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PANAMA CITY – On the Pacific side of the Panama Canal, a huge gray conference center built largely by Chinese vendors glows in the sun and enthusiastically welcomes visitors from a world emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic. A few miles north, colorful shipping boxes piled up under the stern gaze of dock cranes at the port of Balboa, a facility run by a company connected to China.
It is intended to build a new bridge in the same area. Several plans have called for it to have six lanes, two slender towers and even an upscale restaurant. To the delight of Panamanians, the stretch would facilitate traffic by obstructing other bridges connecting the east and west of the Central American country, the kind that leads to trips of two or even 3 hours. To the chagrin of American diplomats, the contract to build the bridge was awarded to a consortium controlled through the Chinese government.
Let it not be so.
In 2017, then U. S. Ambassador to Panama John Feeley suggested that U. S. corporations compete to build the so-called “fourth bridge. “It was a delicate moment. Earlier that year, Panama had replaced Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with Beijing, which caught Washington off guard. A bid for the $1. 5 billion allocation could have signaled America’s enduring interest in this country in its own hemisphere, home to a channel whose structure is led by the United States. He reshaped the global industry more than a century ago. But U. S. corporations, for various reasons, refused to bid. And unlike his Chinese counterparts, with his communist regime and state-owned enterprises, Feeley, a mere American diplomat, had little about American corporations.
“I felt frustrated and helpless,” Feeley recalls. I rang all the bells in Washington to get the American personal sector interested. I asked for a delegation of industrial attempts to come and they gave me nothing.
Such scenes are unfolding from Kenya to the Solomon Islands as the U. S. The U. S. and China are interacting in an unfolding struggle for foreign influence that may shape geopolitics for decades to come. Beijing’s good fortune in strengthening its presence in the Americas is a testament to the scale of its ambitions and the magnitude of the U. S. challenge. UU to assemble them. President Joe Biden and his aides recognize what’s at stake and argue that to compete with China, the U. S. is not willing to compete with China. The U. S. will first have to invest in its physical, technological, and even sociological infrastructure. At home.
But when it comes to a global confrontation, U. S. technique for international relations is arguably its greatest weakness, according to conversations POLITICO has had with more than 50 existing and former U. S. and foreign officials, diplomats, analysts and other officials who adhere to foreign affairs as well as critics. A diversity of congressional studies, think tanks and others. Some of those interviewed were granted anonymity to discuss a sensitive factor more frankly.
Over the past decade, China has increased its diplomatic spending and even surpassed the United States in the number of diplomatic posts in the world. It turns out to have a greater number of diplomats, and they are much more trained and assertive than their predecessors. , adding in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations. U. S. Meanwhile, diplomatic spending has remained stable, as has the length of U. S. foreign service. While funding, security, and other points have limited U. S. diplomatic presence. U. S. abroad.
“Once upon a time, it’s a fact, the U. S. embassy was not a good time. “The U. S. Embassy in a given country, in most countries, the largest embassy, the maximum visual embassy, the maximum influential embassy,” said Eric Rubin, president of the U. S. Foreign Service Association. U. S. diplomatic union, and former U. S. ambassador”U. S. in Bulgaria. ” This is no longer the case today in many parts of the world. In much of the world to come, it’s China.
China’s emphasis on “publicity diplomacy,” which includes selling industrial deals and infrastructure projects, gives its envoys an advantage, especially in Latin American and African countries that feel ignored by Washington. government projects to counter China’s infrastructure systems are neither readily available nor well-funded. Meanwhile, American diplomatic tradition has downplayed the advertising element. The relatively few American diplomats who specialize in it rely heavily on a personal sector that, unlike own businesses, fails, especially in some parts of the world.
“The Chinese are not in Africa to teach painting on rice paper,” said Patricia Moller, a former U. S. ambassador to Guinea and Burundi who now works in the personal sector on the continent. “They are in Africa to advertise Chinese investment companies. That’s why they’re here, and it’s a very sharp spear that the Chinese have.
Growing political partisanship is another thing that undermines America’s ability to conduct grassroots international relations. Republicans and Democrats in Congress agree that China poses a long-term challenge to the United States, and they have higher military spending and faithful new resources to confront Beijing economically and technologically. But the law that strengthens U. S. international relations is not a law that strengthens U. S. The U. S. is delayed or derailed amid partisan fire, and U. S. diplomats cannot guarantee that Congress will fund an administration’s projects after the next election.
The challenge of partisanship is the greatest in the willingness of U. S. senators to block ambassadorial candidates, for reasons unrelated to their positions. Some embassies have remained empty for years to update Feeley, who left his post 4 1/2 years ago. The absence was due in part to a Republican senator’s preference for pressuring Biden in Cuban politics. This disappointed Panamanians and gave China’s resourceful Spanish-speaking ambassador here a chance.
The paralysis of U. S. confirmation “creates opportunities for our adversaries to reach out to the countries involved and say, ‘We care about you because we have an ambassador here. ‘The United States doesn’t care about them because they don’t have any. “said Harry Harris, former U. S. ambassador to South Korea.
China’s diplomatic rise is not without its flaws. Their envoys and staff are rarely so competitive that they motivate negative reactions; some have recently been filmed attacking pro-democracy protesters in Britain. The Chinese government’s overseas economic projects, from port structure to railways, especially under the Belt and Road Initiative, have been of poor quality, harmful to the environment, and burdensome to host country budgets. Beijing is reportedly overhauling the Belt and Road as its partners struggle to pay their debts.
