[Editor’s note: This is a speech at the convention on “The Change of Power and Governance of the People’s Republic of China” sponsored through the Council on Mainland Affairs (MAC) and organized through the China Advanced Policy Studies Council (CAPS). ]
Today, I’ll share my thoughts on the clients of U. S. -China relations. I will do so in the context of domestic developments in China, and add Xi Jinping’s start to a third term as head of the CPC, as well as broader trends in the region and the world. I’m sorry I’m not in the room with you, but occasions have demanded that you be here in New York. That said, I will soon board a plane to Taiwan. , and I’m looking forward to visiting and getting a first-hand look at what other people are thinking there lately.
More about:
What we saw at the 20th Party Congress, while not surprising, shows that Xi Jinping exerts a degree of force that many underestimated and has only a precedent in the history of the People’s Republic of China. For the foreseeable future, this is Xi’s China.
A variety of original analyses, knowledge visualizations and commentary, examining debates and efforts for global health. Weekly.
With some consequences comes this reality. Some can be simply positive, as they allow for transparent decision-making, consistent policy and disciplined implementation. In theory, clear authority allows those in place to prioritize long-term goals over short-term considerations. It ruffled many feathers and earned tough enemies, and while it was also a political crusade, there is no doubt that he tamed corruption and made significant progress on a thorny issue, the one that plagued his predecessor.
But the pitfalls of such centralization are likely to be greater, which we have noticed in other authoritarian systems where force is highly utilized and centralized. First, the bureaucracy is paralyzed, waiting for a man’s resolution. It is difficult to do anything unless the leader(s) agree and authorize his subordinates to implement a program. Decisions can be made arbitrarily, without paying sufficient attention to opportunities and costs, while advisors are afraid to speak up and offer other perspectives. If this user makes an incorrect resolution, it is difficult to change. The threat of miscalculation is high. This is not to say that democracies are immune to mistakes, which they obviously are not. But democracies provide greater constraints on what leaders can do, allow more varied contributions to resolutions, and, most importantly, have a greater ability to correct. Kind mistakes after they have been made and acknowledged.
This is applicable because Xi has made mistakes. His assertive foreign policy has alienated neighboring countries from Australia to India, South Korea and Japan, as well as in Europe. Public polls on attitudes toward China attest to this. He signed an “unlimited” appointment with Russia on the eve of Vladimir Putin’s launch. a brutal, unjustified and costly war against Ukraine, a war that violates what have long been precepts at the core of Chinese foreign policy, adding a commitment to non-aggression, respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of others, and interfering within the affairs of others. His policy toward Taiwan has put Beijing’s desired unification purpose even more out of reach. Economic performance.
As for foreign policy, Deng Xiaoping’s era of hide-and-seek is over. Xi’s China is announcing itself on the world stage. He believes China’s time has come and is willing to tolerate more dangers in pursuing China’s interests.
More about:
We can see a trend of this, from the militarization of the South China Sea to a border with India, economic sanctions against Australia, South Korea, the Philippines and others, and increasing pressure on Taiwan.
We also see worrying symptoms in what China will not do. China has refused to cooperate with the WHO or maintain evidence on the origins of the Covid-19 virus despite valid questions about its origin. There is no evidence that China is its influence in influencing North Korea’s competitive behavior. And although, as far as I know, China does not provide arms to Russia, it continues to buy energy from Russia, thus financing its war effort.
We’ve had a decade of this and there’s no explanation for why Xi will recalibrate. Instead, without having to anticipate some other party conference for a while and surrounded by loyalists, we are more likely to see a continuation of trends or even a doubling down.
For decades, the CCP and a succession of leaders have gained much of their national legitimacy by achieving ordinary degrees of economic performance. Such expansion is no longer possible. Misguided Covid policies, stagnant economic reform, drought, unemployment, currency bubbles, and demographic trends add to domestic pressures. The threat is that China will resort to what it does beyond its borders to compensate for deficiencies within them, to play nationalism. card.
This may also become a major threat to Xi’s third and potentially subsequent term. Obviously, Xi sees himself as a leader on par with Mao, the country’s founder. But it is not known what achievement it will entail as evidence of his belonging to this company. If the economic expansion falters, Xi may look elsewhere to protect his legacy, possibly in Taiwan.
