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On October 31, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka approved a draft agreement with Russia on the creation and operation of combat centers for the joint education of the Belarusian and Russian army (Belta, October 31). As such, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense is now tasked with leading negotiations with Russian army officials to finalize and sign the agreement. This is the latest progression in a series of recent bilateral moves between Belarus and Russia in the military sphere. The most resounding of these was the resolution to deploy the Regional Grouping of State Forces of the Union of Belarus and Russia (RGF) announced on October 10 (Kommersant, October 10). This immediately grabbed Western headlines, as many observers noted it as an imaginable sign that Minsk and Moscow might be planning an imminent offensive against northern Ukraine. In addition, the announcement was followed by conflicting data about the launch of an anti-terrorist operation and rumors about a possible mobilization in Belarus, which increased public and foreign fear (Mil. through, October 13; Belta, October 14).
Commenting on the deployment of the RGF, Lukashenka said that the resolution was taken in reaction to the deteriorating security scenario along Belarus’ western border (Belta, October 10). In particular, he highlighted 3 main factors. First of all, Minsk fears that the endless narrative in the Western media about Belarus’ plans to go to war and send its own troops to Ukraine, in fact, indicates the preference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to see hostilities spread to Belarusian territory. The Belarusian government draws the same conclusion from the fact that the opposition in exile has declared its willingness to use the militarized resistance bureaucracy opposed to Minsk (see EDM, August 17). In Lukashenka’s words, this course receives in the West and “radical fighters are being trained in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, which now represents a “direct threat” to the national security of Belarus (Belta, October 10).
Secondly, whereas a few months ago, when Minsk reacted definitively to the withdrawal of its troops from the Belarusian border by the Polish army, now Lukashenka claims that the troops have only moved a hundred kilometers (and can return in a few hours) and are reinforced through new weapons systems. Finally, the Belarusian leader said he had obtained information through personal channels that Ukraine was planning missile attacks on internal Belarusian targets. According to other Belarusian officials, warnings about possible attacks came from Ukrainian business circles, with which Minsk maintains confidential channels of communication (interviews with the author, October 25).
Belarusian officials stress that this deployment was triggered in accordance with the doctrine of the Union State Army. In fact, this last document, in its existing edition of November 2021, stipulates that the FGR must be deployed “in the era in which the army runs the risk of charging. “(the era of a direct risk of aggression) by resolution of the Supreme Council of State of the State of the Union” (Postkomsg. com, November 4, 2021). In other words, it calls for a unanimous resolution through the presidents of Belarus and Russia and their mutual popularity that the army risks the security of the Union state has intensified to such an extent that it is very likely that an army will attack its territory.
Once this resolution is taken, the RGF joint command will be set up to manage the joint forces and adjust the group’s existing military plans according to advances on the ground. The bureaucracy of the Belarusian army is the core of the RGF, which also includes Russian forces from the Western Military District and the Baltic Fleet (Minsk Dialogue, November 3). In addition, the 2021 army doctrine specifies that the RGF can function alone or in conjunction with the country’s national armed forces.
On October 17, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense organized a briefing for 19 foreign army attachés, who joined NATO member states, on the deployment of the RGF (Mil. by, October 17). The head of the Department of International Military Cooperation, Colonel Valery Revenka, provided additional main points on some parameters of the joint grouping. According to Revenka, up to 9,000 Russian soldiers, about 170 tanks, two hundred armored fighting cars, and a hundred guns and mortars with a caliber greater than one hundred millimeters were expected. Above all, under the pressure that those troops would be stationed in 4 posts in eastern and central Belarus, that is, far from the borders of Ukraine and NATO. This indicates the defensive nature of the deployment. With this in mind, Revenka insisted that Belarus regards the RGF as a mere tool of strategic deterrence.
Despite signals and statements from Minsk, on October 20 the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces declared that the risk of an invasion in the north was expanding (YouTube, October 20). The representative of the General Staff clarified that such a hypothetical invasion can target only the western regions of Ukraine, with the aim of breaking Poland’s weapons material. However, only 4 days later, Ukraine’s defense intelligence chief, Major General Kyrylo Budanov, questioned those assessments, adding that he had observed no signs of readiness for an offensive in Belarus and is therefore considered unlikely in the coming years (Hromadske, October 24). He added that it would take Russia about two weeks to deploy enough troops needed in Belarus for an offensive, and that would not go unnoticed.
In addition to the considerations highlighted by Budanov, another thing comes out of the concept that Minsk has no plans to attack Ukraine from Belarusian territory, namely the serious lack of adequate military, medical and engineering infrastructure on the Belarusian side (Minsk Dialogue, November 3). Unlike the case on the Russian-Ukrainian border on the eve of Moscow’s invasion, Belarus is doing nothing to actively prepare such infrastructure. On the contrary, as the Ukrainian Defense Ministry reported this summer, Belarus has planted explosive mines in forests, roads and bridges near the border with Ukraine, which may clearly indicate the goal of launching an offensive (Kmu. gov. ua, June 2).
Thus, the deployment of the RGF and the fact that Minsk initiated it to reflect the Belarusian leaders’ belief in threats and vulnerabilities. Moreover, these advances obviously amount to Minsk redoubling its efforts on the narrative of the “hypothetical NATO attack” that it throws in anticipation. Belarus’ direct involvement in the war in Russia is not easy (see EDM, September 27).
By the Jamestown Foundation
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