Did you know that China’s population in 1978 was smaller than it was in 1949?Did you know that the percentage of foreign nationals in China today is lower than in North Korea?These are some of the unexpected facts that came up in my verbal conversation. Exchange with Frank Dikötter, taken from his recent e-book China After Mao: The Rise of a Superpower.
Frank Dikötter is Senior Lecturer in Humanities at the University of Hong Kong and Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Before moving to Asia in 2006, he was Professor of Modern Chinese History at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of Hong Kong. He researches and writes about the history of fashion in China and has published a dozen books that have replaced the way we view other ancient periods of China. Mao’s Great Famine: The Story of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 won the 2011 prize. BBC Samuel Johnson Prize for Non-Fiction, Britain’s highest literary non-fiction award.
We begin our discussion with how Frank perceives Deng Xiaoping, the key political figure after Mao who engineered the era of “reform and opening up. “He demands that he raise Deng’s not unusual belief as a friendly, open-minded leader and argues that we misunderstand what happened in the 1980s. Frank points out, for example, that Deng never intended to undermine the People’s Communes in 1979 and that the Tiananmen Square protests and bloodbath in 1989 were a watershed moment that allowed Deng to maintain Maoist structural features that, as Frank explains, were never abandoned.
As Frank says, there is more continuity than replacement in Chinese politics after Mao, and this continues to influence China’s economic situation. From the revision of the Constitution in 1982 to the recent announcement of the dual circulation economic policy, the state has exercised strong control over the means of production. Once this point is clear, it is less difficult to perceive how these long-standing structural features create challenging situations and constraints to resolving existing disruptions, such as debt and unemployment, in China’s new economy and society. Can China cope with its aging population?If the government’s technique of encouraging the birth rate fails, what is the solution to China’s demographic disorders?How can we interpret the restriction of private companies and, a fortiori, foreign companies?And finally, how can China cope with its aging population?Do we perceive China’s economic reforms in a context of globalization and deglobalization?
Christopher Marquis: I enjoyed reading the ebook. My paintings on China have also focused on how some of Mao’s concepts and the political structures he created continue to overlook tactics that I think the West does not appreciate or recognize. My first question is about the title, China after Mao. the e-book is clearly addressed to Dèng Xiǎopíng邓小平. In my experience, in the West, Deng’s symbol is that of a popular guy dressed in a cowboy hat who sells reform and opening-up. And one of the things I liked about his e-book is that you go into more detail about some of Mao’s influences, or that the post-1976 or post-1978 era wouldn’t have been as radical a change as the West. So can you tell us a few words about how you see Deng and his leadership in the post-Mao era?
Frank Dikötter: Yes, I can. I think Mao is by far the smartest of this group. And one of the big decisions he made was to keep Deng, even though he was purged several times. I think the explanation for this is that he knew very well that Deng was a staunch Marxist. The Leninist Deng, in 1956, had opposed the very concept of The Hundred Flowers (1956-1957): to let others speak. It was he who appointed the head of the country through Mao in 1957, when many of those who spoke were sent to hard labor camps. Deng’s unwavering commitment to the principles of Marxism-Leninism is one of the reasons why, to this day, Mao’s portrait of the Forbidden City still stands.
I also think we have a tendency to think that Deng and many other leaders were not literally chasing the long haul in 1976. They were chasing back. They were staunch Marxists and they need to have a socialist economy, but one that actually works. That is, not the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), nor the crisis of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), still preferably something quite Stalinist, as was the case until 1956, when Mao, in his view, began to lose ground with the Hundred Flowers. Therefore, they adhere to the Marxist precept of state ownership of the means of production.
Thanks to Deng, the 4 cardinal precepts were enshrined in the 1982 Constitution. If you read them carefully, you will notice that those 4 precepts boil down to two. One is to “maintain the leadership of the party,” which is the Leninist precept of monopoly of power, the other is to “follow the socialist road,” which refers to the Marxist precept of state ownership of the means of production. Leninism is related to power, I think that’s very much what it tried to do.
That is why I think we do not understand what happened in the 1980s, especially if we are talking about the so-called ‘transition’ to a market economy. Rather, it was an attempt to revive the socialist economy while temporarily giving some freedom to the market, much like Lenin’s New Economic Policy.
One example is the contractual formula that Deng introduced in the 1979 campaigns. Their aim was never to undermine the people’s communes, quite the opposite. In 1980 and 1981, campaigns followed one another to save villagers from dividing the land and remind them that the collective economy was the backbone of agriculture.
The contracts were intended for other people’s communes, not to weaken them. But the chiefs of the communes passed on these contracts to the villages, and the village chiefs passed them on to the individual families: soon, all over the countryside, other people abandoned their cadres. in the communes to act independently. The communes collapsed as early as 1982. There is a tendency to think that Deng freed the villagers from the constraints of the People’s Communes, but this was not what happened at all. The population of the countryside was liberated and thus doubled their income.