Xi may also see little cost, as customers for advanced relations with the United States have yet to disappear. A deep mistrust of China is now shared by all parties in my country. The language of the national security strategy, recently released through Biden’s administration, portrays China as the only competitor attempting to reshape the foreign order and increase economic, diplomatic, military and technological strength to achieve that goal. This language may also have been produced smoothly through the Trump administration. . . And it is very likely to be representative of American thinking, regardless of what happens in the upcoming midterm elections or the 2024 presidential vote. The era of a more open, market-oriented, nonviolent China has been largely replaced by an era in which the United States reluctantly accepts restriction. It is based on desired domestic reform, seeks to curb China’s rise, and strives to restrain its external behavior.
For more than 4 decades, Taiwan has enjoyed a non-violent and solid society that has supported its economic progress and political evolution. Today’s democratic, filthy rich and flourishing Taiwan is the result of this. This can no longer be assumed.
The main explanation for why it comes from the continent. We can expect more pressure on Taiwan, economically, diplomatically and militarily, to try to influence political developments on the island and promote the prestige quo in China’s favor. Taiwan poses a risk to the People’s Republic of China because of what it does and what it does. It is. It represents a political, economic and social path of choice for China and the Chinese people.
Two parallels occur to me here. One is Hong Kong. One country, two formulas are unacceptable to a continental government that feared the example of a formula at a moment of success that promised a degree of freedom and a dilution of party control. The result is more and more a country, a formula. Ukraine was a risk for Russia because it represented a democratic future chosen, anchored in the EU, for the Slavic people. be impossible to resist Russians living in Russia.
Thus, develop impatience with the prestige quo, Xi’s particular link between unification and his broader purpose of national rejuvenation, more common military incursions, economic sanctions, and the obvious acceptance on the mainland that nonviolent unification is moving away and that forced unification would possibly be necessary, sooner rather than later.
What are the United States and its partners doing about it?
First, build deterrence. The goal is to deter war or, failing that, to protect Taiwan rather than liberate it. For the United States, this means expanding our defense budget: the good news is that we spent far more as a percentage of GDP during the Cold War. And that didn’t crowd out other expenses. Equally important, it means moving functions to the Indo-Pacific, strengthening our bases, dispersing our forces through the pursuit of new access agreements, and pressuring our military facilities to prioritize China. A clearer commitment to Taiwan’s defense, what I’ve called strategic clarity, would also help. It would be the same to stay the course on behalf of Ukraine and against Russia; it is imperative that Russia’s attempt to gain territory by force does not succeed, lest China receive a damaging lesson. . . And, more broadly, that disrespect for borders does not deserve to become a characteristic of foreign relations, so that order in the global is not lost.
Taiwan, for its part, urgently wants its defence. His steady increases in defense spending are welcome, but more is needed. Taiwan will have to make smart use of this cash, investing in asymmetric functions such as missiles and small attack ships. able to survive. It will have to expand a territorial defense force. One lesson from Ukraine deserves to be that all Taiwanese deserve to be involved, not just those in uniform. Taiwan will also have to focus on its resilience through energy and food storage. and discover how to continue functioning as a society without the Internet or telecommunications.
Japan will play a pivotal role in any defense of Taiwan, and the United States wants to better perceive the extent of Japan’s aid. Public statements through Japanese leaders that any attack on U. S. forces in Japan would be an attack on Japan itself would be welcome.
Second, deterrence and, where appropriate, defence require reducing our collective economic dependence on China, both as a market and as a supplier of inputs. Here, I’m not just talking about rare land minerals or other strategic elements. everything that is strategic due to the volume of trade. We will need to conduct a thorough investigation of our vulnerability to a crisis and take action to address it. I don’t think decoupling is feasible or desirable, yet what I would call economic distancing would possibly be so. This applies to Europe, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and any other spouses or allies. It makes no strategic sense that Taiwan’s largest trading spouse is the mainland. This needs to be adjusted. Economic leverage will have to paint in our favor, not in China’s favor.
Thirdly, we will have to act responsibly and with discipline. The purpose will be to avoid war. This will require avoiding unnecessary provocations. Taiwan’s formal independence is not in the cards. The stakes are too high for unnecessary symbols or provocations. politics.
It is more important to perceive Taiwan and the US triangle. US-China-Taiwan as a scenario to control than a challenge to solve. Unilateral action through any party to replace the basics deserves to be avoided. The 3 parties, as well as the region and the world, have benefited from an imperfect but solid scenario. The purpose of international relations deserves to be to expand this, as the choice is sure to be costly in all respects for everyone, whether they are directly involved or not.
Thank you for asking me to speak today. I look forward to their reactions and questions.