However, many countries place China as a willing wife while the United States is not. China is determined to win hearts and minds while the United States seems arrogant. Again, Panama is an example: The country’s current government distrusts Beijing and has delayed or canceled some Chinese projects, but Washington has not seized the moment, Panamanian leaders say privately. Raise safety considerations related to Chinese projects along the canal. But the Americans will offer few, if any, tangible opportunities for trade, infrastructure projects and other aid that Beijing is willing to offer the country of 4. 3 million people.
U. S. officials “basically tell us, in the region, ‘Be careful with China, be careful about this or that,'” said Nicole Wong, a former senior Panamanian foreign ministry official who helped oversee Taiwan’s replacement of diplomatic relations with Beijing. “But the schedule, the bilateral schedule, the structure of a very smart bilateral schedule is set aside, because they communicate about the structure of things together. “
Biden’s management is well aware of many of the vulnerabilities in the U. S. diplomatic playbook. The U. S. government, however, has limited responses so far, is strongly targeted at the country, and can take years to implement; another presidential administration may simply replace the course, or Congress may simply resist the lack of funds. And, to some extent, Biden’s administration is still looking to repair the damage done to the State Department by former President Donald Trump, who tried to cut his budget. through a third party. Congress thwarted this attempt, but it damaged the diplomatic prestige and morale of the United States. Trump’s heavy-handed foreign policy technique has also led many seasoned American diplomats, like Feeley, to resign.
“We had dug a hole deep enough for ourselves in recent years, and the world was not going to wait for the United States to defend itself while China evolved,” said State Department adviser Derek Chollet, one of the senior officials. that the branch has appointed to speak on the general factor of U. S. international relations. “The U. S. and the Chinese challenge. ” There is no silver bullet. “
China’s communist formula would possibly be repressive and rigid, but it is more solid than the American trajectory, with long-term plans that can last for decades. Diplomacy, on the other hand, has become too capricious, unreliable and exposed to partisan gridlock, according to officials and analysts.
Regarding embassies and more, “domestic politics in the United States undermines American citizens around the world,” warned Samuel Lewis Navarro, Panama’s former first vice president and foreign minister.
Three years ago, Washington was shocked to learn that China had established a network of diplomatic services larger than the United States, surpassing a ranking of countries. ” reported the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank. He helped China control to pressure governments in places like Panama to abandon Taiwan in favor of Beijing.
It’s unclear how it has replaced the think tank’s rating since 2019, even though a senior Chinese official recently said the country now has more than 280 diplomatic outposts, while recent State Department statistics imply the U. S. has more than 280 diplomatic posts. In any case, the message was unequivocal: In diplomacy, China intends to be everywhere. In particular, Chinese diplomats pay close attention to two regions that are considered lagging behind in U. S. policy. They are in the U. S. , Africa, and Latin America, while devoting significant resources to their Asian neighbors. This may mean building giant embassies or simply having a small outpost with a few diplomats, just to mark a presence. This includes places right on America’s doorstep, such as the Caribbean.
For the Chinese, “it’s about geography,” said Matt Pottinger, Trump’s former deputy national security adviser. XVIII and XIX centuries to mimic the geographical distribution of possessions and key bases and treaty ports, as they in fact seek to replicate, in particular, the British model of the nineteenth century.
In this century, China’s multifaceted diplomatic technique has been to try to dominate the virtual and data space, especially through state media, while selling infrastructure and trade projects. These are also symbolic gestures that still resonate abroad: for example, in more than 3 decades, the Chinese Foreign Minister’s first annual foreign trip was to Africa.
It is difficult to determine the exact number of Chinese diplomats. A Chinese official said “thousands” after reviewing the matter. The investigation through POLITICO and Sydney Tucker and Yun Sun of the Stimson Center, a security-focused think tank, found judgments that Chinese diplomatic staff numbered at least 5,000, however, it is unclear to what extent that number is up to date or how “diplomatic” is defined.
The State Department has about 13,500 foreign service workers, classic American diplomats rotating in embassies, and 11,000 public service workers. These numbers have changed slightly in about a decade. The branch also has approximately 50,000 contract workers worldwide.
Meanwhile, the U. S. The U. S. also faces questions about the world’s diplomatic footprint, and decisions over decades now seem unwise.
Take the Solomon Islands, a Pacific country where the United States fought the Japanese in the Battle of Guadalcanal, a turning point in favor of the Allies in World War II. In 1988, amid disputes over fishing rights and the simmering dispute in Bougainville, the United States opened an embassy in the islands’ capital, Honiara, according to the State Department’s Office of the Historian. (This decade also saw some American considerations about the Soviet Union’s influence in the Pacific. )However, the U. S. ambassador to the islands was co-accredited as an envoy to Papua New Guinea and founded in that country’s capital, Port Moresby, according to the historian’s office.
But five years later, the U. S. is still in the U. S. The U. S. Embassy closed the Solomon Islands embassy, one of 20 diplomatic facilities, most commonly consulates, to be closed. officials at the time called it a “reorganization” and said it was mandatory because the United States needed to open missions in newly independent post-Soviet states, according to media reports at the time. Diplomatic budget to raise new posts.
