Proponents of American “global leadership” infrequently admit that Washington has gone further, pursued foolish policies, failed to achieve its stated foreign policy objectives, and violated its stated political principles. However, they see such moves as regrettable aberrations and that the U. S. He will be informed of those (rare) mistakes and act more wisely in the future. Ten years ago, for example, political scientists Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth declared that the Iraq war was a mistake, but insisted that the policy they liked of “deep engagement” remained the right choice for American grand strategy. In his view, all the United States had to do to maintain a benign global order was to maintain its existing commitments and not invade Iraq again. To say, we just want to avoid doing “silly things. “
George Packer’s recent defense of U. S. force in the Atlantic is the latest edition of this trite argument. Packer opens his essay with a false and revealing comparison, arguing that Americans “exaggerate our crusades abroad, and then we exaggerate our entrenchments, never avoiding in the middle, where a county exit would seek the right balance. “But a county exit that still has more than 700 military installations in the world; aircraft carrier battle groups in most of the world’s oceans; formal partnerships with dozens of countries; and that lately he is waging a proxy war against Russia, an economic war against China, counterterrorism operations in Africa, as well as a never-ending effort to weaken and one day overthrow governments in Iran, Cuba, North Korea, etc. , can hardly be accused of exaggerated “entrenchment. “Packer’s concept of this “subtle balance” (a foreign policy that is neither too hot nor too cold, but perfect) would still require the United States to take on ambitious goals in almaximum each and every corner of the world.
Unfortunately, Packer and other advocates of American primacy underestimate how complicated it is for a hardline liberal country like the United States to curtail its foreign policy ambitions. I love America’s liberal values as much as anyone else, but the mix of liberal values and immense strength makes it almost inevitable that America will do too much than too little. If Packer favors the right balance, he will have to get more involved in directing the interventionist impulse and less in those he takes a look at involving him.
Proponents of American “global leadership” infrequently admit that Washington has gone further, pursued foolish policies, failed to achieve its stated foreign policy objectives, and violated its stated political principles. However, they see such moves as regrettable aberrations and that the U. S. He will be informed of those (rare) mistakes and act more wisely in the future. Ten years ago, for example, political scientists Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry and William Wohlforth declared that the Iraq war was a mistake, but insisted that the policy they liked of “deep engagement” remained the right choice for American grand strategy. In his view, all the United States had to do to maintain a benign global order was to maintain its existing commitments and not invade Iraq again. To say, we just want to avoid doing “silly things. “
George Packer’s recent defense of U. S. force in the Atlantic is the latest edition of this trite argument. Packer opens his essay with a false and revealing comparison, arguing that Americans “exaggerate our crusades abroad, and then we exaggerate our entrenchments, never avoiding in the middle, where a county exit would seek the right balance. “But a county exit that still has more than 700 military installations in the world; aircraft carrier battle groups in most of the world’s oceans; formal partnerships with dozens of countries; and that lately he is waging a proxy war against Russia, an economic war against China, counterterrorism operations in Africa, as well as a never-ending effort to weaken and one day overthrow governments in Iran, Cuba, North Korea, etc. , can hardly be accused of exaggerated “entrenchment. “Packer’s concept of this “subtle balance” (a foreign policy that is neither too hot nor too cold, but perfect) would still require the United States to take on ambitious goals in almaximum each and every corner of the world.
Unfortunately, Packer and other advocates of American primacy underestimate how complicated it is for a hardline liberal country like the United States to curtail its foreign policy ambitions. I love America’s liberal values as much as anyone else, but the mix of liberal values and immense strength makes it almost inevitable that America will do too much than too little. If Packer favors the right balance, he will have to get more involved in directing the interventionist impulse and less in those he takes a look at involving him.
Why is it so difficult for the United States to act with restraint?The first challenge is liberalism itself. Liberalism begins with the assertion that all human beings possess secure natural rights (e. g. , “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness”). For liberals, the main political challenge is to create political establishments strong enough for each other, but not strong enough or out of control to deprive us of one’s rights. Even imperfectly, liberal states achieve this balancing act by dividing political power. ; holding leaders accountable through elections; enshrine the rule of law; freedom of thought, expression and association; and emphasize tolerance standards. For true liberals, therefore, the only valid governments are those that possess those characteristics and use them to safeguard the natural rights of one and both citizens.
