It is commonplace to recommend that the war in Ukraine is just a Western fixation. According to this argument, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine galvanized the West and encouraged concerted action in defense of a democratic country, but failed to resonate in many other parts of Ukraine. of the world. The countries of the South sometimes feel indifferent to the fate of Ukraine or simply annoyed by the inconvenience that the war has caused to their economies. Observers of the Global South would likely astutely point to the overlooked conflicts raging in their parts of the country, yet their critics in the West see the final, functional neutrality of democracies like Brazil, India, and South Africa as tantamount to tolerating Russian actions or rejecting liberal norms and values.
And yet, those fence keepers simply sit passively on the sidelines; Many of them actively seek to end the war. A number of peace plans have poured in from the Global South in recent months, with separate projects carried out across Brazil, Indonesia and an organisation of African countries, among others. Western observers have an end to either reject those proposals outright or not pay much attention to them, and Russian and Ukrainian officials have rejected many facets of the plans for conceding too much to the other side.
To be sure, battlefield situations will have to be decisively replaced before Moscow or Kiev are willing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the conflict. Russia and Ukraine have not reached an impasse that would force them to the table. The discussions I have had visits to Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of the war last year show very obviously that neither side is lately seeking a ceasefire or a diplomatic end to the war. Russia is prone to a protracted war, believing that in the long run it has the upper hand. Although it is not opposed to a ceasefire, the Kremlin will not abandon the captured territories. The Kiev government, which depends on immense popular aid for its troops, believes that momentum is in its favor, but that without further primary victories on the battlefield, Ukraine will negotiate only from a position of weakness.
But in the absence of a final resolution, international relations can still constrain and mitigate the ravages of war and its repercussions on the global economy. Countries in the Global South that have not taken a transparent look at war are better placed than Western countries or China to serve as impartial arbiters in the pursuit of a diplomatic procedure that can curb the excesses of war and lay the groundwork for a ceasefire or peace agreement.
India, as a vital force that has been assiduously courted through Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of the war, has a role to play here. New Delhi’s refusal to blatantly condemn the Russian invasion has allowed it to regain its longstanding ties with Moscow. it also warmed up last year in Ukraine. When Indian Prime Minister Narfinishra Modi met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of the G7 summit in Japan last May, he was confident India would do “everything I can” to help. End the war.
By mediating between Russia and Ukraine, India can facilitate much-needed talks between the warring parties, moderate the humanitarian impact of the confrontation, and help mitigate the economic damage the war has caused in the South. India deserves not to overestimate what it is doing, but neither does it deserve to be afraid to serve as a referee and assert its concepts in a clash so far from home.
The meeting between Modi and Zelensky marked a remarkable shift in India’s strategy towards Ukraine. In recent months, New Delhi has taken steps that imply it has nonetheless begun to deal seriously with Ukraine, and has facilitated talks between Zelensky’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak. and Modi’s national security adviser Ajit Doval on bilateral relations and Ukraine. Ten-point peace plan. Previously, India’s continued strong ties with Russia, adding greater energy purchases, after the invasion attracted global attention and provoked Western impatience. Today, India is adopting another technique. While subtle, this shift is the product of several factors, adding Modi’s preference to present himself as a global statesman in the run-up to the 2024 general election, developing Indian fear about Chinese ambitions, the simultaneous desire to confront Western sensitivities, and the imperative to balance rivals that is at the core of India’s strategic tradition.
It is not unexpected that a non-Western force would be so interested in the Ukrainian conflict. So far, the most significant agreements reached between Russia and Ukraine during the war have been negotiated through Turkey: the now-deserted deals on shipping much-needed grain and agricultural products across the Black Sea. Initiatives funded through close allies and supporters of Ukraine in the West or through China, Russia’s benefactor, will inevitably arouse suspicion. India has the unique opportunity to worry precisely because it has not condemned Russia and continues to have ties to Moscow. Just over a week after meeting Zelensky, Modi called on Putin to urge “dialogue and diplomacy” to end the war. At the latest G-20 summit in Indonesia, India helped members of the group, including adversaries Russia and the United States, agree on the language of the official issued after the meeting. As Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s Foreign Minister, has noted: “India could not have played a valuable mediating role and helped to alleviate the situation if it had done what the West wanted it to do at the start of the war.
In September, India will host the next G20 summit. He can further highlight his leadership ability by suggesting and guiding modest diplomatic exchanges between Russia, Ukraine and their partners. It is that great proposals will be taken to end the war, such as those proposed by several countries, including Brazil, China and Indonesia. seriously at this stage. But India may bring adversaries to the table in search of more interim deals and deals.
New Delhi, despite everything, began to seriously deal with Ukraine.
New Delhi can simply inspire and facilitate discussion between the parties on a variety of low-level issues. During my recent conversations and discussions with officials and members of the strategic network in New Delhi and Kiev, several useful concepts emerged with prospects for practical application. On the one hand, India can host high-level assemblies between opponents. New Delhi hosted the first assembly since the outbreak of war between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Ahead of this year’s G20 summit, New Delhi can actively inspire more such assemblies in India between actors. While New Delhi is unlikely to invite Ukraine to participate in the G-20 (Ukraine is not a member), the summit may simply become an opportunity for “chance encounters,” “meetings,” side assemblies, or even more formal discussions between the leaders of Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. New Delhi may be offering the sweetness of an unbiased but interested matchmaker.