Leapfrog almost 3 decades. In February of this year, Secretary of State Antony Blinken showed that the United States would re-establish an embassy in the Solomon Islands. The main reason? To counter China’s intense seduction of Pacific island countries. It was temporarily revealed that the Solomon Islands has signed a security pact with China that worries the United States and its allies, plus Australia, will give Beijing too much and a long-term military base. It is not transparent that having a U. S. embassyin the Solomon Islands would have prevented the security pact, but may have led to prior intervention through U. S. officials. U. S.
Biden’s management has sent representatives to urge Honiara to reconsider, as part of a stampede to show that the United States still cares about the region. Management said it would also open embassies in the Pacific island countries of Kiribati and Tonga and launch other systems to convert American devotion. Last September, the United States hosted a summit for Pacific Island leaders and unveiled a “Pacific Partnership Strategy. “
As he faces Russia’s war in Ukraine, Biden and his aides have long made it clear that Asia is the region the U. S. is in the U. S. to war. The US will have to prioritize in the long term, exactly because of the difficult situations posed by China. Biden’s team has laid out a number of other projects for what it calls the “Indo-Pacific. “This includes a special security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom.
Few foreign policy experts say Washington deserves to focus less on Asia. But many warn that the United States will also have to have a much higher minimum commitment point, a really extensive commitment and funded with tangible effects within a moderate time frame, in the rest. of the global, since Beijing sees the whole world as the stage of competition. Otherwise, the U. S. will not be able to do so. The U. S. risks making the same mistake it made decades ago by fleeing the Pacific islands, on a larger scale: in Africa, the Middle East, and the neighborhood of South America.
In the latter, the long-standing emotions of forgetting are turning into outright anger, especially after what many Latin American leaders saw as a lackluster U. S. performance. The U. S. Department of the U. S. at this year’s Summit of the Americas was the U. S. The U. S. government put forward proposals that some leaders said lacked substance. . .
Latin American leaders do not advocate the kind of participation beyond the U. S. This has included coup support, troop deployment, and support for deeply repressive governments. So as not to interfere in the American hemisphere: it aroused unpleasant memories in the region. (Biden administration officials have shied away from that language, even as they question China’s motives. )However, many Latin American leaders need new or renewed industrial agreements with Washington. , they need infrastructure projects, and they need more than what Francisco Santos Calderon, Colombia’s former ambassador to the United States, calls an American “blah, blah, blah. “
As for China, “there is no rivalry, because the United States is present in this rivalry here in Latin America,” the former envoy said. He added that China is now the largest trading spouse of several Latin American countries. “There is no genuine evidence that there is a U. S. policy. to Latin America,” he said. There are statements, there are communiqués, but a policy?No way. “
When pressed about their diplomatic priorities, Biden’s aides mention the demanding situations they face, as well as the efforts they are making. They point out that the war in Ukraine has attracted much of their attention and that after the Trump years, they had to spend a lot of time rebuilding relations with U. S. allies. U. S. But they also mention the State Department’s plans to remodel and modernize which, among other things, require a more tech-savvy diplomatic team and the creation of a “China House” to focus on Beijing. The interagency “negotiating teams” that U. S. companies abroad predate Biden, but his aides also see them as vital mechanisms. They further note that senior State Department officials constantly visit countries around the world, not just those in Asia.
Above all, Biden management officials say the most productive thing the U. S. can do is the most productive thing the U. S. can do. The U. S. military to allocate its strength is to rebuild at home, so they point to recent infrastructure and other expenses directed to the front of the house. An EE. More dynamic U. S. spending may be offering more to other countries and away from what would possibly be predatory Chinese influence, U. S. officials say.
“We know this is the defining geopolitical challenge of this decade, and we want to organize to address it,” a senior State Department official said. Asked whether such a long-term technique was vulnerable to long-term U. S. political stalemates and faster Chinese moves, the official pointed to the risk. “I wouldn’t possibly argue that we would like to go faster, offer more and better,” the official said, “but we have to do it in a way that ultimately meets the highest standards. “
Some analysts worry that by pointing out that the Chinese Communist Party poses a risk to U. S. dominance, it will lead to the need for dominance. U. S. (a trust with a broad bipartisanship in Washington), U. S. The US could galvanize an unnecessary and in all likelihood violent confrontation, and some argue that China’s rise is exaggerated. given its demographics. Pandemic trends and struggles. But there is also a widespread sense that, China or no China, the United States has for too long allowed its diplomatic muscles to atrophy while increasingly relying on its military strength as leverage.
For the past 10 years, annual U. S. investment has increased its investment. The U. S. Agency for State Decomposition, the U. S. Agency for the U. S. Department of State. The U. S. Department of Defense for International Development and similar purposes, for all intents and purposes, remained the same: about $55 billion. (This comes with the emergency investment generated in the component through the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, but comes with the now-eliminated budget category called “Overseas Emergency Operations. “)By contrast, the U. S. national defense budget is in decline. billion in the next year.
China’s investment in foreign affairs is less transparent, but available figures show that, although well below the US budget, China’s investment is less transparent. In the US, the Asian giant has increased its diplomatic spending by about 50% over the past decade and more than doubled in the last 15 years. . years, which represents about $7 billion in the 2022 budget. The figures, released through China’s National Bureau of Statistics, come with some investment cuts in pandemic years.