But beware: because these principles start from the confirmation that all human beings possess the same rights, liberalism cannot restrict itself to a single state or even a subset of humanity and remain consistent with its own premises. that Americans, Danes, Australians, Spaniards or South Koreans have those rights, but other people living in Belarus, Russia, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia, the West Bank and many other places do not. For this reason, liberal states are very prone to what John Mearsheimer calls “the crossover impulse”: the preference to spread liberal principles as far as their strength allows. The same problem, by the way, afflicts other universalist ideologies, whether in the form of Marxism-Leninism or the various devout movements that have the duty to place all humans under the yoke of one faith. special. When a country and its leaders sincerely verify that their ideals offer the only correct formula for organizing and governing society, they will try to convince or coerce others to adopt them. At the very least, this will generate some friction with those who have another point of view.
Second, the United States finds that it is difficult to exercise restraint because it possesses remarkable power. As former U. S. Senator Richard B. said in the 1960s. Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and without a dove, “[I]f it’s simple for us to go anywhere and do anything, we’re moving to move somewhere and do anything. They do not have the same latitude and therefore do not face the same temptations. New Zealand is a healthy liberal democracy with many admirable qualities, but no one expects New Zealanders to take the lead in handling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran’s nuclear program, or the Chinese. incursions into the South China Sea.
On the other hand, whoever sits in the Oval Office controls a multitude of functions whenever a challenge arises or an opportunity arises. A president can impose sanctions, order a blockade, threaten to use force (or use it directly), and a number of other actions, and almost without endangering the United States (at least in the short term). Under those circumstances, resisting the temptation to act will be incredibly difficult, especially when a refrain of critics is in a position to denounce any act of restraint. as reluctance, appeasement or a fatal blow to the credibility of the United States.
Third, because the United States has occupied the pinnacles of global strength for more than 70 years, there are now strong bureaucratic and corporate forces with a vested interest in maintaining their large global role. As former U. S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower said in his farewell Confront in 1961, the emergence of a harsh “military-industrial complex. “The US in a more militarized and interventionist direction. in the world of foreign policy think tanks, the vast majority of which are committed to selling American commitment and advocating for a U. S. -mediated global order. The result, as Zack Beauchamp observed a few years ago, is that “the debate about politics tends to be primarily between the center and the right. The question is regularly how much strength America deserves to use rather than whether it deserves to use it at all.
Fourth, as I have already pointed out, liberal America is open to foreign influences in a way that many other countries are not. They may rely on national teams to work on their behalf. They can make generous donations to think tanks that will announce their cause, and foreign leaders can publish editorials and articles in influential American publications to influence the opinion of elites and the masses. Such efforts won’t succeed, of course, but the net effect will tend to inspire the U. S. The U. S. government is to do more rather than less.
Moreover, the number of foreign voices whispering in the American ear increases every time the United States adds a new ally, a “partner,” or a “special relationship. “We used to have 11 NATO allies seeking to shape American policy toward Europe; Now we have 29. Some of these states contribute significant resources to collective defense, but some of the others are weak and vulnerable and are better seen as shields than equivalent partners. Not surprisingly, those states are among the loudest voices insisting that the United States live up to its commitments and protect them, warning that America’s credibility as a global force is at risk, and that any hope for a more benign global order is based on their advice. According to our many clients, the deeper America engages, the more it will have to remain engaged.
Make no mistake: I am not advocating ignoring allies’ considerations or ignoring their recommendation. Allied leaders occasionally have smart things to say about new global problems, and it’s simple to think of examples (Iraq, anyone?) where the U. S. is not a new one. The U. S. would have been better off if he had listened to French or German warnings rather than relying only on his own lawyer. But there may be a bad symbiosis between the interventionist impulse of much of foreign policy and the self-serving recommendation. that countries waiting for U. S. coverage and assistanceThe U. S. is willing to participate in foreign policy debates. It’s no wonder that U. S. foreign partners are not yet in the U. S. The U. S. sometimes needs Uncle Sam to do more for them and rarely raises the U. S. to do more. UU. se reduce a little.
Combine those other elements and you’ll understand why it’s so hard for America to avoid doing so. Ideology, force, bureaucratic impulse, and the preference of other states to use American force for their own ends mix to create a strong predisposition. to do anything and a concomitant inability to set transparent priorities and stick to them when temptation arises. To strike the right balance that Packer and others seem to want, more desires to be made to counteract this predisposition rather than seek to protect it.
Stephen M. Walt is a columnist for Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Relations at Harvard University. Twitter: @stephenwalt
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