I think there’s something else worth mentioning, and that is that Deng hasn’t been as firmly in office as we’d like to imagine. On the one hand, it was he who enlisted the help of a gigantic number of high-ranking officials to undertake an extensive program to rehabilitate those falsely accused and imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution. But it is exactly the leaders he rehabilitates who restrict his power, particularly the so-called Eight Elders who are as interested as Deng in playing a role. In the 1980s, he had to constantly seek the recommendation of the party’s older members and reach compromises, swinging back and forth, while an effort at “openness” was followed by a new crackdown on “spiritual contamination” or “bourgeois liberalism. “
On the other hand, let’s remember that the book begins with Tiananmen Square, not in 1989 but in 1976, when the death of 周恩来 of Zhōu Ēnlái was celebrated in a move perceived by the rulers as “counterrevolutionary”. Four banged on the table and proclaimed that the police sent to suppress the motion would be armed only with batons. Compare that to 1989, when some 200 tanks and 100,000 troops were used to crush the motion for democracy. As one observer of the foreign army put it, it was a demonstration of “total incompetence of the army. “Here, too, Deng hesitated, was dragged back and forth, unable to take advantage of several chances of victory almost without bloodshed.
Christopher Marquis: You describe the 1989-1991 era as a turning point and talk about the conversion of perceptions around the Tiananmen protests. Can you say why this moment is so vital to perceiving what followed?
Frank Dikötter: From 1989 to 1991, it was almost as if China reconnected with its Maoist afterlife and severed its ties with other countries. At one point, Lǐ Péng李鹏 even tried to collectivize the countryside again. Even today, some leaders regret doing so. People’s communes have collapsed and villagers have been given secure economic freedom.
These were dark years for both the regime and the population as a whole. This is a turning point because the regime is becoming much more entrenched. Take Li Peng, for example, who has led the crackdown on the entire bureaucracy of dissent over the phone: “shoot the bird. “”The concept was, and still is today, that the slightest incident must be nipped in the bud, as it can spread at full speed and endanger social stability with the covert help of hostile foreign forces.
An obvious post-1989 example that comes to mind is the case of two grandmothers, aged 77 and 79, who were arrested during the 2008 Olympics for attempting to gain access to a “special zone” created specifically to allow other people to express themselves freely, fulfilling promises. These years were also a turning point, because Jiāng Zémín 江泽民, in the summer of 1989, opposed the struggle to “peaceful evolution”, that is, to the alleged attempt of the “imperialist camp” to undermine socialism without striking a blow, one of the main priorities of the regime. This is still the case today.
Christopher Marquis: You’ve explained that, in the case of Deng, some Maoist structural features have been retained that many Western observers probably wouldn’t have appreciated. Looking at the new disorders in China, it turns out that many of those old disorders may also simply be the cause, or at least hinder it. For example, you write about how debt and unemployment, vital disorders today, have ancient roots. Therefore, addressing them is a greater challenge than many realize because of such structural disorders as the CCP’s monopoly of power, control of the means of production, and others. Can you tell us a few words about how some of those long-standing structural features are a real challenge or limitation to solving the current messes?
Frank Dikötter: Once again, we come back to the four cardinal principles. When a regime brazenly defends a Leninist monopoly of force, there can be no separation of forces, no formula based on checks and balances, no independent judiciary, no free and independent press. In other words, a meaningful political reform within a Leninist formula is a contradiction in terms. One of the consequences of the absence of separation of forces is that the party will have to defend itself, since there is no external establishment capable of disciplining it. The party tends to do this through anti-corruption campaigns. Since corruption thrives where the force is not divided, anti-corruption campaigns never stop.
We have a tendency to talk about “economic reform” simply because that’s the term the party has been using since Mao’s death. But the term means something very different from what it means in the West. Think, a transition from the plan to the market, or from socialism to “capitalism. “As I have said before, “economic reform” means tweaking the socialist economy to make it more effective without relinquishing the state over the means of production.
What the leaders had in mind in 1976, and to a large extent still today, was the Stalinist style of development. After 1929, for example, the Soviets collectivized the country to empty it of grain, meat, and milk, which were sold. in the foreign market in exchange for foreign currency. The foreign currency was used to purchase the trading apparatus needed for high-speed trading. Deng and his cronies tried it in 1978, calling for a “New Leap Forward. “In short, export and use hard currencies to build capacity. Forty years ago, it was heavy industry, today it’s chips and synthetic intelligence.