Current and former U. S. diplomats seem dejected when asked why congressional spending on their paintings has remained stable. Some argue that the State Department and USAID could do more with the existing budget if they were more effective. Others say more resources are needed, however, it’s hard to sell the American public the importance of diplomacy, which reaches behind-the-scenes scenes where the key weapons are words and trust, not fighter jets or tanks. Lawmakers eager to keep gun brands in their districts don’t have the same motivations. for diplomacy, despite the fact that many U. S. defense officials have been able to do so. The U. S. has suggested Congress devote more resources to diplomacy. Trump’s denigration of American diplomats, portraying them as a “deep state department” that thwarts his agenda, has left a mark. Republican presidents on the campaign trail will try to cut the department’s budget or avoid expanding it to appease the Republican base.
Top lawmakers from either party bristle at the idea that they don’t care, but their actions, or lack thereof, underscore that international relations are not a top priority. Many stories about how those expenses have fallen victim to partisan objections, clues, or outright negligence on the part of lawmakers facing many lawsuits of their time. Unsurprisingly, Republicans blame Democrats and Democrats blame Republicans. Being set aside at the “water’s edge” is in tatters.
“Diplomacy is too important for politics,” said Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-N. Y. ), chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee. so that we can devise a genuine diplomatic policy and be an example to our friends and allies. “
Last year, the first time in nearly two decades that Congress passed a comprehensive bill authorizing spending on state decomponentization and setting policy priorities. However, to push for it, lawmakers included it as a component of the must-have National Defense Authorization Act, a symbolism that has not escaped U. S. diplomats.
“Yes, please call your congressman and let him know that we want a bigger foreign policy budget,” a senior State Department official said at one point. “It all depends on the budget, whether it’s macroeconomic for loans or the ability to open embassies. . It’s all about money. “
At the sumptuous Central Hotel in Panama City’s Casco Viejo district, a combination of narrow streets, artsy cafes and historic buildings, Wei Qiang takes a sip of cappuccino and expresses disbelief that his embassy, or country, is a risk of any kind to the United States.
The Chinese ambassador is easy to locate here, politely texting a reporter on WhatsApp and sharing photos of himself younger with Cuba’s revolutionary leader, Fidel Castro. Dressed in a blue short-sleeved shirt, gray-haired Wei wears Spanish words. In the occasional moments when you can’t, you don’t forget the English words. He is familiar with the points of Chinese diplomatic speech, but he is also outspoken compared to many of his colleagues.
Wei expresses perplexity at recent warnings from a U. S. military commander. The U. S. government is talking about Chinese projects along the canal. He points out that one company under scrutiny, the one that manages ports on the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the channel, is a personal company founded in Hong Kong. which has been operating the services for many years. It rejects arguments that Hong Kong is now firmly under Beijing’s control, that even personal corporations are not immune from Chinese Communist Party control, and that China is arming its corporations for its geostrategic goals. .
In Panama, at least, the U. S. diplomatic presence has taken place. UU. es more potent than China’s, Wei insists, laughing when mentioning the long absence of a U. S. ambassador. UU. La U. S. Embassyhas many employees; the Chinese embassy, for now, regularly has fewer than 20, according to Wei. we decided to create a clash with Beijing.
“We don’t perceive why they care so much,” Wei said of U. S. officials. “In my view, it is regrettable that the United States practices or develops anti-China policies in the region. “
Wei’s claims about American influence here are not unfounded. Panama has long been a cultural crossroads, especially because of the canal. But whether along the country’s palm-fringed sea coast or in the modern skyscrapers of Panama City, American influence far exceeds China’s. Here the US dollar is accepted, many Panamanians speak at least some English and the United States is the main source of foreign direct investment in Panama, despite the corruption problems that have placed Panama on the “gray list” of the Financial Action Task Force and have been highlighted in the investigation of the “Panama Papers”. U. S. -Panama relations have not been harmonious; The U. S. briefly invaded Panama 33 years ago to topple an army leader, but American democratic ideals resonate with Panamanians.
Panama is generally thought to be relatively prosperous, but it is one of the worst performing countries in Latin America in terms of source of income distribution, with wealthy urban centers and poorer rural areas. spouse and would like this marriage.
“We are still hopeful and need to have more interaction with the U. S. Trying to get more investment from the U. S. “Erika Mouynes, who until recently served as Panama’s foreign minister,” Erika Mouynes, who until recently served as Panama’s foreign minister, told POLITICO in a September interview. They’re coming out of the pandemic, so we’re all looking for foreign investment. “When asked if he could ask Biden for anything specific, Mouynes replied a “capital plan for infrastructure. “
That said, Panamanian leaders should not forget China’s perspective as a partner. Although Panamanian President Laurentino Cortizo, who took office in 2019, has been far more cautious than his predecessor, Juan Carlos Varela, in his dealings with Beijing, Cortizo said in May this year that he sought to restart loose trade negotiations with China.
And many other people in this country see the price of not opting for the US-China sides. “We are a small country,” said Raul Mitchell, 56, who works in tourism. “We have to be peaceful, neutral, don’t mess with anyone, settle for everyone. “
Chinese diplomats in Panama need to increase their influence beyond business. One of its objectives is the large number of Panamanians of Chinese origin. Many of the ancestors of those Panamanians came to Panama in the nineteenth century to build a railroad that preceded the canal. diplomats say enviously that Beijing is making inroads into this diaspora, whose prominent members come with Wong, the former Foreign Ministry official.
