Select Page
Posted via Arthur Kaufman | December 22, 2023
In the mere 22 months since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia and China have come closer on a variety of parameters. Political and economic ties between the two countries have blossomed, and amid doubts about Western aid to Ukraine and Taiwan, some wonder if the wind is now blowing on the backs of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. As Kawala Xie reported for the South China Morning Post, the positive relations between China and Russia were underlined through an assembly between the heads of government of the two countries this week in Beijing, during which the country’s China Socialist Party (BEIJING) said the progression of bilateral relations was a mutual “strategic choice”:
Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in Beijing on Wednesday, Xi pledged that Beijing would continue to expand “high-level” political and economic relations with Moscow.
“Maintaining and improving China-Russia relations is a strategic choice made by both sides and based on the fundamental interests of the two peoples,” Xi was quoted by China’s Foreign Ministry.
“The two sides are making the most of the benefits of political mutual trust, economic complementarity, interconnected services and people-to-people exchanges. “
China and Russia’s economic ties have noticeably deepened. China’s customs authorities showed that bilateral trade between both countries grew 26.7 percent year on year to over 218 billion USD between January and November. China is also now Russia’s biggest energy buyer, and last week Russia’s Gazprom set a new daily record for gas deliveries to China. Russian Prime Minister Mishustin noted that over 90 percent of this trade is now being conducted in either rubles or yuan, as Russia tries to escape its dependence on the U.S. dollar and insulate itself from international sanctions. Keith Bradsher at The New York Times described how the “biggest winners for China from the surge in trade with Russia have been its vehicle manufacturers”:
[. . . ] Luxury car sales in Russia have plummeted, contributing to the decline in the total length of the country’s car market, which is now less than a fraction of Germany’s. But poor, lower-middle-class Russian families, whose members make up the bulk of infantrymen fighting in the war, have increased their purchases of Chinese cars, according to Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
One of the reasons, according to Gabuev, is the death and disability that the Russian government and insurers pay to the families of Russian infantrymen: up to $90,000 in the event of death.
[. . . ] Russians buy almost exclusively internal combustion cars. China has a surplus because its consumers have opted for electric cars.
[. . . ] Chinese automakers have captured 55% of the Russian market, according to GlobalData Automotive. They had 8 in 2021. [Source]
Increased collaboration has been documented in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Recent reports have shown how Russia has used Chinese intermediaries to circumvent global technology bans. A New York Times investigation found that “China and Hong Kong provided 85% of semiconductors imported into Russia between March 2022 and September 2023, up from 27% before the conflict, according to the Silverado Policy Accelerator, a nonprofit that studies Russian industry routes, and a Russian e-commerce site imported $150 million worth of PC hardware from China this year. Last month, Markus Garlauskas, Joseph Webster, and Emma C. Verges explained to the Atlantic Council how China’s stance toward Russia has hampered Ukraine’s counteroffensive:
Open-source industry knowledge suggests that increased imports of Chinese-made products with significant military uses has played a key role in Russia’s ability to bolster its defenses on Ukrainian territory and keep them supplied and prepared to deal with the counteroffensive. . . . ] Even when weapons and ammunition entering Ukraine from NATO countries, they are compensated by Chinese imports: not weapons, but fabrics important to Russia’s ability to maintain its stubborn and continuous efforts to retain Ukrainian territory.
[. . . ] A Chinese-made military has literally helped Russia entrench its forces in the Ukrainian territory it occupies. The large increase in vehicle imports, along with super-heavy trucks, has likely allowed the Russian war industry to continue to make military cars a must-have for forming combat forces for defense-in-depth. These Chinese cars also enable the logistics of the Russian army for the delivery of aircraft and materials to the front.
Meanwhile, a sharp increase in imports of ball bearings from the People’s Republic of China has probably also enabled the production of deposits. Finally, the continuity of the People’s Republic of China’s silicon chips has provided key elements for Russia to repair its weapons production, allowing, for example, Russian artillery. , missiles and drones to continue to wreak havoc on Ukrainian counterstrike forces and civilian targets.
Taken together, all of these elements have enabled Russia to build an effective, resilient and multi-layered defense against the Ukrainian counteroffensive. If we take them away, one wonders, at best, whether Russia could have kept its defense in depth. on occupied Ukrainian territory. [Source]
The two countries have also aligned their attempts to interfere in foreign elections, according to a U. S. intelligence assessment declassified this week. He stated that China and Russia, as well as Iran and Cuba, have made greater efforts compared to the U. S. midterm elections. until the last midterm election cycle. This week, Joseph Webster wrote in The Diplomat about the alignment of China and Russia in their attempt to throw the bucket in this year’s election:
[W]hile Beijing and Moscow have an interest in splitting the Western alliance, China’s preference for stability in oil markets may simply contradict Russia’s interest in supporting Trump’s candidacy.
[. . . ] The world’s two toughest autocracies are poised for good luck in their respective interference campaigns. Even if the PDP appears to have the best chance of securing a victory in the presidential race, Beijing’s economic sanctions against Taiwan and information campaigns about the island will likely guarantee at most, at the very least, that legislative power returns to the KMT.
[. . . ] Beijing and Moscow rely on information and, perhaps more importantly, economic equipment to weaken their opponents’ electoral clients and, in some cases, their preferred candidates. These campaigns of authoritarian influence pose thorny dilemmas for liberal democracies. [Source]
Categories: China & the World,Article 2
Tags: foreign trade, elections, influence, automobile industry, economic policy, production industry, foreign relations, Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping