluded, or are in the process of concluding, historic normalization agreements with Israel, and Israel’s upcoming neighbors and long-standing peace partners, Jordan and Egypt, maintain diplomatic and security relations with each other. benefits that contribute to regional security. At the same time, given that the Palestinian cause looms large among Arab populations, and in the midst of a war that appears to cause massive destruction in Gaza, Arab leaders will have to act conscientiously to avoid triggering a national and international backlash. diplomatic level. Meanwhile, the embattled Palestinian Authority, long in place in the West Bank, faces its own developing challenges. And with a months-long security crisis, the Palestinian Authority now faces the genuine option that the West Bank could be drawn into Hamas’s war against Israel, as fighting becomes bloodier in Gaza.
As this explosive scenario unfolded, deep divisions have begun to emerge in the Arab world. Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, which signed the Abraham Accords with Israel, issued statements obviously condemning Hamas. In turn, Qatar, Hamas’ main Arab backer, lashed out at Israel and used language very similar to that of Hamas. Meanwhile, Jordan and Egypt, which are at stake on the ground, have been cautious, navigating between their own national security considerations and the hostility of their domestic audiences. And then there’s Saudi Arabia, America’s best friend and perhaps the most important regional player today. Saudi Arabia was making progress in historic U. S. -mediated negotiations with Israel at the time of the attack, but it is also seeking to maintain, if not strengthen, its leadership role in the Arab world and is for the Palestinians.
In the face of this incredibly complex regional landscape, the United States will have to strike a balance between potentially contradictory goals, embracing Israel in its reaction to Hamas’ unprecedented attack, averting a wider war, stabilizing the West Bank, and managing its relations with Israel. their Arab partners. Biden’s leadership is already deeply committed to such efforts. President Joe Biden called the Israeli prime minister, European allies and Arab leaders. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Israel and the region. Throughout those efforts, the United States has made transparent its unwavering political, military, and diplomatic support for Israel, while continually urging Israel to comply with the laws of war. War is in its infancy. The pressures encountered in the region will worsen as fighting in Gaza intensifies and Palestinian casualties rise rapidly.
Like the rest of the world, Arab governments were caught off guard by the unprecedented scale and brutality of Hamas’ attack. They shared Israel’s assumption that Hamas was ultimately not interested in primary escalation, but was occupied with the demands of the Gaza government and deterred by Israel’s carrots and carrots. Sticks. Prior to October 7, Hamas’s strategy seemed to be aimed at destabilizing the West Bank while maintaining some calm in Gaza.
Consider Israel’s close neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, both of which reacted cautiously in the immediate aftermath of the attack. Egyptian officials have refrained from condemning Hamas, called for a reduction in tensions and criticized Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. Jordan reacted similarly, expressing support for the Palestinian cause. Indeed, Jordan and Egypt have populations that strongly support the Palestinians and must consider immediate national security considerations. And both governments are being challenged locally through Islamist opposition teams sympathetic to Hamas.
Indeed, Israel’s offensive on Gaza has already caused unrest in both countries: an Egyptian policeman murdered two Israeli tourists and their Egyptian consultant in Alexandria on October 8, a day after the Hamas attack, and thousands of Jordanians demonstrated in Amman in opposition to Israel. As a result, both countries are on high alert. Egypt has explicitly stated that it will not allow a giant of Gazan refugees to enter its territory. And Jordan has banned protests near its border with Israel.
The scenario among the Gulf Arab states is equally complex. Qatar, which backs Hamas and funds Gaza, blamed Israel for the escalation, reflecting Hamas’ rhetoric. In addition, the Arabic-language channel Al Jazeera, a Qatar-funded news channel that reaches tens of millions of people across the Arab world and served as a mouthpiece for Hamas.
Jordan has banned protests near its border with Israel.
Separately, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates condemned Hamas, with the Emirati government calling the group’s moves a “grave and serious escalation” and saying it was “horrified” by the attacks on civilians. The remarks come at a time when diplomatic relations between Israel and the two countries are sensitive. Since joining the Abraham Accords, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have made significant strides in their economic and security ties with Israel. But diplomatic and political relations have been strained in recent months due to inflammatory conflicts. provocative comments and moves through Israel’s far-right government towards Palestinians in the West Bank and specifically in Jerusalem.
Policymakers are closely monitoring Saudi Arabia. At the time of the Hamas attack, Biden’s leadership appeared to be moving toward negotiating a historic deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel aimed at normalizing relations. In addition to firmly anchoring Saudi Arabia in the American security framework at a time when Washington is perceived to be moving away from the Middle East, those negotiations were also aimed at securing significant Israeli commitments regarding the Palestinian issue. But Saudi Arabia plays a leading role in the Islamic world as custodian of Islam’s holy sites, and the Palestinian cause remains popular among Saudis. Furthermore, normalization talks with Israel have exposed the kingdom to accusations that it is abandoning the Palestinian issue. With the outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel, those talks broke down. The Saudi government cannot appear to have ties to Israel at a time when the country is engaged in an active confrontation with the Palestinians. In fact, it is most likely that the Hamas attack was intended, at least in part, to disrupt rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
After the attack, Riyadh issued a message of caution in favor of the Palestinians, in which it neither endorsed nor condemned Hamas’ actions. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has maintained close contacts with the United States and major Arab countries. The Saudi crown prince even had a phone call with the Iranian president, a former rival of the kingdom and Hamas’ main backer. Clearly, the Saudi government seeks to achieve two other purposes. On the one hand, Riyadh seeks to maintain and strengthen its leadership. role in regional diplomacy. While historically cautious, the country has adopted a much more proactive technique in foreign relations under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, known as MBS, its de facto leader. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia remains committed to its long-standing goal of creating a Palestinian state, although it is aware that this is not imaginable in the short term. Saudi Arabia probably feels a desire to repair its pro-Palestinian image.
In the short term, as long as the fighting in Gaza lasts and without delay thereafter, an agreement with Israel is out of the question. In the long term, however, it is unclear to what extent a confrontation between Hamas and Israel will adjust the situation. core interests that have led Saudi Arabia to seek relations with Israel. The two countries carry greater security considerations in the region, adding to contain Iran and curtail Islamic extremism. And the two countries favor stronger economic ties, especially as Saudi Arabia pursues its vision. 2030 plan to diversify its economy.
The calculations of Arab governments in relation to the war between Hamas and Israel become even more confused with the scenario in the West Bank. In launching its new war, Hamas has also tried to galvanize a security breakdown in the West Bank, where the population has been reluctant.
A political and security vacuum has been looming in the West Bank for years, a trend that has accelerated since Israel formed the toughest government in its history last year. Expansion of the agreement. But this deterioration is not just the result of Israeli policy. The Palestinian leadership is aging, unpopular and sclerotic. Widespread corruption, poor governance, and increasingly authoritarian tendencies have led a majority of Palestinians to lose confidence in their leaders and government structures. Today, 80 percent of Palestinians consider the Palestinian Authority to be corrupt and the top of that needs their 89-year-old President Mahmoud Abbas to step down. As a result, the Palestinian Authority is unable to exert control on the ground.
As it becomes even more lethal, the war between Israel and Hamas may push the West Bank over the edge. If a terrorist incident or attack originating in the West Bank induces Israel to respond with force on a large scale – or if the settlers themselves attack Palestinians, as happened in the village of Hawara in February 2023 – it can galvanize the fighting in the West Bank. The region is already showing precautionary signs of impending violence. Palestinians protest daily against Israeli attacks in Gaza, though for now protests remain limited.
There is a political and security vacuum in the West Bank.
Given such chaos, and its own weakness, the PA has few good options. It thinks it has little room to maneuver and must try to balance its desire for stability with its need to cater to highly inflamed public opinion—which will only become more difficult as the war in Gaza gets bloodier. So far, the PA has reacted by publicly blaming Israel for the escalation with Hamas. After coming under international pressure, the PA has condemned violence against civilians without explicitly mentioning Hamas. But it has also tried to maintain calm in the West Bank by using its security forces to keep demonstrators away from checkpoints and other areas where confrontations with Israeli forces are most likely to occur.
Still, riding the wave of anger against Israel carries risks. By echoing Hamas’s message, West Bank leaders will only inflame emotions, whether among Palestinians or within an already demoralized security system, whose members would likely refuse to report for duty. Moreover, Abbas, who was already viewed negatively by many world leaders due to his poor governance in the West Bank and uncompromising diplomatic approach, further squandered what little foreign goodwill he had left by making anti-Semitic statements in September 2023. It’s a coincidence that Biden hasn’t called him yet, delegating that task to Blinken.
An escalation in the West Bank would have huge repercussions in the region. Not only would the death toll be high, but given the fragility of the Palestinian Authority, the fighting could lead to the collapse of the organization. Many teams would welcome such a fall, adding Hamas and terrorist organizations in the West Bank, such as the Lion’s Den. If the PA were to relent, the political vacuum in the West Bank would most likely lead to Israel returning to direct rule of the territory, extending into Jordan and provoking the broader regional and foreign diplomatic technique for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has long addressed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinian Authority as the representative of the Palestinians in efforts to create an eventual two-State solution. What is at stake is preventing the war from spreading to the West Bank deserves to be among the top priorities of Washington and its close Arab allies.
For the United States, managing these highly complex regional dynamics will not be easy. Washington will have to balance the political wishes of its various Arab allies while maintaining its aid to Israel and taking every conceivable step to bear the humanitarian costs of the war in Gaza. Arab governments cannot forget their own domestic political pressures, but they are in Washington’s interest in preventing the war from spreading. The Biden administration will want other things from other Arab countries. Egypt will play a very important role in mediating an eventual end to the war in Gaza. Jordan has unprecedented influence vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority. These countries may not share Washington’s public position, but they have proven to be reliable partners in the past.
Relations with Riyadh will be more complicated. Biden and MBS have suffered from strained relations. Still, U. S. efforts to negotiate a deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia have created opportunities for the U. S. to explore tactics in which Saudi Arabia could simply promote some of Washington’s positions. For example, Riyadh could simply use its stance to counter Hamas’s claims that its movements are legally sanctioned.
Like other Gulf countries, the United States deserves to publicly recognize the principled positions taken through the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. On the contrary, Washington deserves to explicitly denounce Qatar’s aid to Hamas. Once the fighting in Gaza ends, the United States deserves to examine the role of Arab states in post-conflict reconstruction and, if Hamas is dislodged, in control of Gaza. Furthermore, Washington deserves action to stabilize the West Bank through urgent economic and security measures.
But ultimately, the events that will take place in Gaza in the coming days and weeks will determine what is diplomatically possible. The U. S. will have to remain focused on its goal, as U. S. leaders put it, of making sure Hamas never backs its power. reveal the type of terrorist attack he carried out on October 7.