China reaches Panamanians from all walks of life through places like the Confucius Institute he opened at the University of Panama, one of many such centers he has introduced around the world. He achieved them by selling books that plundered American creation movements across the United States. of the 50-mile canal from 1904 to 1914. He achieves them by spending giant sums on Spanish-language media controlled by the Chinese state. It achieves them through scholarships and other means that disseminate young Panamanians to China as a country and culture, a “person-to-person” effort that Wei is keen to highlight. (The United States has many similar outreach programs, adding an “American space” that recently opened in Panama, one of six hundred in the world. )
In many ways, Wei embodies the increasing sophistication of Chinese diplomacy.
Whereas before Chinese diplomats didn’t speak local languages well, dressed in old-fashioned ways and only watched debates, they are now elegant, linguistically fluent and assertive participants in debates, several former U. S. ambassadors told POLITICO. U. S. The Chinese will also rent who is responsible, no matter how they were given there.
In Myanmar, also known as Burma, Chinese diplomats lost a bit of a rhythm when the country went from a military dictatorship to a partial civilian government and then to a military dictatorship again. Scot Marciel, former U. S. ambassador The U. S. military military in Myanmar said that in 2017, when Myanmar’s military carried out a brutal crackdown on Rohingya Muslims that much of the world calls genocide, China saw “an opportunity. “Beijing.
“They don’t have to worry about complaints from their human rights teams or anything like that,” Marciel said. Instead, he said, the Chinese essentially told Myanmar, “We will take care of you in the UN Security Council,” that sort of thing. They are your friends. And, by the way, we all have those projects that we need to do.
Marciel said he and the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar have smart relationships but unexpected interactions. For example, the Chinese ambassador strongly advised Marciel not to stop in Kachin State, a troubled region of Myanmar bordering China. Marciel replied that he was accredited as a country and that he would travel wherever he wanted. Once, after Marciel’s stopover in Kachin, the Chinese ambassador went there and told the local teams not to interact with the Westerners. This disappointed some local leaders, who complained publicly.
Some Chinese diplomats, encouraged by their leaders’ calls for a “fighting spirit,” have adopted attitudes so competitive that they have been dubbed “wolf warriors,” a reference to a Chinese movie. Among them are Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian and the backward Chinese Ambassador to Sweden. The latter won so many battles that he summoned the Swedish Foreign Ministry more than 40 times.
Wei is not considered a “wolf warrior,” but defended his colleagues who were, saying they reflected the emotions of the Chinese people. However, the “wolf warrior” position has failed internationally, and Chinese officials seem to realize this. This year, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for a symbol of a “credible, type-like and respectable China” so that he can expand his “circle of friends. “Since then, other Chinese officials have indicated that their diplomats will not back down.
Xi consolidated his rule in China, where he has become the toughest leader since Mao Zedong, thanks in part to a crackdown on dissent. Xi’s preference to make China a global rival to the United States has emboldened Chinese diplomats, but also limited them, forcing them to watch their backs in a formula where partners are meant to communicate with each other.
Daniel Russell, one of then-President Barack Obama’s most sensible Asian advisers, recalled a meeting in Beijing with a highly experienced Chinese counterpart in the Xi years. The past discussed.
This time, when referring to a sensitive issue, “I looked away and saw my Chinese interlocutor doing something that I had probably never noticed him doing,” Russell said. “He opened his notebook, flipped through his table of contents,” and discovered the most sensible one, knew the page number, opened the e-book on that page, and began to read the text and read the Chinese position paper from beginning to end. What he told me was that he wasn’t talking to me. . He went down to get advantages from other people sitting him down to take notes, which anyone would have gladly denounced, because attrition, in the most sensible, is the most productive strategy to advance in a highly competitive system.
The U. S. Embassy in Panama is a cry of the bustling center of the capital, nestled on a hill along a wooded area. Its main construction shines in the sun after one of Panama’s many rainy season storms. doors and heading towards a winding road.
U. S. Embassy staff The U. S. includes at least one “China regional officer,” a category established in the Trump era. These officers, along with the State Department’s so-called “China monitors,” another relatively new formal category, monitor the Chinese government’s activities in a host country or an entire region, sharing this data with other members of the U. S. government. U. S. Some of the exchanges take a position in what are called “Chinese conferences. “One such collection is scheduled for December in Hawaii, according to a user familiar with the matter, and one of its goals is to strengthen collaboration with the Defense Department, according to the text of a timeline that no one shared. (The State Department declined to delve into many major points about China-focused diplomats or China conferences. )
Embassy officials have paid close attention to China’s incursions here and admit that the Chinese government’s ability to steer corporations toward infrastructure projects is a credit to Beijing. the conference center built in China and changes to the original designs of the fourth bridge. Officials have said U. S. pressure is one reason Cortizo’s government is more skeptical of China.
“There are things that have made them perceive the dangers and opportunities to reconsider and move on to more reliable suppliers,” said a senior U. S. embassy official. U. S. over Panamanians. ” But a big component of that is just learning the hard way. “
Panama is one of many places where Chinese projects have generated controversy. A Chinese-built railway in Kenya is the subject of corruption lawsuits and investigations. A Chinese-built port in Pakistan has sparked protests among Pakistanis dissatisfied with the area’s increased security. damage to fishermen’s livelihoods and reports that China, not Pakistan, is reaping the maximum of the wealth the port produces. In Sri Lanka and elsewhere, China has been blamed, in part, if not entirely, for the debt crisis. Complaint in some countries for uploading Chinese hard jobs instead of hiring locals.