The important thing is that the state is still in charge. What does the Marxist precept of state control of the means of production mean?This means that the land belongs to the state, the raw material is controlled through the state, power is sold through the state. , and the capital is deposited in state-owned banks. Needless to say, the commitment to public ownership comes with an enormous number of constraints, not to mention long-term structural problems.
It was relatively simple to allow farmers to make basic decisions about what to plant and where they could trade, especially since the land remained owned by the state. It was also relatively easy to allow small personal businesses, which had existed since the Maoist era, to continue their activities, especially since the state continued to control banks, power and raw materials. But it is much more complicated to move away from state control over the means of production with a party and statutes fully committed to “following the socialist road. “
Christopher Marquis: A rapid regression to the new era and foreign trade. It is attractive to hear how the Stalinist style was used before and after the Cultural Revolution, that is, by employing crusading resources to modernize through investments in foreign technology. .
What has happened in the last 20 years? Since joining the WTO, it has invested through foreign corporations, and at the same time, China has also heavily promoted urbanization. Many others have moved from rural to urban spaces. . And since spending time in China, there has been enormous pressure to rebalance the economy from one that is geared around state investment to one that focuses more on individual consumption. Although economic knowledge most commonly recommends that this effort to rebalance the economy has failed.
These concepts are also reflected in the most recent dual-flow strategy, in which the government needs to promote an internal cycle of domestic production, domestic consumption, and then some other circular of foreign investment, circular budgeting, and technology, which can also help drive this flow. Internal cycle. I’m curious to know how you think the latest on consumption, urban environments, and dual flow is or isn’t a replacement for the fundamental style you describe.
Frank Dikötter: This is within the existing framework that I described earlier. So, first of all, when it comes to investing, you have to give credit to Deng. He was the one who invented the concept of progression zones in 1992. The plan was simple enough: lend land to foreigners in exchange for capital, use the capital to build infrastructure, and use the infrastructure to export more. The increase in exports is accompanied by the foreign exchange needed for modernization. Deng called them “capitalist equipment in the hands of the socialists,” meaning that foreign investment had nothing to worry about, as the party continued both on the land and in the banks.
Another generally socialist (Stalinist, it must be said) characteristic is that superior expansion and state-building require low consumption. Put simply, whether under Stalin, Mao, Deng, or Xi, the maximum of GDP goes to the socialist state. In other words, the citizens of the People’s Republic get one of the lowest reserves of domestic production in the history of the fashionable world.
What I said at the beginning: the population in 1978 was smaller than in 1949. It’s not that the economy didn’t grow after 1949, it’s that the maximum benefits of expansion went to the state, not the state. . to the people. Under Mao, what the state reaped was reinvested in the economy, tirelessly seeking maximum expansion. This precept remained virtually unchanged after Mao’s death. Deng and others emphasized maximum expansion to catch up with or surpass certain “capitalist countries” in a short, predetermined era. of time.
The fact is that income is low, and can only be low, since anything else would involve a large redistribution of wealth from the state to other people. I don’t see that going down anytime soon. On the contrary, the scenario has worsened even more. more since COVID. I think the evidence, as circumstantial as it is, indicates that it’s no longer just other people who are working hard and are incredibly invested in their long-term and eager to save rather than consume. They can simply be described as quite well-off, those who drive great cars and invest in apartments. If they’re worried, you deserve it too.
Christopher Marquis: Yes, even though the incomes are quite low, the savings rates are very high. And despite the many government narratives about consumption, what happens is that other people simply don’t accept it as true in the long run in many ways. When you’re not sure, you may not buy a lot of stuff; You’ll be saving for the potentially difficult times ahead.
I don’t know if this is precisely an analogy, but one of the things that also struck me in your ebook in relation to this dynamic is your discussion of birth policies. The one-child policy is well known and, more recently, abundant. Efforts have been made to advertise two children, and now 3, who don’t paint at all.
Nutrition has been effective in preventing other people from having children, but as with consumption, it is very difficult to get other people to have children. Based on your long-standing knowledge, what is your assessment of how China is dealing with existing demographic disruptions and encouraging births?
Frank Dikötter: Well, I’m not a demographer. But you can’t really oppose a long-term trend overnight. Of course, you can oppose COVID policy overnight. That is another matter entirely. But I would say that if you need an example of a successful one-party state, you deserve to take a look at Singapore. However, even Singapore has not been able to meet the challenge of declining birth rates. So, good luck to the People’s Republic of Porcelain.
