China in 2023: Xi redoubles his ‘fight’

China proved highly efficient at controlling its population during the pandemic, but it could not prevent a grassroots sense of frustration with the authorities from developing. Even messianic Xi Jinping cannot eliminate this discontent with his pithy sayings, promises and remonstrations to “struggle” against “dangerous storms”.

Maintaining a policy of getting rid of COVID for much longer than any other country in the world was a major achievement of the CCP, but it was not a viable long-term strategy. People and the economy have suffered terribly and an economic downturn has ensued. it was felt in 2023.

Chinese exports are flagging (in June, year-on-year exports had slumped 12.4 per cent), debt is at record levels and the property sector crisis has deepened further. In fact, house sales are just half what they were in December 2020, and 60-80 million apartments lie empty across the nation. Government efforts have not propped up sagging business or consumer confidence either. A foreign investment deficit of USD 11.8 billion occurred from July-September, the first time foreign businesses withdrew more money from China than they invested. Xi’s anti-espionage and national security laws are partly to blame as he creates communist totalitarianism.

Youth unemployment is also staggering. Mid-year data showed unemployment among 16- to 24-year-olds was 21. 3 percent, double what it was four years ago. But the scenario is much worse: in China, a user is considered to have a paid task even if they only work one hour a week!This figure also does not apply to young people in rural areas. Some estimate China’s youth unemployment rate to be as high as 50 percent. The best Xi gives to China’s youth are epithets like “endure hardships” and “eat bitterness. “

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With deep-seated economic structural issues, a rapidly ageing population amidst a declining birthrate, and Xi’s fanatical policy of centralising political power, it is no wonder that President Joe Biden described China’s economy as a “ticking time bomb”. The coming year should bring a continued slowdown, as Xi makes China an increasingly unattractive proposition for investment. Xi has eschewed collective decision-making, as he amasses power and blurs the lines between state and party. Xi floated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, but a decade later, it is suffering from economic malaise. After the BRI peaked in 2018, it has had to tighten its belt.

China announced three waves of new projects in 2021-2022 (the Global Data Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative) that aim to gain greater influence over the Global South and increase belief in the decline of the United States. and announce the prospect of progress of China. order.

In a rare note for Xi, he managed to negotiate the embarrassing death of former Premier Li Keqiang on October 27. Li represented an opposition faction, the Communist Youth League.

Regardless, China’s reaction to COVID and the CCP’s inability to provide answers to a generation unaccustomed to hard times have tarnished Xi’s popularity since his coronation for a third term at the 20th National Congress. In October 2022, Xi installed an unprecedented number of his own men in the halls. of power and his position as an ideal, unassailable leader.

However, his ability to discern the character of his protégés proved fallible in 2023, when one after another disappeared from public view and faded into oblivion. First it was Foreign Minister Qin Gang, followed by Defense Minister Li Shangfu. Maj. Gen. Li Yuchao and Political Commissar Gen. Liu Guangbin of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force were also killed. The PLARF leadership has been decimated, with perhaps 70 officials arrested so far, so it’s hard to see how Xi can accept this as true. strength in rate of its strategic weapons.

China continues to claim to be impartial in the face of Tsar Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. There are few examples of Chinese corporations supplying combat aircraft to Russia, but it has been tangible in other ways. For example, China and Hong Kong provided 85% of PC chips imported through Russia between March 2022 and September 2023.

On February 24, Beijing released “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis. ” However, this was not a peace plan but rather an ideological regurgitation that, in some words, was hypocritical. For example, “one country’s security is not worth pursuing at the expense of others,” China proclaimed, but Xi openly refused to say this to his friend Putin.

Hong Kong’s National Security Law, passed on June 30, 2020, has succeeded in quelling any form of protest or political expression in the British colony. To date, 285 Hong Kongers have been convicted of crimes under the ambiguous law, which provides the government with an indefinite mandate to crack down on freedom of expression. Moreover, in just 4 years, Hong Kong has gone from the highest turnout ever recorded in local district elections to the lowest in history. In 2019, 71. 2% of the population most commonly voted for pro-democratic candidates, however, the December 10, 2023 election attracted only 27. 54% of voters.

Much of China’s vicious cycle is due to its own actions. Take, for example, the case of its high-altitude surveillance balloon program. Relations with the United States reached a new low point after an F-22A fighter jet shot down a Chinese jet. balloon on Feb. 5 while flying over sensitive nuclear sites in Montana. The Pentagon noted, “We spoke directly with Chinese officials through various channels, but instead of responding to their intrusion into our airspace, the People’s Republic of China gave an explanation that lacked credibility. »

As it turned out, this wasn’t an isolated incident either; The Pentagon explained that five Chinese balloons are believed to have circled the globe, wearing out between 20 and 30 missions over the past decade. Caught red-handed, China attacked those who had detained it.