Yet even when foreign governments are more cautious, it’s hard to resist China’s temptation. This is especially the case if there is little interest or resources from the United States or other Western countries for progress projects. And for many unscrupulous foreign leaders, China’s willingness to forget about issues like human rights and corruption is an advantage.
There is also the truth that the Chinese have lifted many millions of their own citizens out of poverty in recent decades. For political leaders to maintain the loyalty of their people, especially in poorer countries, this is difficult, W said. Gyude Moore, Liberia’s former minister of public works who now works at the Center for Global Development.
“I can have a lazy speech and be hungry, I can have minority rights and be hungry,” Moore said. “While genuine human rights,” the Chinese will say, “is about offering economic opportunities for other people and lifting them out of poverty. “
Chinese officials like Wei are involved in the setbacks. The ambassador expressed confidence that, whether in Panama or elsewhere, China will remain a horny partner. He also said China will be informed of its mistakes and adapt. “China has progressed, little by little, step by step. . . in the quality of their projects, their work, in terms of corporate governance, social responsibility, respect for the environment, that kind of thing,” Wei said.
U. S. leaders The U. S. has identified the strength of projects targeting China’s infrastructure, especially the Belt and Road. These projects have grown as the classic U. S. advancement arms of the U. S. have grown their lives. U. S. citizens, such as USAID, have increasingly focused on less visual projects, such as offering technical assistance to governments throughout. from schooling to the fight against corruption. Despite how critical this painting is, it doesn’t get the credits in the U. S. For example, the construction of a sports stadium obtains in China.
One of the main responses from the U. S. The U. S. International Development Finance Corporation was created in 2019 by the U. S. International Development Finance Corporation. The U. S. Department of Agriculture, a government company that helps finance infrastructure and other projects. But the DFC has an investment cap of $60 billion, well below the billions of dollars of burdens China is willing to devote to development (some reports imply China has spent $1 trillion on Belt and Road).
The DFC aims to target poorer countries, leaving a country like Panama largely ineligible. It also has what many officials describe as a nightmarish amount of bureaucratic hurdles. “I tried to get cash from DFC for a port in Colombia in Uraba, Antioquia region. It’s impossible,” said Santos, the former Colombian envoy.
There are efforts in Congress for the DFC, but it’s unclear how far they will go. A spokesperson defended the DFC, saying it “has intensified its operations and worked to develop its portfolio, maximize its impact, and advance foreign progress and U. S. foreign policy priorities. “
Rising populism and deepening partisanship in the United States have made it increasingly difficult for a president to strike industrial deals with other countries. Instead, Biden’s management promoted economic “cadres. “These agreements are packages that address issues such as supply chains and sustainability, but they are confusing and do not necessarily involve lower price lists or open markets. They view them as comprehensive as promising rather than substantive agreements. Similarly, they shrug off the recently unveiled Global Infrastructure and Investment Partnership, a task led by the United States and other G-7 countries that pledges to “mobilize $600 billion through 2027. “for infrastructure assignments worldwide. This “mobilization” includes the mobilization of personal sector investments.
Again, this is theoretical, and no one can say for sure that the cash will arrive, yet Biden administration officials urge foreign leaders to be patient and weigh the downsides of making quick deals with the Chinese.
“We’re not telling our corporations to pursue intellectual property loans,” said a third senior State Department official. The official added that it is unlikely that the U. S. create state-owned enterprises like China, but organizations like DFC and other projects can The assistance offers more incentives for the U. S. private sector to do so. “The U. S. invests in certain regions. ” We have tools,” the official said. We just have to do it with them. “
Never far from the minds of foreign officials is the fact that U. S. presidents are not far from the minds of foreign officials. The U. S. serve no more than 8 years and are subject to the whims of a Congress that is sparing even when controlled by the president’s party. In addition, new presidents must abandon old plans, so projects come and go.
Under Trump, for example, the U. S. The U. S. Department of Agriculture introduced the America Crece program in 2019. According to a press release at the time, the program was “a cutting-edge government-wide technique to support economic progress through catalyzing personal sector investment in energy and other infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. Today, Latin American officials, let alone the United States, have only a vague reminiscence of that plan, and the Biden administration appears to have abandoned it while trying to get rid of Trump’s remains. .
In mid-August, a State Department spokesperson said America Crece had been “replaced” through Biden’s plans as PGII. When asked if the branch could cite examples of infrastructure projects presented under America Crece, the branch waited more than a week to refer to POLITICO. to the Treasury Department for a response. After two weeks, the Treasury Department declined to comment.
When Mouynes asked about economic frameworks and other U. S. proposals. The U. S. Department of Health said they had not yet been implemented. “We can’t wait to get started and see how this translates into concrete projects in each of our countries,” he said, adding. : “Of course I have hope. “
Chollet, the State Department adviser, said the U. S. policy formula fosters a view of “presenteeism” when it comes to foreign policy. “We’re looking to build structures that will outlive us,” he said of the Biden administration.
The U. S. Embassy The U. S. Department of Commerce has diplomats who focus on trade, which is not unexpected given the canal’s importance to world trade. (According to key metrics, EE. UU. es the largest user of the channel, followed by China. The canal is so vital to Washington that the United States transferred control of the crossing to Panama more than two decades ago, reserving the right to take military action to protect it if necessary, a well-known Beijing arrangement. )
However, U. S. diplomats in Panama and far beyond say that if any component of the U. S. diplomatic infrastructure would be a major diplomat. The U. S. wants help, it’s the disintegration of the U. S. U. S. and foreign industry.