The Indian government can also assist the semi-official Track 1. 5 talks and the unofficial Track 2 talks between key interlocutors from Russia, Ukraine, the US and Europe to discuss the existing prestige and developments in the war, its implications and the possible tactics in which it will end up. Such a conversation would help build a degree of mutual acceptance as truth and understanding, a prerequisite for any long-term peace agreement. India may host or inspire such talks on an official or unofficial basis. The utter lack of meaningful talks along these lines is deeply puzzling (a meeting earlier this year between Lavrov and various academics and former US officials was a rare exception). What is even more puzzling is the reluctance of the world’s peacemaker, the EU, to apply its experience in peacebuilding and conflict resolution to its own conflict with Russia. India, on the other hand, has a culture of engaging with its adversaries even in the midst of war, as it did during the Kargil clash with Pakistan in 1999. Its ability to interact with Pakistan and China, with whom India has fought wars and has a contentious relationship, it also highlights a preference to avoid an inflexible Cold War-like ideological enmity. with those opponents.
In consultation with its partners, New Delhi can also identify vital issues that Ukrainian and Russian officials can also address with the aim of building trust and helping war-affected civilians. Both sides would likely be interested in discussing issues such as humane reparation for prisoners, identifying and implementing (with the International Atomic Energy Association or IAEA) restrictions on military attacks around nuclear power plants, discouraging the use of cluster bombs, evacuating civilians from spaces of intense fighting, and organizing temporary local ceasefires to protect civilians. .
India can prove that nuclear weapons are not used in war.
Indian officials have been constantly under pressure over the impact of the war on national economies and food security, and on the South in general. Russia’s war against Ukraine sent food and energy prices skyrocketing, sparked inflation, weakened national currencies and diverted foreign attention from economic turmoil in many southern countries still reeling from the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s recent unfortunate decision not to renew the Turkish-brokered grain deal, which once again raised food security considerations around the world, is an opportunity for New Delhi to emphasize the importance of food security. New Delhi may be able to persuade Moscow to renew the deal, taking advantage of its strong economic relationship with Russia, which has only grown since the start of the war, and the goodwill it enjoys at MoscowArray. In early June, the US ambassador to Ukraine, Bridget Brink, encouraged India to do just that. “Indian leaders,” she said, “have a unique voice to advocate for emerging countries and encourage the continuation and expansion of the Black Sea Grains Initiative to make sure other people everywhere can access the food they need. ” desperately”.
India, as a nuclear Power, can also ensure that nuclear weapons are not used in any form in this conflict. New Delhi has advocated the non-use of nuclear weapons, adding smaller tactical nuclear weapons and a strong supporter of the nuclear taboo. India deserves to call on all parties involved to ensure that no aspect introduces tactical nuclear weapons into the war, even if such a proposal may not impress Russia.
To get things moving, New Delhi deserves to appoint a special envoy to summon the various parties to confrontation and adopt efforts such as those described above. You can also sign up for projects submitted through various states and foreign organizations, such as Brazil, Turkey, and the IAEA, to expand a peace plan or at least the facets of a plan to end the war in Ukraine. But it deserves to act temporarily to take advantage of the emerging warmth between Modi and Zelensky and the attention India will get as host of the upcoming G20 summit. Once the war ends or the parties agree to a ceasefire, India could also take on a bigger role in peacekeeping efforts between the two countries, given its extensive participation in peacekeeping operations around the world. a prospect Kiev officials are likely to welcome. judging by my conversations there. In this way, India can play a supporting role in maintaining European security in the long term.
It is indisputably in India’s interest to try to impose that role on itself. At the broadest level, such moves would allow the Modi government to remind the world that India is a vital power. India seeks to identify itself as a pole in a multipolar foreign system, and interfering in the war in Ukraine would underscore its ability to contribute to the maintenance of global order. This is even more vital for India at a time when its neighbor and rival, China, has also sought to present itself as a foreign peacemaker. By running to secure a complicated détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China has proven to be a major geopolitical force, all that India has yet to prove.
China has its own complex peace plan to end the war in Ukraine, although officials in Kiev and the West do not take it seriously. But China’s attempt at mediation has allowed it to tame goodwill in Russia, Ukraine and Europe, with Ukrainians and their Western allies hoping China will be willing to help in the eventual reconstruction of the devastated country. This will only affect China’s geopolitical position. The longer the war drags on, the more Russia’s dependence on China will increase and the more it will limit Russia’s ability and willingness to help. This deserves to provide a strong incentive for Indian officials to threaten antagonizing Russia by pressuring it to de-escalate hostilities. New Delhi does not need war to leave Russia battered and weak, but needs to maintain a strong Russia that can multipolarity in Asia and roll back Chinese hegemony.
The war in Ukraine will eventually end. In the meantime, countries will have to try to moderate the intensity of the violence, set the level for more strategic talks, and build confidence for a long-term ceasefire and an imaginable peace agreement. New Delhi’s efforts could, at best, mitigate the maximum devastating effects of the war; At worst, they would make little difference. But Indian officials would be making a mistake if they did nothing when they and the world have much to gain.