China continues to invest heavily in the EPL. Al announcing its defense budget on March 5, China allocated 1,553. 7 billion yuan ($224. 59 billion) to the military, a 7. 2% increase from last year. Despite all the economic obstacles, this represents the highest cumulative percentage in recent years. 4 years.

China’s arsenal of nuclear weapons is also growing incredibly in size. According to the Pentagon, in 2022, the PLARF had about 400 nuclear warheads, but that number had already risen to more than 500 as of May 2023. In addition, China’s operational arsenal of nuclear warheads is expected to succeed by more than 1,000 by 2030, plus the PLARF is moving toward “higher degrees of readiness” for its strategic weapons.

The risk to Taiwan has also increased, and the PLA has maintained an even more bellicose stance following Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022. The PLA has maintained a maximum rate of air intrusions into Taiwan’s Identification Zone. Taiwan’s air defense, thus building a new baseline. for coercive activities such as Beijing tightening the mental screws. As Taiwanese citizens approach the presidential election on January 13, 2024, China has raised the bar.

As an example of this pressure, Lieutenant General He Lei, former vice chairman of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, brazenly threatened Taiwan in October: “Once the Chinese government is forced to use force on the Taiwan question, it will be a war for reunification, a just and valid war sustained and in which the other Chinese participate, and a war to counter foreign interference. However, the Taiwanese do not wish to join with China in what would not be reunification, but rather annexation. or colonialism.

China has continued to exert stronger pressure in the South China Sea too. The Philippines has been on the receiving end of some harsh treatment, as Xi expresses his displeasure with the government’s firmer stance on preserving Philippine territorial interests. In particular, it has used greater force – including ramming, water cannons and swarming vessels – to dissuade the Philippines from resupplying troops garrisoned on a naval vessel beached on Second Thomas Shoal.

The Philippines and allies such as Australia and the United States are making more publicity to shed light on China’s reckless actions. For example, a Chinese J-11 fighter flew dangerously close to a B-52 bomber over the South China Sea in October, while Australian Navy Divers were injured by intentional sonar from a Chinese warship opposing them in waters near Japan in November.

The more China expands its influence, the more it exposes itself to accusations of imperialism. He constantly accuses the U. S. of “hegemony” and maintaining a “cold war mentality,” when in reality China is a planned disruptor that crosses the line between valid and illegal use of force.

A sullen China has rejected any communication between the PLA and the U. S. military. Adm. John Aquilino, head of the U. S. Indo-Pacific Command, complained earlier this year: “It’s been a year and a half since I gained a reaction to resolve for my request for conversation. I didn’t get a “no. ” I didn’t get a “Wait, can we adapt?” message. I didn’t get any reaction. ” When Biden met Xi in San Francisco in November, Beijing nonetheless agreed to resume communications.

The year 2023 has demonstrated the instability of the world in countries like the Middle East, even if China has been able to seize unforeseen opportunities to advance its cause. Unfortunately, China’s goals are very different from those of the democratic West, and many others still don’t realize it. One of those other people was French President Emmanuel Macron, who visited China in April. Rejoicing in a rock-star welcome, Macron deftly bolstered Xi’s arguments with comments like this: “The question we Europeans have to answer. . . Is it in our interest to escalate [a crisis] in Taiwan? I think we Europeans want to become experts on this subject and be inspired by the American calendar and China’s overreaction. “

Xi’s goals come with dividing European unity and driving a wedge between Europe and the United States. Xi fortunately rubbed his hands together when Macron said, “The Europeans cannot solve the crisis in Ukraine; How can we credibly say in Taiwan, “Be careful?””If you do something wrong, we’ll be there”? If you need to ratchet up tensions, that’s the way to do it. “China needs to defeat Taiwan without a single shot being fired, and Macron’s acquiescence is exactly what Xi needs, for the West to surrender and hand over Taiwan to Chinese machinations.

In the annual “Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in February, the conclusion was this: “The CCP will continue efforts to achieve President Xi Jinping’s vision of making China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage. As Xi begins his third term as China’s leader, the CCP will work to press Taiwan on unification, undercut US influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system.”

In fact, Beijing sees competitive relations between the United States and China as part of a historic geopolitical shift. It views Washington’s diplomatic, economic, military and technological measures against Beijing as part of a broader U. S. effort to engage China. As a result, Beijing is increasingly combining its developing military strength with economic, technological, and diplomatic clout for the CCP regime, capturing territory and regional preeminence and seeking global influence.

However, China faces a number of demanding internal and external situations that obstruct Xi’s ambitions. Like the simple emperor, it is evident to many that Xi will do almost anything to consolidate his strength and satisfy his destiny. Let’s hope it doesn’t make it in 2024 as it responds to those mounting pressures and constraints. (ANI)

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