The disintegration of advertisements is part of the Disintegration of Commerce, not of the state. Their day jobs are to help increase U. S. exports. Removing industry barriers, in order to level the playing box for U. S. corporations. U. S. citizens who must comply with U. S. law. This is the U. S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Provided at U. S. diplomatic missions. in about 78 countries, adding Panama. exports
In 2014, the Sales Department had around 1,750 employees. In the following years, it lost many workers due to attrition, stagnant budgets and other reasons. With some fluctuations, the number of workers was reduced to about 1430, adding 250 foreign service officers. Under Biden, he seeks to recover the losses, according to a Commerce Department official who presented the figures to POLITICO.
The Biden team favors other tactics to emphasize such diplomacy; As a component of plans to modernize the Decomposition of the State, Blinken pledged to increase the number of diplomats focused on issues such as trade, adding “economic agents” whose daily job is to report on similar business and activities in other countries.
During Tibor Nagy’s tenure as undersecretary of state for African affairs under Trump, he inspected embassies under his duty to find out how many diplomats were focusing on industry issues. “I said, ‘Tell me, how many positions does the Chinese embassy have?to advertise industry and investment, instead of the U. S. embassy. And then, in Africa, we have embassies that. . . Their staff is so small that we have someone who may be, let’s say, guilty of promotional advertising, advertising diplomacy, but they do the visas in the morning. It’s probably ridiculous. “
Wei readily acknowledges that while U. S. diplomats focus on selling issues like smart governance, democracy and human rights, Chinese envoys are more interested in publicizing economic ties. Bilateral appointments,” said Wei. Se marveled at how U. S. personal sector corporations are being held in the U. S. UU. se forget about bidding opportunities in Panama: “They are not interested,” Wei said. “They never come. “
U. S. personal corporations have many points when comparing projects abroad. Corruption is one of them, but it is a global problem, not only in Panama. The FCPA prohibits such corporations from engaging in foreign bribery. In a sense, the law provides protection to corporations when requested for such programs, it can also thwart U. S. efforts. The U. S. government is able to compete with put option corporations without such rules.
Other issues come with the size of the market, whether the task is big enough to make a profit, as well as the prices of hard work. hard labor prices may be lower.
“Especially in small, right-wing countries, including Peru and Ecuador, but especially in the Caribbean and Central America, countless government officials have told us that we are only interested in American corporations,” said Roberta Jacobson, a former high-level state official. An official in the department who has dealt with Latin America and served as U. S. ambassador. Even when U. S. corporations are in the U. S. If the U. S. government was interested, Jacobson added, they risked being belittled through Chinese corporations or others whose governments subsidize their labor.
Among U. S. -based companies, Feeley said he approached bidding for the “fourth bridge” structure in Panama Bechtel, the structure and engineering giant. A Bechtel spokesperson said that in delivering the fourth bridge project, “we had to prioritize key resources and where we had a greater chance of winning and executing effectively. “The spokesperson also warned that, in the long run, Bechtel was serving U. S. interests. It is a matter of high-quality work.
“Bechtel competes and wins primary projects overseas, but the festival to win is intense, which adds to state-backed corporations in other countries, and the dangers can be significant,” the spokesperson said in a statement.
Some foreign diplomats say the U. S. The U. S. wants to offer more incentives for personal corporations to adopt projects in regions such as Latin America or Africa. But sometimes, U. S. diplomats and analysts say, the most productive technique is not to rely on the American personal sector. , it is better to inspire a foreign government to turn to corporations allied with the United States, such as Japan or South Korea or any number of European countries, than China. That’s one explanation for why the Biden administration, which has worked hard to repair relations with frayed allies through Trump, is pushing multilateral economic projects like the PGII. But such efforts also require greater U. S. diplomatic concentration. U. S. in the industry space.
For up to five years, the U. S. Embassy in Panama has been headed by a “chargé d’affaires. “This person, a career diplomat, may attract more attention from Panamanians than diplomats from many other countries, and some in this position is considered very effective. But none have the prestige or influence of a Senate-confirmed ambassador, U. S. officials admit. In a small country like Panama, where the entire government is dedicated to working on WhatsApp, an ambassador can make a big difference. And in many countries, diplomatic protocol is very important, so a chargé d’affaires cannot as easily reach a president, or even a foreign minister, as a genuine ambassador.
Feeley ended her 28-year diplomatic career in March 2018, blowing up Trump as he said goodbye. In April 2020, Trump announced that his nominee to upgrade Feeley would be Erik Bethel, a monetary professional who speaks Spanish and Mandarin. It has never been shown. Nearly nine months into his presidency, Biden announced his pick for Panama’s post: Mari Carmen Aponte, a lawyer and former ambassador to El Salvador. It was shown at the end of September. The delay in his case is due in part to Republican Sen. Rick Scott of Florida, said a user familiar with the problem. Scott has blocked some applicants from opposing Biden’s Cuba policy, a significant factor in his status.