The solution, of course, is immigration. It is simple to say that the number of foreign citizens in the People’s Republic today is about 600,000. I think there were around 850,000 in 2020, which is less than 0. 05% of the population. That’s less than North Korea, a country that doesn’t appear. that is, liberal for me. This is probably the lowest point on planet Earth. In fact, in 1919, there were around 300,000 foreigners in the Republic of China, which was a much larger overall proportion than today, and this proportion continued to increase until 1949. While immigration possibly offers a solution, it is unlikely that happen in the short term. A regime that does everything possible to keep the global world at bay and is concerned about “peaceful evolution” is not willing to open the doors. Like consumption, this would be a primary political resolution that would go against the vision that leaders have. been pursuing since 1949.
Christopher Marquis: I totally agree, and part of the challenge is to be more open to outsiders, but the other is to get them to want to be there. I’ve spent several years in China in the afterlife and enjoyed it, but my interest in spending time there in the coming years is the same as before.
Frank Dikötter: If you look at the civil war between the KMT and the CCP from 1945 to 1949, you probably won’t find a single example of refugees heading to Communist-occupied territories. Refugees are moving to KMT areas. This would possibly be a very remote example, but I’m not sure many other people would be willing to migrate to the People’s Republic of China if given the opportunity.
Christopher Marquis: One of the spaces that I focus on a lot is companies, whether they’re public, private, or multinational, and how the CCP might or might not replace its attitude toward those other types of entities over time. A descriptive metaphor for “resting in the cool shade of a giant tree,” describing the relationship of personal businesses with public enterprises and the state.
From the early 2000s until Xi’s second term, for many personal businesses, things seemed relatively open, if not more open than in the past. There was a market, at least by some people’s estimates, and the emergence of many cutting-edge personal companies. . But more recently, there have been a number of repressive measures, whether it’s technology, education, the emergence of preferred stocks that increase state control over tech companies, or the rise of party branches in companies. Can you tell us a little bit more about this, especially in terms of the history of the evolution of personal business in China?
Frank Dikötter: This quote is very attractive and illustrates a very undeniable fact: in the 1980s, a personal company could not be without the coverage of a state-owned company. One had to depend on the other, simply because the state discriminated so much. as opposed to the personal sector, no matter how small.
The 1980s began a long time ago, but once again, there are continuities to this day. Whether Deng, Jiang, Hu or Xi, they are all committed Marxists. They are not Marxists in the sense that they spend many afternoons reading conscientiously. They are Marxist in the sense that they are completely committed to state ownership of the means of production. They are deeply suspicious of what they call “capitalists” and the personal sector. They might be willing, like Lenin, to give the public sector some room for manoeuvre. But as soon as policymakers feel that the personal sector has too much influence, they reduce it again.
However, there is a key moment of change, namely in 2000, when Jiang Zemin imposed party committees on each and every personal enterprise, no matter how gigantic or small. As the preference for creating party cells into personal corporations grew, in 2010 they were tough enough to block the renewal of the license of a law firm deemed problematic. In other words, party cells can simply shut down the very corporations in which they were embedded. In my view, this means that the gap between the public and personal sectors, which were vital before the year 2000, has been eroded beyond its significance. In other words, nothing outside the state, nothing that opposes the state.
Christopher Marquis: One thing I say to investors or entrepreneurs, who don’t understand the hardline strategy and the recent crackdown on companies that they’ve developed immense respect for, like Alibaba or Didi, is, I think, consistent with what you’re saying is that in 2020, the Council of State officially conceived of knowledge as a thing of production that unites the most classic things on earth, labor, capital, and technology.
Thus, the basic commitment to control the goods of production means that those industries will necessarily have to be run through the state. State-owned enterprises in the afterlife were the classic goods of production, in the fields of energy, finance, communications, etc. And now, knowledge as a production thing means that, in reality, the state and surveillance have undergone a radical replacement and now it’s about technology. So do businesses.
My last question is about what happens next. You’ve finished this trilogy and I see a superbly made set of 3 books that the publisher is selling. In a way, it would possibly close a studio bankruptcy for you. So I’m curious to know what’s next, what runs in?
Frank Dikötter: China After Mao is a sequel. Now I’m working on the prequel. In other words, how did 12 guys in a 1921 play manage to conquer a quarter of humanity in 1949?Of course, many books have been written on the subject. But as far as I’m concerned, they follow Edgar Snow’s Red Line. It stars China too closely. If you really start looking for evidence, you’ll find that the story unfolds quite differently.
Here’s an example: the Sino-Soviet War of 1929. Imagine Ukraine, with thousands of troops on the ground, planes, gunboats, and entire cities razed to the ground. Apparently, no one in China has heard of it. It is not covered in most textbooks. When Michael Walker, a historian of the Soviet Union, published an e-book on the subject in 2017 called The Sino-Soviet War of 1929, he added a subtitle: The War No One Knew About. Do we miss? A lot and it’s fascinating.
Christopher Marquis: Yes, it sounds desirable and feels like a much-needed corrective to earlier narratives. I can’t wait to read this in the future.