A year after Russia introduced a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, debate continues over whether or not this is President Vladimir Putin’s war. Peace Russians, many of whom have sought safe haven outside the country, blame the Russian president. For them, their delusions and paranoia provoked a turn toward neo-totalitarianism at home and army aggression abroad.
Russia’s opposition in exile and in crime insists that if Putin were to fall from power, the scenario would be reversed. Leonid Volkov, the number two of jailed opposition leader Alexey Navalny, even advised that after the war ends, the West rises. with “a Marshall Plan” not only for Ukraine, which urgently needs reconstruction, but also for Russia.
In words, Russian opponents expect Moscow to rebuild bridges with Europe and the United States once Putin is no longer on the throne.
Naturally, the perception of “Putin’s war” is almost invaluable in Ukraine itself. In general, Ukrainians blame Russia as a country and as a society, whether they are the cheerleaders of Moscow’s “special army operation” or the silent majority who simply choose to forget it and move on from their lives.
Why deserve Russia to behave one day, they ask, given that Putin speaks for a country with an imperial spirit?
Moreover, the 70-year-old leader’s successor is unlikely to come from the pro-Western opposition or be another member of the current Kremlin occupier. So, for Ukrainians, Russia will have to be defeated, no matter who directs the exhibition in Moscow.
Has the war taken its long-cultivated relations with Russia beyond a point of no return?
This is largely the case for Poland and the Baltic States. For the past year, they’ve had their “I told you so” moment. Even before the Russian invasion last year and the profession of Crimea in 2014, they argued that Russian revanchism posed a risk to the post-Cold War order in Europe.
In the West, however, France and Germany have been much more ambiguous in their relationship with Russia. Since first taking office in 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron has advocated for Europe to think long-term and have contact with Russians. Macron remained faithful to this line until the invasion and continued to call Putin in the hope of finding some diplomatic solution. And as recently as last December, the French president spoke of “security guarantees” for Russia that would be part of a deal.
Germany has provoked even more frustration and anger among Ukraine’s Eastern European friends. Long years of rapprochement with the Russians and advertising and political companies, such as the Nord Stream pipeline, have tarnished its record. Germany’s political elegance has long regarded Russia as a friend. and some, like former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, have won lucrative contracts with Moscow’s state-owned electricity companies.
Over the past year, there have been some changes in action and rhetoric. After the invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared the so-called Zeitenwende (historical turning point), the idea that Berlin, despite everything, would take European defense seriously. and put their weight on it financially and politically. His position has found help among the German public, most of whom are also pro-Ukraine.
However, the German tendency to embrace Russia tightly, in the hope that closer ties will bring more security and predictability, has not been relegated to the past. While Scholz is slow to offer military aid to Ukraine, adding Leopard tanks, he points out that German leaders have not abandoned Moscow at all. In Germany’s logic, Russia will be there, whether we like it or not, and we can’t just close it, build a fence around it, or forget about it.
Of course, a more charitable interpretation of tank warfare is that Scholz’s bet was aimed at involving the U. S. The U. S. presidential election is on European security, with the 2024 U. S. presidential election on the horizon. at the forefront of the coalition “Stop Russia” in the future.
So does the lack of complete alignment with Russia mean that the EU is leaving the door open to a normalization of long-term relations?Not exactly.
The war can and will probably last for years. As long as fighting rages, it is difficult to foresee any form of productive diplomatic engagement, let alone revive political and economic ties. Certainly, as long as Putin is not in power, relations will be confrontational.
On the occasion of de-escalation, a new line will be drawn along Eastern Europe, leaving Ukraine and in all likelihood Moldova and Georgia on the “western side”, Belarus on the Russian side and Armenia and Azerbaijan in no man’s land. A Cold War-like situation will materialize, with pro-Western countries drawn into the EU-NATO orbit and Russia entrenching themselves in each and every component of Ukraine it could retain.
It also means that Cold War-style international relations will unfold. The EU, and its ally, the US, will only interact with Russia to maintain stability and avoid a head-on collision. The essence of Western policy will be containment, not integration as in the 90s and 2000s.
The war has weighed heavily on economic ties between Russia and the EU, and Putin’s potential policy choices have accelerated forces that any long-term leader would likely struggle to topple. Moscow is one of the union’s main energy suppliers; It no longer exists and is unlikely to relocate its position. Russia’s share of European fuel imports has fallen from 50% in 2021 to a meager 12. 9% today.
European sanctions have forced Russia on China and, to some extent, on the countries of the South. This will be one of the lasting legacies of war.
Anti-Putin Russians hope their country can finally find its way back to the West. European leaders are right to think long and hard about what will happen after the fighting ends, faster or later. However, as history shows, wars are transformative. Events. For better or worse, the clock may not turn back until February 23, 2022.
The perspectives expressed in this article are those of and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial position.