A spokesman for Scott blamed the confirmation delays on Democrats’ misuse of Senate talk time. Other Republicans point out that while some senators use the nomination procedure to score political points, the White House may also be slow to review and name people. Whatever the reason, according to the Public Service Partnership, the past 15 years have seen a serious slowdown in ambassador confirmation. Under Biden, since last Tuesday, it has taken an average of 145. 7 days. Under Trump, also 145. 7 days, while Obama ran to 121. 1 days. Previous presidents who have returned to Ronald Reagan have not exceeded 3 figures. As of Oct. 7, only about 40 ambassadorial positions were vacant, according to the American Foreign Service Association. They come with stalls in India, Italy and Colombia.
“This is no way to govern a country,” said Max Stier, executive director of the Partnership for Public Service, a nonprofit whose activities include tracking presidential candidates. “We compete in the quality of our government with our main competitors, so China is obviously the main concern. China doesn’t have that problem. “
Like Trump, Biden has appointed “special envoys” for certain posts, avoiding blocking verification, though management officials deny that’s the reason. However, the heavy use of special envoys has upset lawmakers. In doing so, they strengthened the force to verify such roles in the authorization bill approved last year, an invitation to a more partisan stalemate.
Chinese diplomats appear to spend more time in a country and, in some cases, appear to get more education than their American counterparts. Four told POLITICO that their typical tour of duty in an overseas position is 4 years, compared to 3 years in the U. S. U. S. The most sensible diplomats in China stay for more than 4 years. Many of China’s most sensible diplomats attended American universities or sent their children to those schools.
Foreign affairs experts disagree on whether the fact that U. S. diplomats are in place to be able to do so. U. S. spending longer in office would help advance U. S. interests. But sometimes they agree that more U. S. diplomats are in the U. S. “The U. S. deserves to be in Washington. de friction, so to speak, and that doesn’t mean bigger embassies, which means more presence problems,” said Pottinger, who now chairs the Defense of Democracies Foundation’s China program.
Chinese diplomats have some other merit over their American counterparts: They don’t have to worry so much about security. America’s prestige as the dominant global force means American diplomats have targets behind them. As a result, safety regulations make things difficult for them. to travel within a country or even open diplomatic facilities, and U. S. embassies. In the U. S. , they are rarely fortified spaces far from city centers. Chinese emissaries rarely have more freedom of movement.
Biden’s team has taken steps to ease those restrictions on U. S. diplomats, taking high-profile steps like reopening its embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine, despite the ongoing war. But it’s a gamble. The fallout from the 2012 attack on the U. S. project in Benghazi, Libya, which killed 4 Americans, an ambassador added, and provoked repeated Republican political attacks on Democrats, casts a partisan shadow that analysts say has handcuffed American diplomacy.
China is also paying greater attention to multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and seeking to put its citizens at the forefront of those institutions. Chinese skeptics say Beijing needs to rewrite foreign regulations on everything from industry to human rights in its favor, and that’s one explanation for why it will pay diplomatic attention to even the smallest countries. These countries, after all, get votes in foreign forums. A senior Chinese official recently explained that a key concept of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” is that China “lead the reform of the global governance formula with the concept of fairness and justice. “
Jeff Feltman, a former senior UN official, noted that China occasionally insists that UN documents reflect its views, stressing that states’ rights over American ones and economic rights are more vital than political rights. In the rule of law documents, he said, “The Chinese charge ‘between states’ after the word ‘rule of law,’ so that instead of being a discussion about how governments treat their citizens, it becomes a discussion about how states interact with each other. To ask for a greater voice, Feltman said, however, it means the United States wants to improve its multilateral diplomatic art and give more prominence to international relations.
As a nod to those concerns, Blinken created a State Department to make sure the United States and its allies get more prominent positions in multilateral bodies.
As night approaches Panama City, a multitude of car headlights shine from one of the existing stretches over the canal, the Bridge of the Americas. Once again, traffic on the bridge slows down, delaying those who wish to return home.
In theory, the fourth bridge would be built near the Bridge of the Americas, absorbing much of its existing vehicular load. The bridge has been talked about in one form or another for at least a decade, and its absence until now. It’s ironic. It is a country, after all, that stands out for its ability to facilitate transit.
“Yes, we want the fourth bridge,” said Yanina Campbell, 55, an artisan who sells specially designed handbags. “There is a lot of traffic, and let’s understand, the industry is positioned either in the capital or in the peripheral areas. “
Construction of the bridge was delayed for a variety of reasons, adding considerations about a similar subway allocation that eventually broke away from the bridge plans. Funding the allocation was also a challenge, which the pandemic didn’t help. The contract, however, looks solid, Panamanian officials say, making the cancellation of Chinese corporations legally dangerous for Panama.
Asked if the Cortizo administration’s distrust of expanding Chinese influence in Panama was one of the reasons the bridge projects were suspended, Mouynes insisted the reasons were technical and financial.
“We need to start this task as soon as possible,” the former foreign minister said.
The same goes for the Chinese government.
Indeed, Chinese state media is already touting the fourth bridge as a prime example of Beijing’s growing influence in Latin America. The U. S. seeks to catch up, Chinese media rejoices. , he quoted analysts as saying that if the U. S. “tries to force [other] countries to take sides, it is doomed to hit the wall because countries are tired of trying to politicize economic problems and foment ideological clashes. “
With China planning to play a bigger role in Panama and beyond, clashes of all kinds seem inevitable.
Nahal Toosi is a senior affairs correspondent for POLITICO. Nicolle Liu contributed to this report.